North Korea that uses it as much as necessary, and increasing fatigue with North Korea - Theory of 'cool inter-Korean relations' ④ [Walking with reporter Ahn Jung-sik in Pyongyang]

In the last three articles ( ▶ [Walking with Ahn Jung-sik and Pyongyang] Why didn’t the Sunshine Policy not work - ‘Cool Inter-Korean Relations’ Theory ①), the Sunshine Policy did not work properly for the past 20 years and said that it is highly likely in the future. I did.

He also said that it seems difficult to expect North Korea's denuclearization as it seems that North Korea's will to possess nuclear weapons is firm.

If so, what kind of approach to North Korea do we need?

This is the last article on 'Cool Inter-Korean Relations'.

'Cool Inter-Korean Relations' Articles in order

① Why didn't the Sunshine Policy work

② Could North Korea give up its nuclear program

③

Did

Chairman Kim Jong-un show a will for denuclearization

④ North Korea using as much as necessary, increasing fatigue with North Korea

Do sanctions and pressure work?

There are two main reasons why the previous articles stated that the Sunshine Policy through exchanges and cooperation is unlikely to induce gradual change in North Korea and achieve North Korea's denuclearization. First, South Korea's inconsistency in North Korea policy due to the hostile confrontation between progressives and conservatives will continue for the time being. Second, it is difficult for North Korea to be incorporated into the international community due to the rigidity of the North Korean system that comes from the hereditary dictatorship of the Kim Il-sung family.

If so, can sanctions and pressure be used to force change in North Korea and achieve denuclearization of North Korea?

It's not like that. North Korea is backed by China, whose core interest is North Korea's survival, and has the ability to survive through self-reliance even if China participates in sanctions against North Korea. Since North Koreans are accustomed to not being able to eat and live, and the North Korean regime's control over the people is still strong, it is unlikely that the North Korean regime will face a crisis that it will not be able to withstand even if external sanctions and pressures are applied. To achieve the denuclearization of North Korea through sanctions and pressure or to seek changes in the North Korean regime is nothing more than excessive 'expectations'.

If denuclearization of North Korea cannot be achieved through exchanges and cooperation or through sanctions and pressure, should North Korea recognize its possession of nuclear weapons?

It can't be.

Regardless of the fact that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is a violation of the NPT regime, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to our national interests.

Since nuclear weapons are asymmetric weapons, conventional weapons cannot cope with them.

We must either develop nuclear weapons independently or rely more on the US extended deterrence. It is not easy to develop nuclear weapons independently despite the sanctions of the international community, and the more we cling to the US extended deterrence, the more our security dependency grows.

UN sanctions against North Korea are constant

At this point, UN sanctions against North Korea become constant. Although North Korea does not give up its nuclear weapons, in a state in which North Korea cannot accept its possession of nuclear weapons, UN sanctions against North Korea will inevitably exist for the time being. If the United Nations sanctions against North Korea continue, progress in inter-Korean economic cooperation will also become difficult unless we are willing to deviate from the economic system of the international community.

Given this situation, it is not realistic for the government to cling to inter-Korean economic cooperation. As long as North Korea does not give up its nuclear weapons, the limits of inter-Korean relations are clear, and it is only an excessive 'expectation' to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons by advancing inter-Korean relations. The more South Korea clings to progress in inter-Korean relations, the more North Korea uses South Korea as much as it needs.

The fact that North Korea did not hesitate to bomb the Kaesong inter-Korean liaison office shows just how merciful it is to South Korea. North Korea is confident that even if it does such a reckless act, the South Korean government, which clings to inter-Korean relations, will always respond again if they reach out their hand. Perhaps North Korea thinks that with just one word of 'sorry', South Korea will always build a liaison office again.

It is because South Korea is confident that South Korea can be used at any time, saying things like 'special idiot' or 'incompetent' to South Korea, and then turning back when inter-Korean relations are needed.

North Korea also thinks that it can receive various humanitarian aid from South Korea whenever necessary.

As North Korea repeats this pattern of bullying South Korea, comforting South Korea, and using it as much as necessary, our people's fatigue toward North Korea is only increasing.

Is it only in the national interest to show favor to North Korea?

This is not to respond emotionally to North Korea's actions. Even if it feels bad right now, if it helps the national interest, of course, we must again reach out to reconciliation.

However, it is necessary to consider whether it is in the national interest to show unconditional favor to North Korea, which uses South Korea as much as necessary while steadily heading toward becoming a practical nuclear power.

Some say that based on the experiences of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, our voices in Northeast Asia will be raised only when inter-Korean relations progress. If the two Koreas are communicating enough to have deep conversations with North Korea, the United States and China will have no choice but to listen to our story on the Korean Peninsula issue. However, things are different then and now.

Progress in inter-Korean relations during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations was possible because the denuclearization of North Korea was agreed upon in the Geneva Accords (1994) and the September 19 Joint Statement (2005). Since the North Korean nuclear issue had been sealed by an international agreement, inter-Korean relations could progress regardless of the nuclear issue.

However, the nuclear agreement was broken, and since then, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests. It has also developed an ICBM projectile that can reach the United States. North Korea's will to possess nuclear weapons has grown stronger, and UN sanctions against North Korea have become denser in multiple layers. Progress in inter-Korean relations has become a difficult situation.

It is also necessary to examine whether inter-Korean relations have progressed just because they show unconditional favor to North Korea.

During the Moon Jae-in administration, all efforts were made to improve inter-Korean relations, but as a result, did inter-Korean relations dramatically change?

Although economic cooperation is difficult due to UN sanctions, there are parts that are possible in health sector cooperation such as COVID-19 prevention and people-to-people exchanges, but even this is cold to South Korea in North Korea.

This is because inter-Korean relations are not viewed as a relationship of practical cooperation, but are being used politically.

Since North Korea knows that the South Korean government is clinging to inter-Korean relations, it moves by calculating the value of political use of every little exchange and cooperation.

Let's admit we can't do what we can't do

The important thing is to be conscious of our reality and admit that we can do what we can and cannot do what we can't.

There were people who expected that there would be many changes in inter-Korean relations when the Moon Jae-in administration took office, but neither the Kaesong Industrial Complex nor the Mt.

The fact that the Moon Jae-in administration made no progress in the September 2018 inter-Korean summit agreement with the phrase, “As conditions arise, first normalize the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. because the sanctions against North Korea were still in place.

As long as North Korea does not give up its nuclear weapons, this situation will not change in the future.

Under the current circumstances, inter-Korean relations have no choice but to remain cool for the time being.

In a situation where North Korea does not bend its will to possess nuclear weapons, the progress of inter-Korean relations is unavoidable.

It is realistic to acknowledge North Korea's will to possess nuclear weapons and UN sanctions against North Korea as constants, and to pursue possible inter-Korean relations in that line.

If you admit that you can do what you can and cannot do what you can't do, then there is no need to cling to North Korea, thinking, 'When will North Korea respond?'

The possibility of cooperation and support for North Korea is open from a brotherly point of view, but if North Korea does not respond to inter-Korean relations, that is also inevitable.

If it is judged that the possibility of using South Korea for political purposes has decreased, then North Korea will begin to consider whether to cooperate with the South from a practical level.

Inter-Korean relations are not the only thing that can be solved with enthusiasm

This does not mean that we should end all inter-Korean relations. As long as it does not violate sanctions against North Korea, government-level humanitarian aid, exchanges and cooperation with private organizations, and human exchanges may continue depending on the circumstances. Events such as the Pyeongchang Olympics can be used as a driving force to improve inter-Korean relations, or South and North Korea can seek directions for cooperation in health fields such as swine fever and COVID-19. It is just that we should not cling to such cooperation and have a cool attitude that North Korea can do it if it wants to.

If you think you are too passive about inter-Korean relations, let me ask the question you asked earlier. Has the current government, which has been devoted to inter-Korean relations, made epoch-making progress in inter-Korean relations as a result?

In a situation where North Korea's nuclear development and UN sanctions against North Korea are still in place, nothing much will change if you only have enthusiasm for inter-Korean relations.

Some say that the reason why North Korea is cold to the Moon Jae-in administration, which put great effort into inter-Korean relations, is that the South Korean government has done nothing. Among the stories from those who deal with North Korean intelligence, "The Moon Jae-in administration pretended to do everything, but what did it actually do? There are also reports of North Korea expressing dissatisfaction, saying, “What is it?”

As for North Korea, they expected that the Moon Jae-in government would speed up cooperation with North Korea to some extent apart from their nuclear development, but it was disappointing when nothing actually happened.

Although we cannot accept the North Korean side's statement as it is, there is something to consider whether the current government was indulged in excessive 'expectations' of progress in inter-Korean relations despite the reality of North Korea's nuclear development and UN sanctions.

'Cool' inter-Korean relations

Negotiations on denuclearization must continue. Although the possibility of North Korea's denuclearization seems low, if North Korea continues to demand denuclearization and takes some advanced tactical measures related to denuclearization in order to escape isolation, we will also take some forward-looking measures by receiving an exception to sanctions in consultation with the international community. You can also take it. Depending on the level of North Korea's behavior, the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex or Mt. Kumgang tourism could be considered. The important thing is to manage inter-Korean relations under a sober judgment without flirting with each and every tactical change in North Korea.

Expectations and desires to overcome division through the development of inter-Korean relations are hypothetical, but when expectations and desires are too far ahead of reality, North Korea policy pursues an ideal in the air. For the time being, the two Koreas will inevitably remain as two systems as they are now. It is foolish to pursue North Korea's collapse and to drive relations with North Korea hostilely, but it is also unrealistic to cling to inter-Korean relations because of excessive enthusiasm that exchanges and cooperation with North Korea, a hereditary dictatorship with nuclear weapons, can lead to unification. not.

We need to be a little more calm. You must have strong affection for the ideal of unification and inter-Korean relations, but you must also be able to calmly recognize the objective reality and sometimes observe the situation. There is no such thing as rushing in haste. The 'cool inter-Korean relationship', which acknowledges the reality and pursues the relationship in the best possible way, may seem slow right now, but it will reduce people's fatigue with North Korea and create a more stable inter-Korean relationship in the long term, going beyond the ups and downs of inter-Korean relations that go back and forth between cold and hot water. may be.