Change, not continuity, is the dominant dynamic on how the world will develop over the next two decades, so flexibility and adaptation to face uncertainty about the future are among the main factors in the relative rise and fall of democratic and authoritarian rule alike.
Flexibility and adaptation affect the performance of governments - whatever their nature - in order to meet a "more demanding and more capable audience". Relations between governments and their societies are likely to face persistent tensions due to the growing mismatch between what the public expects and what governments offer, and this widening gap threatens more. From political fluctuations and protests, a threat and a decline in democracy, and a gap in governance that other parties - other than governments and states - fill them, thus expanding alternative sources of governance and there is a constant aspiration for adaptive governance and local governance that may contradict its policies with the national level, but has the ability to respond effectively According to the needs of his society, and in light of these contexts, we are not expected to be confronted with new ideologies, but different approaches to governance if the necessary conditions are provided for their production.
These are the most prominent features of the state and governance over the next two decades, as concluded by the Global Strategic Trends and Scenarios 2040 Report issued by the US intelligence community last March.
The public ... increasing aspirations and government impotence
The general feature of the future - as the report explains - is the mismatch between public demands and government capabilities. Over the next two decades, relations between states and their societies in each region are likely to face persistent tensions due to the growing mismatch between what the public needs or expects and what governments can provide.
In many countries, populations whose expectations have increased due to human development and previous economic booms are likely to face greater pressures and disruptions due to slower growth, fewer uncertain job opportunities reshaped by technology and demographic changes, and these peoples will also be better equipped to defend their interests after decades of Steady improvements in education and access to communication techniques, plus greater cohesion for like-minded groups.
Although confidence in government institutions is low among the general public, they are likely to continue to view states as ultimately responsible for meeting their challenges, and for asking their governments to provide more solutions.
The erosion of states ’capabilities and their inability to meet the aspirations of their people stem from the four structural factors that the report monitored, which are population change, economic conditions, climate changes, and finally technological developments. While these demographic, environmental, economic and technological trends pave the way for the future, the story of the next 20 years It will mainly be written by the choices made at community, country, and international levels.
Governments will be under severe pressure to keep pace with the pace of technological change and implement policies that harness benefits and reduce risks and disruptions, and technological advances will enable individuals and non-state actors to challenge the role of the state in new ways.
But how will the four components interact with the emerging dynamics in society, the state, and the international system?
Here some phenomena can be captured:
Countries with an aging population and those with an increasing youth population like ours will each face a unique set of challenges associated with that demographic.
Immigration is likely to increase, raising with it identity issues that divide societies in receiving countries, and may fuel ethnic conflicts.
Rapid urbanization - which often occurs in Africa and Asia - will challenge governments to provide adequate infrastructure, security, and resources to these developing cities.
Responding to climate change and environmental degradation will stress governments in every region, and the impact will be particularly severe in Africa, Asia and our region, where governments are weak or fragile.
Slowing growth is likely to strain the state's resources and ability to deliver services, especially as governments are already overburdened with debt in an unprecedented way.
Slowing growth accompanied by growing and persistent inequality within many countries, coupled with corruption, will threaten people's trust in governments and trust in one another.
Technological change: Governments will be under severe pressure to keep pace with the pace of technological change and to implement policies that harness benefits and reduce risks and disruptions, and technological progress will enable individuals and non-state actors to challenge the role of the state in new ways.
The conclusion that the report concludes is that in the face of these challenges the existing systems and models of governance have proven that they are insufficient to meet the expectations of the population, and the result is an increasing imbalance between public demands and the ability of governments to provide economic opportunities and security, and this general pessimism is spreading through the governments of the right, left and center. And democratic and authoritarian states, populist and technocratic administrations.
The case of the Arab Spring ... Protests cycles
The report captures the dilemma of the Arab Spring and circulates it to other regions to become a global case. The Arab Spring a decade ago revealed serious deficiencies in the prevailing political systems, but at the same time it was unable to produce a new social contract between the state and society. Other than the world.
Many countries are likely to remain stuck in an unstable imbalance in which the population is dissatisfied with the current order but unable to reach a consensus on the future course.
The report notes the escalation of protests around the world over the past decade, reflecting public dissatisfaction on a range of issues, including inequality, political repression, corruption and climate change, and even if countries improve services and well-being overall, these gains and opportunities may be distributed unevenly. , Which fuels discord in seemingly more prosperous societies.
It is likely in the coming years - according to the report - that this contradiction between the capabilities of governments and the expectations of the public will expand, leading to more political fluctuations, polarization, populism and waves of protest, with an increase in political extremism, violence, internal conflict, or even the collapse of the state.
But the political future will be governed by differences in state capacity, ideology, and the past history of political mobilization, how and when will they turn into public discontent and political upheavals?
Many countries are likely to remain stuck in an unstable imbalance in which the population is dissatisfied with the current order but unable to reach a consensus on the future course.
Polarization and populism
يتوقع التقرير أن يظل الاستقطاب على أسس عرقية ودينية وأيديولوجية قويا، حيث يدفع القادة السياسيون والجماعات المنظمة جيدا مجموعة واسعة من الأهداف والنهج العريضة التي تتقاطع مع القضايا الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والحوكمة والهوية والدولية، ففي بعض البلدان من المرجح أن يؤدي هذا الاستقطاب إلى زيادة وتعزيز الخلل السياسي والجمود، ويزيد مخاطر عدم الاستقرار لأنه بمجرد تأسيس الاستقطاب يصعب عكسه لبناء التوافق.
كما أن عدم الرضا العام الذي برز في العقود الماضية عن السياسة السائدة لفشلها في معالجة المظالم الاقتصادية والاجتماعية أدى إلى ارتفاع عالمي في الشعبوية، ومن المتوقع زيادتها العقدين القادمين.
العنف السياسي وانهيار الدولة
Over the next 20 years, increased volatility is likely to lead to the collapse of the political system and outbreaks of political violence in many countries, especially in the developing world. As of 2020, 1.8 billion people - or 23% of the world's population - lived in fragile contexts with weak governance. Security and poor social, environmental and economic conditions.
According to estimates by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, this number is expected to reach 2.2 billion or 26% of the world's population by 2030, and these countries are mostly concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by our region, Asia and Latin America.
These regions will also face an increasing set of conditions that increase vulnerability, including climate change, food insecurity, youth bulge, population growth (in Africa), and rapid urbanization, exacerbating state fragility.
Democracy under pressure and fragile authoritarianism
This volatile political climate creates vulnerabilities for all types of governments, from established liberal democracies to closed authoritarian regimes, and the criterion of legitimacy becomes derived from the ability of governments to harness new opportunities, adapt to mounting pressures, manage escalating social fragmentation, and provide security and economic prosperity to their people.
The challenges facing governments indicate that there is a great risk that the continuing trend of eroding democratic governance will continue during at least the next decade and perhaps for a longer period. Many internal and external forces are driving this democratic erosion, and behind it is a combination of factors, including weak state capacity and sovereignty Fragile law, weak traditions of tolerance of dissent, high inequality, corruption, and a strong role of militaries in politics.
Externally, China, Russia, and other actors are working in various ways to undermine democracies and support illiberal regimes.
In the long term, the progress or decline of democracy will depend in part on the relative balance of power between the major powers, geopolitical competition, including efforts to influence or support political outcomes in other countries, the relative success in achieving economic achievement and the provision of public goods, and the extent of ideological competition between the Western democratic model and the two models. Chinese and Russian, and this rivalry will shape democratic trends around the world.
Governance gap
More actors are expected to provide a wider range of services. As public needs and expectations increase, there is likely to be an increasing shift towards an adaptive approach to governance that encompasses a wider range of actors outside state institutions - which provide welfare and security - and non-state actors, including This is private sector companies, NGOs, civil society groups, religious organizations, insurgent, and even criminal networks.
These roles are likely to extend to a wider range of actors and functions due to a combination of factors, including states' failure to provide adequate governance, increased resources available to the private sector, NGOs, and individuals due to technology, increasing complexity, and increasing public policy challenges that require many Stakeholders to address it.
Providing governance outside state institutions does not necessarily pose a threat to central governments, nor does it reduce the overall quality of governance that is provided to people, but authoritarian regimes are usually suspicious of any activities carried out by community institutions far from or independent from them, as this depends on the patterns of interaction between the two parties and the relationship between the two parties. Both of them are abroad, in addition to the financing formulas.
The future state faces an environment of uncertainty, and this requires it to have great flexibility with which it can respond to challenges whose features cannot be precisely defined, but whose basic trends can be drawn.
The roles and relationships between governmental and non-governmental agencies will depend on their relative capacity, penetration, and alignment with population expectations. During the "Covid-19" pandemic, many examples of adaptive governance have emerged that have brought together governments, the private sector, social media, large technology companies, research institutions, international organizations and local governments, The increasing availability of data on all aspects of people's lives, coupled with artificial intelligence technology (AI) for its analysis, is expected to make governments more flexible in directing and providing services and security, and once established, innovative governance is likely to spread around the world.
Local governments are also likely to become increasingly important to their ability to provide a solution to the problems of their communities, and local governments generally have the advantage of proximity to the problems of their constituents, flexibility in allocating responses, and are also less partisan.
As the urban population grows and turns into centers of economic activity, technology and innovation, local governments are likely to gain increased influence in the face of national governments, while the expanding role of local administration and city governance may undermine policy coherence when local and national strategies to solve problems differ.
No new ideologies
It is expected - according to the report - that we will be facing a number of combinations or a mixture of regimes on several axes, from central to local government, from the strong state role to a strong non-governmental role, from democratic to authoritarian, and from secular to religious, or from nationalist To international.
Historically, major intellectual shifts across regions have occurred in moments of catastrophic crises as in the aftermath of a major war, economic collapse or foreign invasion. People are more willing to adopt bold systemic changes to address global problems. Nevertheless, the emergence of a new ideology is rare. Other pressures such as a pandemic or major environmental disaster - which imply shortcomings in management - create conditions for new or alternative models that gain momentum in the event of widespread and sustainable dysfunction.
Transforming discontent into something new requires a mixture of inspiring and unified leadership with persuasive ideas or ideology to build political alliances and win society, and this is what the next 20 years will answer.
The future state faces an environment of uncertainty, and this requires it to have great flexibility with which it can respond to challenges whose features cannot be precisely defined, but whose basic trends can be drawn.