China News Service, March 12th. According to the website of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, in order to thoroughly implement the decision and deployment of the Party Central Committee and the State Council on improving the corporate governance of financial institutions, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission systematically organized and carried out the "Rural Small and Medium Bank Shareholder Equity from 2018 to 2020." Three-year investigation and remediation action".

In the past three years, 3898 rural small and medium-sized banks have all completed institutional self-examination and supervisory inspections, achieving the goal of full coverage of investigations and remediation.

　　Rural small and medium-sized banks have a large number of shareholders and an extremely complex structure, showing the characteristics of "small", "scattered" and "weak".

Three years of investigation and rectification involved 385,000 shareholders holding 1% or more shares and 388.9 billion shares, and a total of 19,900 problems were discovered, which were reflected in the following five aspects:

　　First, the qualifications of shareholders are unqualified.

Some troubled investors bought shares through whitewashing of statements and financial fraud, laying hidden dangers for the healthy development of institutions.

For example, when a rural credit cooperative was restructured to form a rural commercial bank, the largest shareholder in the audit report inflated income by more than 80 million yuan, altered the actual operating loss to profit, and concealed the true qualifications.

　　Second, the source of funds for the shareholding is not compliant.

Some shareholders used entrusted funds to buy shares, which eventually led to equity disputes, affecting the stability of the organization's operations; some even borrowed money to buy shares, resulting in serious capital falsehoods.

For example, 70 shareholders of a rural commercial bank obtained a loan of 1.31 billion yuan from the bank to invest in it, accounting for 62% of the bank's total equity.

　　Third, evade "penetration" supervision and hold over-proportional and over-quantity equity.

Some shareholders concealed their relationship by signing drawer agreements with related parties and entrusting their holdings, etc., in violation of the "two participations or one control" and other regulatory requirements to buy a large number of shares in banks.

For example, Xu and his 22 "invisible" related parties hold 400 million shares of 17 rural commercial banks in the above manner, of which 13 are major shareholders.

　　Fourth, conduct related-party transactions in violation of regulations.

Some institutions violate the conditions and procedures of related party transactions or extend credit to shareholders in excess of their quotas, and some use various methods to cover up related party transactions to avoid supervision and information disclosure.

For example, a rural commercial bank issued a loan of 250 million yuan to nine related parties at a level less than half of the bank's minimum execution interest rate; a rural commercial bank failed to perform the related transaction review procedures, and its shareholders and multiple related companies adopted the method of "integrating into parts" Obtained dozens of loans from the bank, which accounted for 95% of the bank’s net capital, most of which have formed non-performing loans.

　　Fifth, the pledge of equity is not restricted.

Some shareholders failed to fulfill the obligation of prior notification to the institution and pledged equity in a high frequency and high proportion for financing; some institutions accepted the pledge of equity of the Bank directly or in disguise, which eventually resulted in a loss of capital.

For example, the six major shareholders of a rural bank failed to apply to the board of directors to pledge all their equity, resulting in the bank’s pledged equity accounting for as much as 56%; a rural commercial bank used the form of "equity pledge counter-guarantee" and actually accepted the The bank’s equity was pledged to provide shareholders with a credit of 110 million yuan.

　　The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission stated that over the past three years, on the basis of a comprehensive investigation, the regulatory authorities have taken a multi-pronged approach to clean up and rectify shareholder equity violations, achieving "three batches": rectifying a number of problems and launching regulatory agreements. There were 2611 talks, 2180 regulatory reminders were issued, 13,600 issues were urged to be rectified, and the rectification rate reached 70%; a group of shareholders were cleaned up, the voting rights of 4758 shareholders were restricted, and a total of 6.23 billion shares were ordered to be transferred; A number of institutions were punished, and 281 institutions were imposed administrative penalties in accordance with laws and regulations. The total amount of penalties was 150 million yuan, and a total of 711 people were given warnings, fines, and disqualifications of relevant persons responsible, and the total fines amounted to 20.39 million yuan.

In the process of rectification, we focused on compacting the main responsibilities of institutions and their shareholders, allowing old shareholders to bear losses in accordance with the law, strictly reviewing the qualifications of new shareholders, and promoting simultaneous and organic integration of rural small and medium-sized banks to optimize their governance structure and transform their operating mechanisms.

　　In the next step, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission will continue to consolidate the results of the three-year investigation and rectification of shareholder equity, with the promotion of strengthening the party’s leadership as the core, deepening the reform of rural small and medium-sized banks, and continuous improvement of shareholder equity management and corporate governance through standardizing shareholder behavior. Optimize the shareholding structure, improve the governance level, and promote the enhancement of the “two capabilities” of small and medium-sized banks in risk prevention and control and serving the real economy, and better empower them to build a new development pattern and serve rural revitalization.