They may not have been around as long as Ismail Omar Guelleh.
But like the president of Djibouti, who is running for his fifth term, the Chinese should keep their economic grip on this small country in the Horn of Africa after the presidential election on Friday, April 9.
In many ways, the history of relations between Djibouti and Beijing is emblematic of Chinese ambitions on the international stage, of how the Asian power is using its new “silk roads” to expand its network of economic influence and its desire to strengthen its status as the leading investor on the African continent.
China's only permanent military base abroad
But it is also the story of a small African country, devoid of natural resources, which has opened wide its arms to foreign powers for twenty years to make profitable its unique geographical location on the Gulf of Tadjourah, in the entrance to the very strategic Red Sea.
And how this former French colony, independent since 1977, took advantage of Chinese financial generosity until it found itself in a situation of economic dependence such that it “risks threatening its autonomy again”, wrote Sonia Le Gouriellec, a specialist in the Horn of Africa at the Catholic University of Lille and author of “Djibouti: the giant diplomacy of a small state”, in the National Defense Review.
The level of cooperation between the Asian giant and this little African thumb of barely a million inhabitants came to light on August 1, 2017. On that day, Beijing inaugurated its military base in Djibouti, making it the only permanent base of the People's Liberation Army outside of China.
The 400 Chinese soldiers have settled just seven kilometers from the US military base and not far from those of France, Japan and Italy.
But unlike other countries which are primarily there for security reasons - the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and monitoring maritime traffic to the Suez Canal - China above all wants to add one more, highly symbolic coin, to its presence in Djibouti.
In reality, Beijing set its sights on Djibouti in the early 2000s. It has invested there in the construction of stadiums, schools, the renovation of roads or official buildings such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
With the arrival of Xi Jinping to power in 2012, and the transformation of various Chinese investments abroad into a major program under the name of the “new silk roads”, the financial effort was further accentuated.
The three flagship achievements under Xi Jinping are the large multipurpose port of Doraleh, the railway line between Djibouti and Ethiopia and the oil pipeline that goes to Addis Ababa.
To this must be added the inauguration, in 2018, of the Djibouti free zone which, in the long term, is to become the largest in all of Africa and was largely financed by Chinese loans.
In all, China spent $ 14 billion on investments and loans for Djibouti between 2012 and 2020.
Chinese welcome
If Beijing has staked so much on this Horn of Africa state, it is because “it allows it to add an African stage - in one of the rare politically stable countries in the region - to its large network of 'maritime routes' of silk ”, underlines a British expert of the Horn of Africa, contacted by France 24 and who preferred to remain anonymous.
It is also “a bridgehead towards the interior of the continent and much more economically interesting countries like Ethiopia”, underlines Gérard Prunier, historian at the Institute of African Worlds, contacted by France 24.
This is the whole point of the railway between Djibouti and Addis Ababa.
“Since the conflict with Eritrea in 2000, the only safe path for Ethiopian exports is through the port of Djibouti and goods must therefore take the railway built by the Chinese”, underlines Zach Vertin, specialist in Africa. and special advisor to the American mission to the UN, in a note on Chinese investments in Djibouti published in June 2020.
But China did not impose its presence on this former French colony.
Indeed, “initially, it was a political asset for President Ismail Omar Guelleh”, recalls Thierry Peirault, sinologist at the CNRS and specialist in relations between China and Africa, contacted by France 24. First, because that the country had a clear need for funding and “that there was no one else to turn to”, underlines this expert.
But also because it allowed the president to sell his project of economic transformation of the country into “a kind of Singapore of Africa”, writes Zach Vertin.
Chinese money thus allowed the president to buy economic stability and social peace, which help explain the longevity of his authoritarian reign, judges the American expert.
A “unraveling marriage”
Over the years, “there has been a kind of cooling, however, it's like a fraying marriage”, judges historian Gérard Prunier.
First, there is the issue of indebtedness.
Beijing now holds more than 70% of Djibouti's debt, which would place the small African country in a situation of dangerous inferiority for its sovereignty, according to some observers.
They fear that Djibouti will suffer the same fate as Sri Lanka which, in 2017, had to cede control of its port to Chinese companies because the country could not repay the loans granted.
But in the opinion of experts interviewed by France 24, Djibouti is not Sri Lanka.
"China has learned from its mistakes in Sri Lanka, and is now more willing to renegotiate debts because it does not want to appear as the big bad in history", says the British specialist of the Horn of Africa interviewed by France 24.
The time has come to take stock of all these Chinese investments, and Djibouti is not sure that it will fully benefit from it.
Have all these large infrastructure projects really helped the country's development?
The port of Doraleh, for example, has done little for local employment and “it seems essentially turned outwards”, notes Thierry Peirault.
In other words, it is mainly Chinese companies that benefit from it.
In addition, the local population is also starting to wonder where all those billions of dollars invested have gone.
“Chinese money has had only a very limited impact for Djiboutians,” confirms the British political scientist.
If the authorities fail to prove that all these investments promote the overall development of the country, China could end up becoming a real political handicap.
The Chinese are no longer as enthusiastic as they were when they left for Djibouti.
Some achievements, such as the iconic Ethiopia railway, are slow to pay off.
“The Chinese realize that the projects they have financed do not necessarily hold water,” assures Thierry Peirault.
In addition, “they are starting to feel a bit cramped in this little pocket square with Americans right next to it, and French people looking out on the balcony,” adds Gérard Prunier.
This cooling of relations does not however call into question the Chinese presence in the country.
“Djibouti remains an important element of the 'silk roads'”, underlines the British expert.
But this cooling can allow other countries to advance their economic pawns.
"No other power is capable of replacing Beijing in terms of lending money, but it is possible that Djibouti begins to seek to diversify its sources of supply," notes Thierry Peirault.
Which could benefit French companies.
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