Sahel: the call of the pastoralists in the face of the pastoral and security crisis
In southwestern Niger, herd thefts and kidnappings by armed bandit groups are on the rise.
In this photo, a Fulani nomad and his son with their herd, near Maradi, on their way to Nigeria, in July 2019. © AFP - LUIS TATO - FAO
Text by: Arnaud Jouve Follow
13 mins
Faced with the pastoralism crisis, aggravated by insecurity in the Sahel, herders' leaders have mobilized and launched an emergency appeal in Niamey, heard by the President of Niger, who has become their ambassador.
A preview of the “Pastoralism and Insecurity” report, interview with Mathieu Pellerin, its main author.
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Mathieu Pellerin is a researcher on the Sahel who works for the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) and for the
International Crisis Group
(ICG).
He is one of the main authors of the “Pastoralism and Insecurity” report, to be published at the end of June.
RFI: Mathieu Pellerin, explain to us what this Niamey appeal is, which was launched by representatives of breeders on May 29?
Mathieu Pellerin:
This call comes from more than 80 heads of Sahelian breeders associations, customary leaders, local elected officials from Sahel countries and West Africa. They call for an awareness of the urgency of remedying the pastoralism crisis which, today, accentuates insecurity. This observation results from a study carried out by the Billital Maroobé Network (RBM) on the reciprocal impacts between the pastoralism crisis and the security crisis. This study collected the perceptions of 2,000 people including 1,700 pastoralists in 23 administrative regions most affected by the current insecurity in seven countries of the central Sahel and West Africa. It delivers a very clear diagnosis in which the authors of the Niamey appeal recognize themselves. This appeal was heard by the President of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum,who accepted to take on the role of ambassador of pastoral organizations to resolve this double crisis, pastoral and security.
This “crisis of pastoralism” is not, however, new. You explain, in this study, that it is a source of decapitalization and injustice for breeders. Can you explain this to us?
Indeed, some specialists already spoke of pastoralism crisis 40 years ago and one of its main characteristics, namely the nibbling of pastoral lands, was already underlined.
The recurrence of droughts, and those of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as certain major trends such as demographic growth, seriously aggravate this crisis.
Other more recent dynamics are added to it, be it cash crops, lowland farming,
ranching.
, the exploitation of mining resources, "rurbanisation" or even agribusiness. This promotes the decapitalization of pastoralists, but in an almost invisible way. They are under-represented politically and institutionally, their voice is not or hardly audible, which prevents to take the full measure of the crisis that pastoralism is going through.
In the Sudano-Sahelian strip, the political economy of land is very unfavorable to pastoralists and the resulting sources of injustice are numerous. The forms of ransom to which herders are exposed are not limited to racketeering by the security forces; they are often much more insidious, through the process of compensating for unfair field damage or illegal impoundments, for example. All this contributes to continuously reducing pastoral land and decapitalizing pastoralists, forced to sell their animals, more and more, year after year. This crisis has become so old and structural that it is considered that conflicts of access to resources, the various forms of injustice mentioned, are normal: "
It has always existed, that's how it is
”.
This is the whole problem, today some of these actors have come to take up arms to oppose this system.
Jihadists in the Sahel.
HO / AAMAQ NEWS AGENCY / AFP
You say that the armed groups have exploited this crisis of pastoralism ...
Undeniably. They exploit all the frustrations arising from the crises in rural areas, of which pastoralism is one of the components. In eastern Burkina Faso, for example, all users are "victims" of the creation of protected areas and hunting zones, depriving them of access to what were previously their resources: herders, farmers, fishermen, hunters. . Some are ready to take justice into their own hands. All the so-called insurrectional areas where jihadist groups operate were covered by the study, and it is very clear that these groups aim to gradually replace States in their primary functions. In these areas, today it is largely these groups who protect, judge and govern rural areas.Since the research fields were conducted in September 2020, it has even worsened and we see these same functions exercised in the Boucle du Mouhoun, for example. It should be noted, however, that very clear differences exist between the areas under the control of JNIM (Support Group for Islam and Muslims) and EIGS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara). The EIGS is accused of not respecting the Islamic legality of the taking of zakat or of indulging in the theft of animals without any fighting justification.Islamic State in the Greater Sahara). The EIGS is accused of not respecting the Islamic legality of the taking of zakat or of indulging in the theft of animals without any fighting justification.Islamic State in the Greater Sahara). The EIGS is accused of not respecting the Islamic legality of the taking of zakat or of indulging in the theft of animals without any fighting justification.
Can the way in which the fight against terrorism was conducted by the Sahelian States also explain the worsening of the situation?
Indeed, the idea gradually took hold that jihadism was the act of "the Peuls and the Tuaregs", and this deeply vitiated the way in which the fight against terrorism was conducted. This is now widely documented in both Mali and Burkina Faso. The SDF (the defense and security forces) have committed numerous abuses against these populations, while self-defense groups have often sunk into community-based settlements in which the control of land or the theft of animals appear as hidden issues, but for all that are decisive. In 2018, this violence took on a whole new scale which pushed entire villages - for example, in north-central Burkina Faso - to join these jihadist groups to protect themselves, and sometimes also to take revenge.These “new recruits” are no longer just victims of the rural crisis, but also educated individuals, sometimes living in urban areas, who joined after their loved ones had disappeared. There is a communitarization of violence which is very worrying. The study illustrates this from very specific cases ...
Can you give some of these specific cases illustrating this spiral of violence involving vigilante groups?
In the exposed area of central Mali, for example, the execution by the jihadists of a Dogon tracker used by the Malian army in 2016 accentuated the already growing tensions between the Dogons and the Peuls, accused of being behind his death.
It is on these embers that Dana Ambassagou was formed, supported by the Malian State with the specific mandate of protecting the Dogon community, naturally pushing the
Fulani
community to seek protection from the
katibat
Macina.
The first massacres of civilians occurred, triggering a chain of reprisals.
In Burkina Faso, the case of Tanwalbougou (Eastern region) is also emblematic of such a spiral. In a context of latent tensions between Mossis and Peuls, in particular around access to land, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP) were set up in Tanwalbougou in 2020 without the Peuls being there. members. The sheikh (Fulani) of Tanwalbougou, anxious to maintain his community in a position of neutrality, had dissuaded the members of his community from joining the jihadists as well as the VDP. The Peuls not being members of the VDP, they have
de facto
not targeted by the jihadists, which exposed this community to accusations of collusion with the jihadists. It is in this context that the Tanwalboguou massacre was perpetrated in the spring of 2020. As in central Mali, this has prompted the Fulani communities to desert the area and take refuge in areas under jihadist control where they paradoxically feel less threat.
In this regard, it should be mentioned that the vast majority of farmers surveyed do not consider jihadist groups to be a solution, but they fear their violence less than that of the VDP and the SDF.
They are looking for neutrality, like the Sheikh of Tanwalbougou, but they find themselves "between a rock and a hard place".
This neutrality is difficult to maintain, because they are always accused of bias by one of the armed actors.
M'Bororo Fulani women in transhumance to Lake Chad ArnaudJouve
You say that the consequences of the security crisis on the pastoralism crisis are "invisible" but very real. This crisis is getting worse, then?
The general opinion is that they are complicit in this insecurity whereas, on the contrary, they are the first victims. The breeders are today the most targeted, whether by the jihadists, the SDF, self-defense groups. Each arrest or execution of a breeder leads to the precariousness of his whole family. The number of single-parent families and orphans has exploded. The breeding activity is heavily affected by the current situation. Mobility is largely hampered within countries or at the regional level, since Togo and Benin block cross-border transhumance in response to the risk of security contagion. The concentration of animals in certain areas increases the pressure on fodder biomass and on access to resources with other users. The markets are slowing down,Due to their inaccessibility, sales fall and therefore animal prices fall, while the cost of transport and feed increases at the same time. Pastoral resilience is very clearly threatened.
In this context, what is the future for pastoralism in the Sahel?
It is seriously questioned by many pastoralists who now see pastoralism as a source of problems.
There is not one but futures for breeding.
Some are resigned to imagining more intensive forms of breeding, not without fear and reservations, others remain resolutely attached to transhumant breeding, whether for cultural or economic reasons ... Others, finally, seek to diversify their activities, or even seek to leave breeding for other horizons, such as trade or gold panning.
It is among young people that this exit from breeding is most frequent.
Despite everything, contrary to an idea often put forward, the "intergenerational break" is not so obvious.
Young people emancipate themselves socially and economically - including sometimes by arms -, creating tensions within families, but in many cases, children do not break with their home country.
Public policies must reflect these multiple aspirations and avoid having an exclusive approach to breeding, tending towards forced settlement.
Transhumance is not just a way of life to be protected, it is a mode of production essential to the sub-regional economy and the preservation of resources.
Only intensive breeding would be untenable in the Sahel and West Africa.
How to get out of this double crisis, both pastoral and security?
Addressing the security crisis first of all requires restoring a climate of social cohesion.
In many conflicts perceived as “communal”, the root of the problem is access to land and water.
Peasant, pastoral and agricultural organizations have a more important role to play here.
This security crisis has profoundly degraded the relationship between breeders and States: it is urgent that these actors speak to each other in order to better understand each other, without collaboration being an expected objective.
Breeders can only stand by being neutral.
States must show that pastoralists are full citizens. The FDS could, for example, protect pastoralists in their mobility, in particular by securing transhumance as has been observed in certain regions in Niger. These forces must no longer be complicit in the abuses perpetrated against pastoralists, but on the contrary in remedies against abuses, for example in the area of cattle theft. This will undoubtedly require a better representation of nomadic communities in these forces, as Niger is already doing.
More fundamentally, to curb the pastoralism crisis, it is essential to rethink the security of pastoral land: pastoralists must be at the heart of local consultation processes which lead to determining the conditions of shared access and use to local resources with other users. Here, the way of doing is more important than what is done. Concretely, it is less urgent to mark out a passageway than to ensure that the process which led to the marking has made it possible to obtain the agreement (and commitment) of all the players. We must change the political economy of land, which I said was unfavorable to breeders. Without this, the texts - however good they may be - will not be applied. In the medium and long term, this requires better customary representation,elective and institutional pastoral communities, so that they are at the heart of local and national decision-making processes. In the immediate term, it is necessary to strengthen the access of pastoralists to justice, whether through formal justice or by mobilizing pastoral organizations or paralegal organizations to offer local recourse to pastoralists. The study mentions a number of existing good practices.The study mentions a number of existing good practices.The study mentions a number of existing good practices.
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