On the sidelines of the recent escalating tension in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, and the Russian crowds and maneuvers near its borders, there are successive signs of hidden tension between Russia and Turkey.
Turkish position
Like other countries, Turkey did not recognize Russia’s annexation of the Crimea peninsula in 2014 after a unilateral referendum, prompted by it - in addition to the illegality of the referendum from its point of view - its commitment to the position of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to which it belongs, and its focus on the population of the peninsula from Turkish race, that is, the Crimean Tatars.
Ankara's position did not stand as an obstacle to cooperation, coordination and development of relations during the past five years with Russia, but the latter appears today to be disturbed by some of the changes and developments in the Turkish position recently.
Despite the improvement in its relations with Russia - during the ensuing years in several economic, commercial and political fields, including understandings and coordination on some issues, strategic arms deals, and giant energy projects - Ankara remained steadfast in its position and echoing it to the ears of Russian officials on every occasion.
Including the statement of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 2020 commenting on the prison sentence of a Russian military court against 7 Crimean Tatars;
Where the statement said that it is regrettable "the persecution of the Tatar Turks, the indigenous people of the Crimean peninsula, by such methods," stressing that Turkey "does not recognize the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and continues to stand by its fellow Turks, the Tatars, who defend their rights and interests by peaceful means."
This Turkish position was reiterated recently by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan when he received his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky in Istanbul, saying that his country "strongly defended the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and confirmed once again its principled decision not to recognize the annexation of Crimea."
However, he stressed that his country's cooperation with Ukraine is not directed against any third party - primarily Russia - and that his country's main goal is the continuation of the Black Sea "as a sea of peace, tranquility and cooperation."
Ankara's position did not stand as an obstacle to cooperation, coordination and development of relations during the past five years with Russia, but the latter seems to be disturbed today by some of the changes and developments in the Turkish position recently.
In December 2019, Ukraine signed an agreement to purchase 6 Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and a year later it signed several cooperation agreements regarding drones and warships. Ukraine donated $ 200 million in military support during Erdogan's visit to Kiev.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Andrei Taran said that these deals aimed at "strengthening the Ukrainian navy to increase security in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov," and that Ukraine announced more than once that it had used these drones over the Black Sea and the Donbas region.
Ankara also announced a few days ago that two American warships would soon pass through its straits to the Black Sea and remain until early May, before Washington reverted to this decision, while reports talked about the possibility of British warships soon passing through the straits towards the Black Sea.
Russian warnings
Russian positions have been conservative and / or critical of Turkey from several official levels over the past weeks.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned Turkey against selling arms to Ukraine, calling on it - and the countries concerned - to "analyze the Ukrainian regime's escalating war statements well, and not to blow on fire."
Assistant to the Russian Prime Minister, Yuri Borisov, in turn, threatened to "reconsider technical and military cooperation with Turkey" if it sold drones to Ukraine.
As for the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, she said that Turkey's exporting of arms to Ukraine "will not help in solving the problem" by peaceful means, urging it to "avoid steps that stimulate retaliatory goals for Kiev."
Moscow also expressed its objection to Ankara's approval of the passage of American warships towards the Black Sea, questioning the intentions of the United States, and conserving what it considered a violation of the Montreux Straits Agreement (1936), which is still in force today. This claim was vehemently denied by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, saying that his country "applies the agreement literally," which should prevent Russia or any other country from worrying, referring to the text of the agreement on the right of countries not bordering the Black Sea to enter their warships to the Black Sea To leave it within a maximum period of two weeks.
Russian anger apparently shifted from statements to the positions, as Moscow stopped its flights to Turkey from mid-April to the first of next June.
Although the spokesman for the Turkish presidency Andrei Peskov denied that the matter had any political reasons and that it was taken exclusively due to the Corona pandemic and the "epidemiological situation in Turkey", an assessment approved by the Turkish Foreign Minister, many linked the decision to the Ukrainian crisis, especially as it coincided with Zelensky's visit to Turkey.
Fallout
Up to the moment, it is not possible to talk about serious repercussions of the crisis and Turkey's stance towards it on its relations with Russia, especially since the two parties were able during the past years to consolidate their relations so that they are not affected by the many differences and differences between them in the various issues and files, through frameworks of understanding and coordination, whose main goal was to spare The two parties clash, advance interests over differences and reach compromises.
However, the current crisis differs from its predecessors in terms of Moscow's view of it and its repercussions on it, as it is located in its strategic depth in which it does not accept any threats or competition.
The crisis has also raised the level of tension between it and NATO, in which Turkey is the second military power, and is trying as much as possible not to differentiate its position from it.
On the other hand, the new US administration appears to be an important factor in the crisis, and perhaps it is one of the most important causes of its recent exacerbation and tension.
There is an impression that Russia wanted, with its mobilization and escalation, to challenge the Biden administration in its beginnings, and that Ukraine is betting in its hardening position on supposed support from Washington, based on the latter's statements and its sharp rhetoric towards Russia.
On the other hand, Ankara is very keen to avoid any crisis with the Biden administration, and thus is interested in coordinating positions with it and with NATO as much as possible.
There are many regional issues that Russia and Turkey are involved in on the basis of difference and difference more than alliance and cooperation, and the Ukrainian crisis is now joining them.
And if Russia has - so far - expressed reservations and cautionary language;
It has previously proven that it connects the issues and tries to dialogue or negotiate about them as one package, and pressures in one of them to obtain a position in another, and this has happened repeatedly in Syria specifically.
Therefore, Turkey is wary of a Russian reaction or a sudden move, and seeks to avoid it.
In the first place, Turkey affirms - according to its foreign minister - that it is not a party to the crisis and stands completely neutral and keen on its good relations with both sides, and that it supports its political and peaceful solution through diplomatic communication. It should not worry Moscow too much.
In general, despite all of the above, Ankara is very keen not to disturb the existing balance in its relations with both Russia and the United States, as it is committed to the general positions and orientations of NATO, but without allowing that to lead to a crisis with Moscow.
Although the recent crisis reaffirmed the wide area of disagreements and differences between Ankara and Moscow, which does not allow now - and in the medium term - to form an axis or alliance, it also confirmed that the ties of Turkey's transatlantic relations are too strong to unravel.
Finally, it is not expected that the Ukrainian crisis will have disastrous effects on Turkish-Russian relations, except in the event that it develops into a large-scale military clash in the form of a confrontation between Russia and NATO, which is very unlikely until the moment according to the current data, which will allow the two countries later to overcome the current tension as They exceeded similar previously.