There is a possibility that they will be defeated

Russia and China will not risk two wars in Ukraine and Taiwan

  • China has not fought a naval war in over a century.

    Archives

  • A large Russian troop build-up in a war against Ukraine threatens Russia's other interests.

    Archives

  • Landing the forces in Taiwan would be costly to China.

    Archives

picture

Much has been said about China's ability to invade Taiwan, almost like the mobilization of Russia near Ukraine that many believe may be a pretext for a future war, and behind this ancient fear that Russia and China will cooperate to undermine the United States, by launching simultaneous attacks, this is not something Imaginable, and unlikely.

Amphibious operation

Let's start with China, as it is clear that the invasion of Taiwan will be an amphibious operation, and the surprise is especially important in an amphibious attack, and in Normandy, for example, the United States and Britain launched a massive disinformation campaign to convince the Germans that they would not land where they did, and if the defenses were focused on the landing point, The attack could be a massacre.

And even if China had superior power, doubling the strength on the ground and the correct preparation, could destroy its forces.

There is also the problem of distance, as about 160 kilometers of water separates between China and Taiwan, and assuming a direct line of attack, the attacking force will be at sea for about five hours, and regardless of alerting the defenders to the planned locations, the force will be subject to more air, missile, and submarine attacks. The danger, and the likelihood of the Chinese reaching the target areas without incurring heavy losses, is low. Even if the US space reconnaissance is completely nullified, and this is difficult, submarines can provide targeting information for US missiles distributed around the world.

If the Chinese forces succeeded in reaching the mainland of Taiwan, and the Taiwan forces were forced to cede the land, supplies and reinforcements would pose a huge problem for the Chinese, and at this stage the landing point would be known on the map, as well as the necessary methods for resupplying the Chinese infantry.

Warning signals

The resupply and reinforcement of the planes will not be sufficient, so even if the Chinese manage to reach the shore of the island, the problem of resupply will impede the Chinese operations, and there is also a political problem, as the Chinese invasion of Taiwan may trigger warning signals among US allies in the region. Some of them may be dangerous, such as Japan. Of course, China's stunning and low-cost victory may force a reconsideration of its alliances, but a prolonged conflict or outright defeat will convince US allies of Chinese intentions and prepare accordingly.

China must win quickly, if it wants to use the attack as a tool to intimidate the region, and this is the final problem for China, as it is likely to lose. Victory turns China into a real superpower, not a theoretical one, and defeat will shatter this dream. In addition, the United States may choose to confront The invasion by simultaneous measures strangling China, in the Straits of Malacca, or in Chinese ports. The Chinese cannot control the response of the United States, which will seek to paralyze China's maritime trade, in addition to punitive economic measures on the part of Europe, and this is likely to cause China’s paralysis.

China has not launched naval battles since 1895, and an amphibious operation against the US Navy may lead to defeat or victory, and China realizes that and that is why it lost the element of surprise. The Chinese do not intend to invade Taiwan, and they have created a feeling of an impending war, yet they are trying to reduce the importance of the war .. Which brings us to Russia.

Strategic depth

Russia is trying to recreate the strategic depth, which it possessed for centuries and lost it when the Soviet Union collapsed, and so far it has reached a dominant position in Belarus, and has managed to exit the war in Nagorny Karabakh with a sound political position, in addition to deploying peacekeepers there, and this means, Successively, it strengthened its position on the western path in Northern Europe, and the entry point into the Caucasus was strengthened by soft political movements.

Of all the important regions that Russia lost in 1990-1991, nothing is more important to Moscow than Ukraine, and the Russians launched soft maneuvers aimed at changing the positions of the Ukrainian government, but they failed constantly, for transient reasons, and because Ukraine has a memory of Soviet brutality, Moreover, Kiev received support from the West, and this support warned to the maximum extent in order not to raise Russian fears of an attack, but it does exist as a possible reality, and the Russian troop build-up along the borders of Ukraine must be read in this sense.

Are the Russians preparing for a military operation to take back Ukraine?

The problem with such an operation is the sheer size of Ukraine, and assuming there is no resistance at all, which is unlikely, it will take weeks for Russia to fully occupy Ukraine, and during those weeks it will have to assume that Western weapons and supplies, and possibly troops, will flow.

A large-scale campaign by Russia would be costly and leave other Russian interests at risk.

Moscow's position could be weakened in Belarus, as well as in the Caucasus.

The emergence of Russia on the borders of a group of NATO members, from the Baltic states to Slovakia and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, is likely to revitalize the alliance, turning most of Europe from strategic complacency to panic.

There is no doubt that Ukraine is crucial to Russia, and revitalizing NATO may be a small price for that, but Russia faces the same problem as China: it can lose, and Russia has a large army, but as is the case with the Soviets, only parts of it are effective Also, Russia's ability to support a large armored force from a logistical point of view is uncertain, and the rapid capture of the area south of Pripyat Marshes may not stress Russian forces, but if the United States and NATO arm Ukrainian forces with anti-tank and aircraft weapons, and logistically support them A quick victory could become a long battle draining Russia.

Ukraine swamp

This will be proven especially if American aircraft are used in battle, and are equipped for anti-armor warfare, while Turkey may see a gap, Russian forces can test the Caucasus, and Poland can move in Belarus.

None of this is certain, but Russian planners must take these possibilities seriously, optimists rarely win wars, and Russia has learned not to be optimistic, and it can find itself mired in a swamp in Ukraine, in the face of advanced weapons and attacks on its outskirts, in the words Others can lose. Moreover, starting the war in Ukraine means sacrificing economic opportunities in Europe.

Russia has used military exercises as a cover for war before, specifically with Georgia, but Georgia is a small country, while Ukraine is a surprisingly large country, and I suspect that its forces will receive training on American weapons, which were not distributed out of concern about Russian concerns, but could be distributed. Quickly in case of war.

Coordination safety

There is therefore the possibility of coordination between Russia and China, and this is reasonable, and in practice this will have little effect, and while the war with China will be free, it seems that the confrontation with Russia will be wild, and if both wars are widespread, which is doubtful, then there will be competition. On supplies, neither Russia nor China can support the other side in the war, as Russia cannot provide important naval support, and China cannot maintain important ground forces at a far distance.

A coalition to wage war together would of course cause panic in the United States, but the latter was good at using panic to mobilize the public, so in my view the probability of a major war or a coordinated war is low.

China and Russia are not so desperate that they risk defeat or a long war that drains their powers, and both act as if they are not serious about the war, and instead they announce the threat, and of course all things are possible, but the war seems far away.

• China has not launched naval battles since 1895, and an amphibious operation against the US Navy may lead to defeat or victory, and China realizes that, and that is why it lost the element of surprise.

The Chinese have no intention of invading Taiwan, and they have created a sense of impending war, yet they are trying, instead, to downplay the significance of the war, which brings us to Russia.

George Friedman - international affairs expert and founder and president of Geopolitical Futures

Follow our latest local and sports news, and the latest political and economic developments via Google news