30 years ago, Iraq witnessed the launch of the first international inspections to search for alleged weapons of mass destruction, as Washington spent hundreds of millions of dollars to prove the existence of chemical and biological weapons or nuclear programs there.
Weeks after the UN Security Council resolution to remove weapons of mass destruction from Iraq, the inspection committees began their work in Baghdad on the morning of September 21, 1991, and lasted about 13 years.
After years of research and investigation, Hans Blix - chief weapons inspector - accused America and Britain of exaggerating intelligence information about Iraq to justify the use of force against it.
Al-Abo: Iraq resorted to France in the mid-1970s to build two reactors for peaceful purposes (Al-Jazeera Net)
destruction programs
Iraq began thinking about the nuclear program in 1959, that is, after the fall of the monarchy, as it contracted with the Soviet Union to build a small nuclear reactor for scientific and research purposes. Corner Abdul-Jabbar Hamid Al-Abo.
He adds to Al Jazeera Net that Iraq resorted to France in the mid-1970s to build two reactors for peaceful purposes, before Iraq's reactors were subjected to an Israeli strike in 1981 that led to the suspension of Iraqi programs.
Al-Abou points out that Iraq began to think about using chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, due to the lack of parity with the human density in Iran, whose attacks were in the form of large human waves that conventional weapons could not repel, which prompted Iraq to seek help from Germany to obtain chemical weapons with the aim of The extermination of the Iranian units trying to enter Iraq.
He explains that Iraq began its secret program on chemical weapons in the mid-1980s, when German scientists and experts came to Iraq with raw materials from Germany and Iraq began to manufacture chemical weapons.
The retired officer asserts that Iraq got rid of weapons of mass destruction after 1991, when committees began entering Iraq and destroyed all facilities, even conventional ones, and the Iraqi nuclear reactor was inspected and confirmed as unfit for use.
Al-Abou points out that Iraq had nuclear studies and research, but it was not able to reach an atomic or nuclear weapon, because it did not have advanced reactors that could produce sufficient quantities.
Al-Janabi denied that the inspectors had found any documents indicating the presence of nuclear weapons in Iraq (Al-Jazeera Net)
Inspection start
The inspections began with Iraq’s approval of the Security Council resolution, opening the way for them and facilitating all difficulties, and they were given the right to inspect any place they wanted, and even the office of the President of the Republic at the time, Saddam Hussein was not an obstacle to them, but protection and escort were provided wherever they traveled, and the decision was The approval is a political decision by the government to stop the war, says the former head of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Fadel Al-Janabi.
Speaking to Al-Jazeera Net, Al-Janabi denied finding any documents indicating the presence of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the inspectors' visit, after they entered many areas - according to the scheme they prepared themselves without Iraqi intervention - a general report on atomic energy belonging to the scientific atomic facility was found. Preserved in a vault under the trade union building in Baghdad.
He explains that the reason for keeping this report and even some equipment in the basement, is to protect it from the bombing that affected Iraq in 1991, in addition to many public documents and scientific papers, as the state at that time was documenting everything in detail.
Al-Janabi notes that the inspection committees disabled and destroyed all the equipment that was found in the bunker for fear of being used in the development of nuclear weapons, while this large equipment had many different and important uses and was not limited to nuclear energy.
Al-Shaher confirmed that Iraq has provided full cooperation with the international inspection committees (Iraqi press)
In the same context, retired Major General Abdul-Khaleq al-Shaher recounts his experience with the inspection committees when a team of inspectors visited - at night - Al-Bakr University for Higher Military Studies, and inspected everything, even the students’ research and theses, in the hope that they would find something in them.
Speaking to Al Jazeera Net, Al-Shaher confirms Iraq's full cooperation with the inspection committees, as a decision was circulated by the then President of the Republic to punish any official who hides information on biological and nuclear weapons from the inspection teams.
Al-Aqidi: Iraq did not possess advanced chemical weapons (Al-Jazeera Net)
stations
Perhaps one of the most prominent stations of Iraq’s dealings with the inspection committees was embodied in the suspension of cooperation with these committees on November 31, 1998, due to their lack of seriousness and falsification of facts through the reports they submitted to the Security Council, according to the academic and researcher in contemporary history, Dr. Bashar Fathi Al-Akidi.
Al-Akidi confirmed to Al-Jazeera Net that Iraq did not possess advanced chemical weapons at the time, but rather were classic weapons with a simple effect, which Iraq considered procrastination by these committees and their lack of seriousness in lifting the siege on it, which prompted the United States and Britain to launch air attacks. on Iraq in 1998 and led to civilian casualties.
Al-Akeedi points out that as a result of the failure of these attacks to achieve their goals of forcing Iraq to return the inspection committees;
The United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999 to form the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), which was entrusted with the responsibility of the previous inspection committees, and according to this resolution, the United Nations is obligated to lift the siege on Iraq after 120 days From Baghdad's cooperation with this committee.
He believes that Iraq was more receptive to the UNMOVIC inspection committee headed by Hans Blix, unlike the first inspection committee, which was formed after the Iraqi forces left Kuwait and was headed by Ralph Akios, who lacked impartiality in this file.
And he continues, the flight of the official in charge of Iraqi industrialization, Hussein Kamel, to Jordan in August 1995, and his meeting with the head of the International Inspection Committee, Ralph Akios in Amman, and making statements in which he indicated that Iraq had managed to produce different and effective types of chemical and biological weapons, gave the inspection committees an excuse to stress Iraq. This statement made by Kamel constituted an important point in the dispute between Iraq and the International Inspection Committee, especially since this committee was formed under political pressure from the United States and not within a legal framework, according to Al-Akedi.
Al-Wondawi considered that the presence of international inspectors in Iraq was for a political purpose (Al-Jazeera Net)
Inspection results
Regarding the results of the inspections, researcher and security and strategic affairs expert Dr. Muayyad Al-Wandawi says that this file was exploited politically with the aim of prolonging the siege crisis on Iraq and bargaining for more, as it was badly used despite the conviction of the international inspectors after a few years that Iraq does not have No capabilities for making atomic bombs.
He shows to Al Jazeera Net that any technical committees can discover the reality of the situation, and therefore the presence of the inspectors was for a political purpose and nothing more, so you find them looking for weapons of mass destruction in bedrooms or in small buildings known to be unrelated to the industry of mass destruction.
Al-Wondawi describes what happened as a humiliating play at the United Nations when the US Secretary of State sat down to accuse Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction on mobile vehicles. This kind of cheap lie was quickly exposed, but after many countries were deliberately and insistently involved.
Al-Wondawi reveals that the committees deliberately - with a clear intent and for political reasons - kept the files of destroying Iraq's comprehensive weapons and claiming that Iraq was not cooperating in order to justify the invasion.