On October 8, 1934, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a directive of several thousand words.
The instruction pointed out that “to fight correctly against the enemy and to completely smash the enemy's five times of'encirclement and suppression' must enable the main force of the Red Army to break through the enemy's blockade.”
This is considered to be the earliest military and political order of the Central Red Army's Long March, and it clearly conveyed a signal that under the circumstances at that time, the main force of the Red Army had to choose to leave the Central Soviet Area and implement a breakout transfer.
What kind of problems does the Chinese Communist Party face?
Why must the Central Red Army be transferred?
In the second half of 1933, the sky over the Central Soviet Area was filled with gunpowder and the atmosphere was tense.
After experiencing four failed "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, Chiang Kai-shek began to launch the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the central revolutionary base area.
As the commander-in-chief of himself, he first mobilized 500,000 troops and besieged the Central Soviet Area in three ways.
Mao Zedong had already left the leadership position of the Red Army at this time, and Bo Gu, the temporary head of the Central Committee, handed over military command to Li De, the military adviser of the Communist International who had no knowledge of the actual situation in China.
Li De refused to adopt the correct opinions of Mao Zedong and others, abandoning the effective mobile warfare in the past, and instead fought a battle against the well-equipped Kuomintang army.
The Central Soviet Area was shrinking day by day during the "encirclement and suppression" of the Kuomintang army.
Mao Zedong later recalled that at that time, "the situation was critical and I was depressed when preparing for the Long March."
In order to mobilize and contain the enemy, reduce the pressure of the Kuomintang army on the central base areas, and prepare to implement a strategic shift, the central government successively dispatched the Seventh Red Army to the north and the Sixth Red Army to the west.
On September 17, Bogu called the Communist International to report that the main force of the Red Army was preparing to implement a strategic shift.
On September 30, the Communist International reinstated the agreement.
On October 7, 1934, on the eve of the Central Red Army’s strategic shift, Chiang Kai-shek’s "Iron Barrel Plan" to "encircle and suppress" the Central Soviet Area was sent to Zhou Enlai by CCP intelligence personnel.
Transfer is imminent.
Facing the extremely dangerous situation, the Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission issued an "action calendar" on October 9, 1934.
In this hand-drawn and filled-in form, a plan for team assembly transfer and rest replenishment was carefully arranged from October 10th to 20th.
On the evening of October 10, 1934, the Central Red Army began to implement a strategic shift.
On October 16, all troops assembled in the area north of Yudu River.
Mao Zedong, then a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, discussed with He Zizhen on the eve of leaving to leave his son Mao Mao in the Soviet area.
Maomao, who was only two years old, was eloquent and likable. He couldn't bring his children on the military road and had to reluctantly separate.
Who would have thought that Mao Zedong and He Zizhen never saw Mao Mao again.
Lu Dingyi, then head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China, was unable to move together because his wife Tang Yizhen was pregnant and was inconvenient to move.
Lu Dingyi did not expect that this separation was actually Yong Jue.
After learning the news of Tang Yizhen's sacrifice, he wrote: "I have insomnia for more than half a month. From then on, whether it is a great joy or a great tragedy, I can't shed tears."
Xu Teli, then the Education Commissioner of the Chinese Soviet Government, rushed to a place 30 miles away to say goodbye to Qu Qiubai, an old friend who stayed behind in the Central Soviet Area.
Qu Qiubai, who suffers from severe lung disease, wants to stay in the Central Soviet Area to fight.
He deliberately changed his horse and strong groom to Xu Teli.
After the two were separated for eight months, Qu Qiubai died bravely.
Starting on the evening of October 17, 1934, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission led the main force of the Central Red Army with more than 86,000 people. Accompanied by the splashes of Yudu River, they embarked on the journey of strategic transfer.
"One sent the Red Army down the mountain, the autumn wind is drizzling and the autumn wind is cold..."
In the night, the people of the Central Soviet Area were full of perseverance and expectation, sending each other ten miles away.
I don’t know how far and how long the Central Red Army will go.
After most of the Red Army soldiers left their hometowns, they never returned.
This is a tragic march, with bullets and bullets all the way, and the mountains and rivers are almost exhausted, but the indelible ideals and beliefs in the chest of the Red Army soldiers, such as the burning torches in the dark night, guide the long journey.
"The Long March is a manifesto, the Long March is a propaganda team, and the Long March is a planter."
It declared the bankruptcy of the Kuomintang's encirclement, pursuit and interception, and realized the strategic shift of the Red Army.
Although the number of the Red Army survived after the Long March was not large, it is the most precious essence of the party and constitutes the backbone of the future leadership of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation.