Consistently administer the party strictly in an all-round way and continuously strengthen the restriction and supervision of the operation of power
Prevent "top leader" from becoming "top leader"
● The "top leader" is the "squad leader" of the party and government leadership team, and belongs to the "key minority" in the "key minority"
● The "top leader" is in charge of a party and a domain, and is often regarded by lawbreakers as a key target for wooing, corroding, and hunting.
In 2020 alone, there will be 5,836 "top leaders" at the county level and above that have been filed and investigated by the national discipline inspection and supervision agencies
● In some typical cases, some “top leaders” have become “top leaders” and do whatever they want.
Problems with "top leaders" are often manifested as "one word" in decision-making, "one word" in employing people, "one pen" with money, and "one hand" in projects.
□ reporter Wang Yang
The "top leader" is the "squad leader" of the party and government leadership and belongs to the "key minority" in the "key minority".
For a period of time, some localities, units, and departments have imperfect systems and mechanisms for managing personnel and powers. There are oversight gaps such as too far superior supervision, too soft supervision at the same level, and too difficult supervision at the lower levels. Hegemonic exercise of power, illegal use of power, willful abuse of power, and even the use of power for personal gains and large-scale transfer of benefits have a negative impact on the political ecology and economic and social development of the locality and unit.
According to the official website of the State Supervision Commission of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, in 2020 alone, there will be 5,836 “top leaders” at the county level and above who have filed a case for investigation and investigation by the national discipline inspection and supervision organs.
An expert told the reporter of the "Rules of Law Daily" that a large number of facts show that the "top leader" is in charge of a party and a domain, and is often regarded by lawbreakers as a key target for attracting, corroding, and hunting.
A small number of "top leaders" take the power granted by the people for their own personal gain, and regard power, money, and pleasure as their life pursuits, which runs counter to the purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly.
Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Party Central Committee has attached great importance to the supervision of “top leaders”. General Secretary Xi Jinping has issued important instructions on many occasions. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee and the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection have focused on strengthening the supervision of “top leaders”. Clear arrangements have been made. At present, important systems such as the “three important and one large” collective decision-making system, the “three indirect management” system, and the “first commander” system for declaring the last position have been formed, releasing consistent and comprehensive and strict governance of the party, and continuously strengthening the control of power. A strong signal of operational constraints and supervision.
Adhere to the collective decision-making system
Effectively prevent personal arbitrariness
The so-called "three important and one large" collective decision-making system refers to the "three important and one large" issues that involve major decision-making, appointment and removal of important cadres, major project arrangements, and the use of large amounts of funds, which must be collectively discussed and decided by the leadership team in accordance with procedures and regulations. .
Except for matters that should be kept secret in accordance with the law, the "three important and one great" matters, the basis for decision-making, and the results of decision-making should be disclosed in various forms and within an appropriate scope to ensure the right of party members and cadres and the masses of workers to know.
According to Pan Chao, a researcher at the Collaborative Innovation Center for Clean Government Construction of Hunan Technology and Business University, before making decisions on the "three important and one big" issue, members of the team must be notified in writing to deliberate, and no temporary motions are allowed; emergency emergencies that have not been dealt with by collective research, the "top leader" The team members should be notified in a timely manner, and written records should be kept.
The purpose is to prevent the “top leaders” from being over-concentrated in power, causing individual arbitrariness, and to solve the problems of undemocratic, non-open, and opaque decisions in some units.
"But in the current reality, a considerable number of leading cadres have become'top leaders', and they feel that they are great, privileged thinking is serious, superior to others, unwilling to accept supervision, and regard themselves as the incarnation of a first-level organization, and other people must cooperate with others. If you stay consistent and treat different opinions as noise, you naturally don’t want to be supervised."
Ye Jiahe, the former director of the Science and Technology and Information Bureau of Siming District, Xiamen City, Fujian Province, who was previously "double-opened", once described himself as the director of the "Four Most": "I am the oldest, the highest position, the oldest, and the oldest in the Science and Technology Bureau. The business is the strongest, because of these four'most', it can be said that I have absolute power in the bureau."
The "Double Hundred" talent Zhang introduced to Xiamen established an information technology company. According to relevant policies, the company can apply for relevant support funds and subsidies in Siming District.
However, when the relevant departments inspected the "Double Hundred" enterprises on the spot, they found that Zhang's company had many problems in violation of the agreement, such as evading registered capital and embezzling supporting funds for other purposes.
Therefore, the staff issued a report based on the conclusion of the inspection, listing Zhang's company as a "reformed" enterprise, and suggested that the third 500,000 yuan support fund be postponed.
Ye Jiahe knew that Zhang's company had various violations, but he explained to the staff to modify the report and adjusted Zhang's company from "requiring rectification" to "stable progress", so that the company successfully received the 500,000 yuan. Support funds.
Afterwards, Zhang asked Ye Jiahe to eat, and during the dinner he handed Ye Jiahe two envelopes containing 20,000 yuan and 2,000 US dollars.
A reporter from the "Rules of Law Daily" combed and learned that a "top leader" like Ye Jiahe is not an exception in real life.
Zhang Qi, former member of the Standing Committee of the Hainan Provincial Party Committee and former Secretary of the Haikou Municipal Party Committee, practiced "paternalism" and "one-talked", using his position for personal gain and destroying the corporate political ecology.
When Zhang Qi was in charge of Danzhou, Sanya, Haikou and other places, he helped many private business owners illegally obtain nearly 7,000 acres of land.
Among them, it helped a real estate developer illegally set up exclusive conditions to illegally acquire more than 1,000 acres of land, occupy geological parks and ecological forest land, and caused billions of dollars in losses to the country.
Zhang Yunshu, a professor at the Law School of Anhui University of Finance and Economics, believes that as early as October 27, 2016, the "Regulations on Inner-Party Supervision of the Communist Party of China" approved by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made the "top leader" the key target of inner-party supervision. .
However, in the past period of time, due to the lack of lenient, soft, and loose management of party members by party organizations, many party members and leading cadres have a poor awareness of observing organizational discipline.
Some “top leaders” even regard the system as nothing and blatantly violate the “three important and one large” situation when they encounter major problem decisions, important cadres’ appointment and dismissal, major project investment decisions, and the use of large sums of funds, etc., which should have been decided through collective discussion. The collective decision-making system makes decisions without asking the organization for instructions and reports.
These serious violations of party discipline have caused significant economic losses to the party and the country and harmed the interests of the broad masses of the people.
Implement the principle of division of labor and responsibility
Optimize internal power allocation
Sorting out the cases of violations of discipline and law that have been investigated and dealt with throughout the country in recent years, many of the party members and cadres who have been investigated and punished are “top leaders” in regions, units, or departments.
In some typical cases, some "top leaders" have become "dominant players", domineering and do whatever they want.
Problems with "top leaders" are often manifested in "one word" in decision-making, "one sentence" in employing people, "one pen" with money, and "one-handed grasp" of projects.
On February 7, 2014, the Research Office of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection pointed out that in order to comprehensively deepen reforms, we must persist in thinking ahead.
It is necessary to effectively strengthen the checks and balances of power, according to the principle of division of labor and responsibility, appropriately decompose the power of main leading cadres, reduce the intervention of main leading cadres in specific affairs, and actively explore and promote the system of main leading cadres not directly in charge of specific affairs.
Since cadres and personnel, finance (affairs), and construction projects are the most important and sensitive hot issues of a unit, and the people are most concerned about, some "top leaders" have monopoly on these three aspects, resulting in an out-of-control and imbalance of power.
In order to curb the formation of this situation and strengthen the decentralization of powers and balances, many places have introduced the "three non-direct responsibility" system for the party and government officials, that is, the "top leaders" of the party and government at all levels do not directly take charge of cadres, personnel, finance (affairs), and engineering construction. For projects, these day-to-day management powers must be decomposed to deputies; the specific "decentralization" situation must be reported to the superior for the record; those who violate this regulation must be held accountable.
Hu Gongqun, a legislative consultant of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal People’s Congress, believes that the essence of the "three indirect control" system lies in the division of powers, optimizing the allocation of internal power, and enabling the power of the "top leader" to be checked and balanced.
The “top leaders” are required to focus their energy on controlling the overall situation and macro-control, and to strengthen supervision of the implementation and implementation of these matters.
A reporter from the "Rule of Law Daily" sorted out and learned that after the introduction of the "three non-direct management" system, officials in many places were investigated and punished for this.
Xiao Mou, former deputy head of Zhengxiang District and former director of the Public Security Branch of Hengyang City, Hunan Province, served as the chief of the public security of Nanyue District, Hengshan County, and Zhengxiang District. He gradually regarded one area as his own "exclusive territory". ", to act arbitrarily on major matters such as cadres and personnel, finance (affairs), and construction projects.
According to the case-handling personnel, Xiao Mou implements an inversion of the financial reporting process, and he signs and approves the invoice first, and then his subordinates sign it up.
In just a few years, Xiao had falsely invoiced and repaid more than 1 million yuan.
In this process, the failure to implement the "three non-direct management" system is an important reason.
Public information shows that because the Research Office of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has only made principled provisions on the decomposition of the powers of main leading cadres, in addition to the "three non-direct management" systems, there have also been "four non-direct management" systems, and "five non-direct management" systems. The system of "not directly in charge", the system of "six not in direct charge" and the system of "seven in not directly charge".
Xining City, Qinghai Province, formulated and issued the "Three Majors and One Large" Collective Decision-Making and the Main Persons in Charge of the "Four Not Directly Managed" System", which clarified that the main leaders of the party and government shall not directly be in charge of personnel, finance, and engineering projects. Directly in charge of the "material procurement work", clarify that a deputy leading cadre will be in charge.
Changchun City, Jilin Province has explored the establishment of a “five non-direct management” system for the main leaders of the municipal organs. The “top leaders” of the city’s party and government organs and enterprises and institutions at all levels require not only not directly in charge of finance, cadres and personnel, and engineering construction. The specific tasks of "administrative approval" and "material procurement" are assisted by other members of the team, and a power check-and-balance mechanism of "deputy duties, chief supervision, collective leadership, and democratic decision-making" is gradually formed.
Nanchang City, Jiangxi Province implements the "six non-direct responsibility" system for party and government officials. The "top leader" does not directly take charge of personnel, finance and engineering. It also adds three items of procurement, administrative examination and approval, and administrative law enforcement, aiming to operate through sound power Supervise and restrict the mechanism to promote the integrity of the party and government at all levels in Nanchang.
Changshan County, Zhejiang Province implements the "seven non-direct management" system. In addition to not directly in charge of the unit's finance, personnel, asset investment and management, the "top leader" also adds four tasks such as project planning, administrative approval, administrative law enforcement, and material procurement. Effectively reduce the incidence of corruption cases in party and government officials.
There is both democracy and concentration
Brainstorm the overall situation
The so-called “top leader” last position statement system refers to when the team collectively researches major issues and major issues, on the basis of fully promoting democracy, the “top leader” finally synthesizes the collective opinions and makes a final statement.
When there are obvious differences of opinion, according to the principle of minority obeying the majority, the team members shall vote collectively, but the "top leader" will still make the final statement according to the collective voting opinions.
Zhuang Deshui, deputy director of Peking University's Research Center for Integrity Construction, believes that democratic centralism is the combination of concentration on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance.
The lack of democratic awareness of "top leaders" will lead to "patriarchy" and "one-speaking"; a unit's lack of collective awareness of collective concentration will lead to a mess.
Only when there is democracy and concentration, can they complement each other, and the team can have cohesion, affinity, and combat effectiveness.
The last position of the “top leader” is a vivid practice of democratic centralism, requiring the “top leader” not only to take the lead, but also to let go, and to be good at mastering the overall situation on the basis of brainstorming.
A reporter from the Rule of Law Daily found that in reality, some “top leaders” always think that they are better than others. They like to make a final decision in their work. They can't listen to or tolerate different opinions. This makes the comrades working around them quiet and silent. In the end, Make a unit lifeless.
Yang Sitao, former party secretary and chairman of the Hainan Provincial Agricultural Reclamation Investment Holding Group Co., Ltd., and former director of the Hainan Provincial Agricultural Reclamation Administration, previously worked in Chengmai County. From deputy county head to county head and county party secretary, he was gradually promoted from deputy division level to department level. In the end, Chengmai "said no two."
What's more outrageous is that Yang Sitao used the county investment committee to suspend the standing committee of the county party committee and the executive meeting of the county government for a long time, and successively made 220 illegal decision-making issues. In his eyes, the system for the last position of the "top leader" was useless, and the kind reminders to the team members were also deaf to his ears.
In August last year, the First Branch of the Hainan Provincial People’s Procuratorate prosecuted allegations: From 2002 to 2017, Yang Sitao took advantage of the convenience of his position during his tenure in Chengmai County to seek benefits for several trustees in land expropriation and government project contracting. And agreed to accept huge bribes.
In addition, abuse of power, designated project construction in violation of regulations, and return of land transfer fees in violation of regulations caused huge losses of state-owned assets.
In addition, Yang Sitao, as a staff member of a state agency, took advantage of his position to seek benefits for others, and was suspected of taking 338 million yuan in bribes, causing a national economic loss of 12.3415.1 million yuan.
During the interview, Guo Zeqiang, a professor at Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, told the reporter of the Rule of Law Daily that due to the lack of power oversight, a small number of “top leaders” use power as a tool to seek personal benefits, and are accustomed to surpassing the team and the organization, and they do a lot of "one talk. Even cover the sky with one hand.
The system for the last position of the main person in charge of the party and government is a specific system derived from the democratic centralism principle of "collective leadership, democratic centralism, individual deliberation, and meeting decisions." Its purpose is to prevent the "top leaders" from taking the lead when discussing important matters. Set the tone, making the discussion a mere formality.
Li Huacheng, deputy dean of the School of Law of Yangtze University, believes that in recent years, the reason why some “top leaders” have become corrupt is subjectively their self-depravity, but objectively they lack effective supervision.
At present, the supervision and investigation of the "top leaders" of the party and government has been regarded as a key task from the central to the local level.
"To prevent democratic centralism from becoming a mere formality, while implementing the supervision and inspection mechanism of higher-level party committees (party groups), discipline inspection and supervision organs, and organizational personnel departments, it is also possible to introduce a mass supervision mechanism and actively invite people’s congress representatives, CPPCC members, mass representatives, and general cadres. Workers and other personnel attend party committee (party group) meetings as non-voting delegates to extend the connotation and level of the people's participation in politics. In addition, some resolutions involving the vital interests of the people can be announced to the public, and they can accept public opinion supervision and social comment.