The withdrawal from Vietnam was not an obstacle to its supremacy

Failure in Afghanistan will not weaken America's strategic alliances

• The decision to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan angered European partners.

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• The chaos that followed the American withdrawal came in the interest of America's opponents.

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• Biden's administration miscalculated in Afghanistan.

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When the administration of President Joe Biden decided in April to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, the announcement was met with intense indignation and the anger of European officials, who felt they had not been sufficiently consulted.

However, condescension toward European allies has been a feature of the last two Democratic administrations, not just the last Republican administrations.

European policymakers can at least console themselves with a highly professional cadre of senior officials in the White House, State Department, and Pentagon, most of whom they have come to know through previous government roles, and these U.S. officials will ensure that the Afghan intervention, initiated by the United States and its European allies, Together, two decades ago, it would come to an acceptable end.

Then came the lightning defeat of the "Taliban" militants of the Afghan army, the collapse of the country's government, and scenes of chaos at the international airport in Kabul.

These events not only revealed Washington's deep misreading of the situation in Afghanistan, but also raised questions about Europeans' confidence in the efficiency of the Biden administration.

Even more troubling, it has prompted current and former European officials and prominent columnists to question whether European governments and America's other allies can trust any US administration, whether Biden or a future Republican, to honor its foreign security commitments.

Fortunately, Washington's flawed and precipitous exit from Afghanistan does not portend a broader rupture in transatlantic relations, nor does it portend a weakening of Washington's commitment to key alliances.

At a time of increasing global threats, the United States and Europe will continue to deepen the renewed transatlantic cooperation called for by the Biden administration.

blaming

Returning to the Paris climate agreement while maintaining trade tariffs on Chinese products reflect this new US approach to Europe. Ending the intervention “forever” in Afghanistan has been the critical test and logical shift for President Donald Trump's administration. This more domestically focused approach to US foreign policy may make sense given the current political climate. But why do European governments and other US allies assume that the American middle class is more concerned with the security of Latvia, Lithuania, or Taiwan than the security of Afghanistan?

And if Biden is so quick to blame Afghanistan's leaders for not standing up to the Taliban, why not ignore the concerns of European governments, which, on average, spend just over 1% of their GDP on defending themselves from Russia and threats the other, while still being overly dependent on the US security umbrella?

Questions

These questions have dominated the headlines since the staggering fall of Kabul, but they have fallen short for three reasons.

First, nothing that has happened, so far, in Afghanistan will shift the Biden administration's focus away from confronting the number one foreign policy challenge: managing China's rise.

Indeed, the withdrawal from Afghanistan is a conscious effort to refocus US strategic priorities away from the greater Middle East and toward the Pacific.

For Europeans, the Biden administration understands, in ways the Trump administration has not, that the Chinese challenge can only be successfully managed with the cooperation of allies.

Washington's European allies are central to this strategy, not because of their geographic location, but because of China's vital interdependence with European economies, and because of the strong voice of European countries in multilateral institutions as China attempts to rewrite the rules of global trade, investment, and technology governance.

split

The transatlantic divide weakens US policy toward China, while Washington's commitment to the transoceanic relationship helps win Europe's support.

Part of the undeclared European price for US assistance in managing the Chinese threat is continued US involvement in dealing with Russia, which is the closest and continuing threat to the interests of many European governments.

Biden did not contest this deal.

Conversely, he has used the June 14 summit, with other NATO leaders, including a separate meeting with leaders of the Baltic states, to underscore America's commitment to Europe's security, and Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which obligates member states to consider that launching An attack on one ally is an attack on all.

necessary success

Second, rather than announcing a flaw in US commitments and backtracking, the general nature of the disaster in Kabul - with its parallel US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 - is likely to compel Biden to prove that the US is indeed "back" globally wherever It was needed. This will largely be alongside European leaders, as the Biden administration fulfills its pledges during its June summit meetings, such as those to establish a US-European Council on Trade and Technology, as well as a task force that will manage the supply and manufacturing chain of "Covid-19" vaccines. Participation in the EU project to enable faster movement of troops across Europe.

It is also likely that the administration will focus more on freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea, pursue defense industrial cooperation with India, and more efforts to institutionalize the Quartet, given that Australia, India, and Japan are critical to US plans to reduce China's growing influence in South Asia and Southeast Asia.

Third, European governments are now investing in the success of the Biden administration, no matter what happens in Afghanistan.

Almost all European governments, including the most important ones—France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom—recognize that they need to renew the transatlantic partnership in the face of China and Russia.

The United States is also a vital partner in addressing the most pressing global issues, for European governments and citizens, and, above all, the challenge of halting global warming.

Nor will the Europeans allow the situation in Afghanistan or the failure in Kabul to distract them for too long from working with America to prepare for the next pivotal United Nations conference on climate change in Glasgow in November.

reminder

While the Afghanistan disaster has sent a reminder of the importance of greater European "strategic autonomy," such autonomy should not come at the expense of transatlantic coordination.

In some areas, such as the regulation of digital and financial markets, Europeans need to deepen their coordination, primarily to negotiate more effectively with the United States.

In other cases, they simply need to assume greater collective responsibility for their own interests, as in North Africa, the Sahel, and the eastern Mediterranean.

The same is true for the future of Afghanistan, given that it will be a growing source of refugees and migrants to Europe, and could re-emerge as an incubator of international terrorism, unless the situation there quickly stabilizes.

Steps to address these risks would make greater European strategic independence complementary to a stronger transatlantic relationship.

relative strength

This still leaves the question of whether America's adversaries will try, in real terms, to take advantage of a moment to humiliate the United States. They will undoubtedly try. The editor of the Chinese newspaper, Global Times, has already described the transition of power in Afghanistan as "smoother" than the transition between the Trump and Biden administrations. The Russian government has been more cautious, reflecting its fears that Afghanistan under Taliban rule, intentionally or unintentionally, could once again become a haven for terrorist groups that would pose as much, if not more, threat to Moscow than to Washington. But just as the US withdrawal from Vietnam did not derail America's continued journey to economic and geopolitical dominance in the 20th century, the chaotic mass migration from Afghanistan should not herald US global decline in the 21st century. Strength in international relations is always relative.In relative terms, the United States pursues it structurally much more than its major geopolitical rivals, especially if it works closely with its allies to achieve their common goals. The chaotic end of the Afghan war need not distract the Biden administration from pursuing its shared priorities with its European partners. Instead, it should push both sides to demonstrate their continued commitment to each other's security. New initiatives the administration has taken with its European and Asian allies in the past six months promise to be more meaningful for the future of transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security than the legacy of its failures in Afghanistan.Instead, it should push both sides to demonstrate their continued commitment to each other's security. New initiatives the administration has taken with its European and Asian allies in the past six months promise to be more meaningful for the future of transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security than the legacy of its failures in Afghanistan.Instead, it should push both sides to demonstrate their continued commitment to each other's security. New initiatives the administration has taken with its European and Asian allies in the past six months promise to be more meaningful for the future of transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security than the legacy of its failures in Afghanistan.

• The events in Kabul not only revealed Washington's deep misreading of the situation in Afghanistan, but also raised questions about the Europeans' confidence in the efficiency of the Biden administration.

• 20 years ago, Pakistan was providing money, weapons, ammunition or food, and it was supporting the "Taliban" movement, and providing it completely in its attacks all over Afghanistan.

• Just as America's withdrawal from Vietnam did not impede its continuing journey towards economic and geopolitical dominance in the 20th century, the chaotic mass immigration from Afghanistan should not herald America's global decline in the 21st century.

Robin Niblet ■ Director of the Royal Institute of International Relations «Chatham House».

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