Its global standing and influence are still unrivaled

America is required to learn the true lessons of 9/11

  • The events of September changed America and the world.

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  • Bush declared a war that lasted 20 years.

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America set out to reshape the world order after the 9/11 attacks, and it is easy to conclude today that its foreign policy has been abandoned on the tarmac of Kabul Airport. President Joe Biden says the exit from Afghanistan was about "ending an era" of long-running wars, but it left America's allies dazed while its enemies jubilant. Most Americans are tired of all this, and about two-thirds say the war wasn't worth it. However, the nationalist mood of tiredness and apathy is bad evidence for America's future role in the world.

Its capabilities remain enormous and its strategy for the 21st century can be retooled, provided the right lessons are drawn from the post-9/11 era. The deaths of 3,000 people on US soil sparked a reaction that highlighted America's "unipolar moment." For a while, she seemed to wield unquestioned authority. President George W. Bush declared that the world is either with or against America. NATO said the attack on the Twin Towers, in New York, was an attack on all of its members. Vladimir Putin pledged Russian military cooperation; The then National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, called it the true end of the Cold War. The ease with which US-led forces defeated the Taliban seemed to herald a new kind of light war: 63 days after 9/11, Kabul fell.

There have been continuous achievements since then.

counterterrorism efforts improved;

Osama bin Laden died, and no similar attack on America succeeded.

Lower Manhattan has been elegantly rebuilt.

But for the most part, the legacy of the response to 9/11 was bitter.

The task of crushing al-Qaeda turned into a desire for regime change and state-building, which led to unsatisfactory results in Afghanistan and Iraq, at a huge human and financial cost.

While Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were a mirage.

America broke its principles by torture and lost its high moral standing.

The initial sense of clarity about when it should intervene militarily faded, and this was repeated over Syria's use of chemical weapons in 2013, for example.

At home, the spirit of unity quickly evaporated and divisions intensified.

The preoccupation with conflicts in the Middle East was a distraction from the true story of the early 21st century, the rise of China.

global interests

Biden's debacle in Kabul produced a horrific conclusion, and some will see it as evidence not only of American incompetence, but also of regression; Although the fall of Saigon did not lead to the West losing the Cold War. And for all of America's flaws — its divisions, debts, and crumbling infrastructure — many of its strengths are intact. And its share of global GDP, at 25%, is roughly what it was in the 1990s. It is still notable both technologically and militarily. Although public opinion has turned inward, US interests are more global than they were during its isolationist period in the 1930s. With nine million citizens abroad, 39 million jobs supported by foreign trade, and $33 trillion in foreign assets, it has a strong interest in an open world.

Foreign policy changed during the era of Barack Obama, who tried to revitalize the "axis" of Asia and reduce the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Donald Trump's turn to deals was explosive and catastrophic, though it helped end America's illusions about China. Biden is well-qualified to pick up on detail, has extensive experience in foreign affairs, and there are advisers who craft the Biden Doctrine, whose goals are to end wars for good, complete the pivot to Asia, tackle new areas such as cybersecurity, and rebuild global alliances.

The Economist supports much of this agenda, not least the focus on 21st-century priorities such as climate change.

The administration's position on women's rights is better than that of its predecessor, and this may affect geopolitics more than most people realize.

But important elements of Biden's doctrine are alarmingly vague.

The abandonment of Afghanistan infuriated the allies, who were hardly consulted.

A confrontational approach with China may blur the focus on climate change.

Among the pillars of Biden's doctrine is the insistence that foreign policy should serve America's middle class, saying, "Every action we take in our conduct abroad, we must take into account American working families."

main condition

Trade, climate and China are both domestic and foreign concerns, and this is clear: all countries act in their long-term self-interest, and strength at home is a prerequisite for strength abroad. However, the drive to make decisions around the world to please local public opinion is already causing problems. In Afghanistan, a withdrawal deadline (by 9/11) was set to satisfy voters at home. The decision to withdraw all forces ignored the fact that modest American forces could have prevented the Taliban from seizing power. With regard to “Covid-19,” America missed the opportunity to lead a global vaccination campaign that would have earned it gratitude and goodwill and demonstrated American supremacy. The danger is that Biden's domestic bias could make his foreign policy less effective.

America needs to find a new way to coexist with China, through competition and cooperation in different areas. Yet Biden's China policy is remarkably similar to Trump's, with an ad hoc set of applied tariffs and rhetoric about a zero-sum contest. He knows that hostility to China is one of the few things that unites Congress and public opinion, with 45% of Americans viewing China as America's greatest enemy, up from 14% in 2001.

The United States still needs to be prepared to use military force to protect human rights abroad.

Biden seems to rule it out.

Perhaps the world's tyrants noticed that.

Biden aims to revive American alliances, which have doubled their influence.

However, his protectionism is hurting allies, and his administration shows little interest in a pan-Asian trade deal that would confront China.

And foreign policy is guided as much by events as by strategy: George W. Bush acted on a sympathetic conservative platform, not on a war on terror.

Biden must answer tough bets.

But he should not imagine that a charged foreign policy of domestic politics would energize America's claim to world leadership.

25% of America's share of global GDP, roughly.

Although public opinion has turned inward, US interests are more global than they were during its isolationist period in the 1930s.

Biden's China policy is remarkably similar to Trump's, with an ad hoc set of applied tariffs and rhetoric about a zero-sum contest.

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