On the eighth of last December, Russia and Sudan announced that they had reached an agreement allowing the former to operate a naval facility in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, thus becoming the first Russian naval military base in Africa since the Soviet era, provided that the facility would be used - mainly - as a A logistical support center and repair and resupply point for ships, while giving the Russians the right to use neighboring Sudanese airports to transport weapons, ammunition and equipment needed to build and operate the base.
The agreement gives Moscow the privilege to operate the base, which is to be established for a period of 25 years, which can be automatically extended every 10 years with the consent of the two parties, and also provides for the Russian Navy to deploy up to four pieces of war at one time, including nuclear powered ships (Russian nuclear submarines in general). President), provided that the number of personnel at the base is limited to 300 military personnel only for operating tasks.
In return, Russia pledges to provide weapons and training to the Sudanese army, in line with the security cooperation agreement signed by the two parties in (May) 2019, and stipulates Moscow's commitment to providing military support to the Sudanese government.
This Sudanese base is a link in a series of military installations that Moscow seeks to spread along the waterways outside its borders, and also includes the naval base run by the Russian army in the port of Tartus in Syria since 1971, which the Russians signed a contract to expand three years ago to accommodate 11 ships, including Ships operating with nuclear energy, and despite the modesty of the specifications of the Sudanese naval facility compared to the Tartous base, and other traditional naval bases, to the point that it is actually closer to a logistical support center than it being a real base serving the tasks of deploying the Russian naval force, despite this its importance The strategy is far more than its size.
This importance is not due only to the fact that a sea site in Sudan would expand Russia's maritime influence in the East and Horn of Africa region, along the vital shipping routes in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and throws Moscow into the heart of a maritime battlefield that many regional and global powers compete for Control over it, but the main importance is also due to the fact that returning to the exercise of influence in the Red Sea was a delayed dream that the Russians have sought to achieve since they were forced to leave this vital region following the collapse of the Soviet Union nearly three decades ago, a dream that Moscow seems to be succeeding in achieving despite everything .
The interest in the Red Sea is not considered a new matter to the Russian military doctrine. The Russians have always viewed the region as a valuable theater to show their power since the thirties of the last century, although the Soviet Union did not appear as a major player on the scene until the end of the sixties, coinciding with the military coup that occurred. Muhammad Siad Barre led him into Somalia in 1969 with the support of the Kremlin.
Later, the Soviets expanded their influence by supporting Djibouti's independence in the mid-1970s.
But by the end of the decade, Moscow's relations with both countries had entered into a wave of tension due to overt Russian support for Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, and it became clear that the Soviets had decided to bet on Addis Ababa as a winning horse in the Horn of Africa.
The Soviet navy ships were already stationed at the entrance to the Red Sea on the island of Nouakra, where they supported the Communist regime in Addis Ababa led by Mengistu Haile Mariam in the face of the rebels demanding independence in Eritrea, which was then still part of Ethiopia.
At the same time, Moscow had a strong naval presence in southern Yemen, the British colony at that time ruled by a Marxist regime that relied entirely on Russian support for its survival.
Ethiopian Derg Communist Marxist-Leninist military junta leaders, Lieutenant colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam with the 2 Soviet leaders, Leonid Brezhnev (1978) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984) pic.twitter.com/pKocq2TVuD
- Nico Delano Leo (@NicoDelanoLeo) June 3, 2019
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, most of the Marxist regimes around the world fell successively, as the dominoes fell, and Addis Ababa was no exception, as the pro-Moscow Communist government was overthrown and Eritrea gained its independence leaving Ethiopia as a geopolitically limp state, and the People's Democratic Republic in South Yemen was forced, under the weight of the fall of its only global supporter, to enter into a forced union with the north, within a wave of forced changes that ended Russia's presence and influence in the region.
Excluding the use of Russian missiles and aircraft by the fighting forces in Ethiopia and Eritrea during the war between the two countries (1998-2000);
The Kremlin remained a marginal player in the Horn of Africa for nearly thirty years, and specifically until the famous piracy crisis in 2008. Because of the threat that Somali pirates pose to their commercial interests, the Russians actively participated in international efforts to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa in cooperation with the European Union and the United States, However, this participation was not sufficient to satisfy Moscow's ambitions to restore its geopolitical presence, prompting it to search for more feasible means of exercising influence.
From the point of view of the Kremlin’s decision-makers, the search for a firm military foothold in the region was the only guarantee for Russia to regain its ability to spread its influence in the vital shipping lanes connecting Asia and Europe, across the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.
All the way to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, so the Russians engaged in strenuous efforts to establish a naval military presence for them in the region again.
In October 2008, Sergei Mironov, president of the Federal Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, visited Yemen, expressing his desire to build a base for his country on the Red Sea coast.
Over the following years, the two sides entered into intense negotiations, but the era of uncertainty and instability that followed the ouster of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2012 led to the derailment of this plan, and prompted Moscow to shift its focus towards building a facility in the Horn of Africa.
In 2014, Moscow embarked on negotiations to build a naval base in Djibouti, but Djiboutian officials eventually rejected the Kremlin's overtures under US pressure.
Later in 2018, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held talks with Eritrea to set up a logistics center on the Red Sea coast, but no significant progress was made on the project.
In light of this series of attempts and failures, Moscow would not have missed the offer of former Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in early 2019 to host a Russian military base, and immediately entered into serious discussions with Khartoum to put the final touches on the agreement, despite the fact that the military presence in Sudan is considered Less geopolitically feasible compared to Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
The Sudanese offer was the culmination of decades of close bilateral relations between the two countries, especially in the era of Al-Bashir, who ruled for nearly thirty years after he ousted the elected Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in a military coup in 1989. Since the early years of his rule, Bashir established good relations with Russia in search of international sponsors in His relations with the West remained tense.
Although Moscow was not supportive of the Al-Bashir regime all along, for example, it supported the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations on the regime due to the war in Darfur, it returned and supplied Al-Bashir with T-72 tanks, grenades and other weapons in the country. 2008 year.
By the last years of Bashir's rule, relations between Russia and Sudan deepened even more.
In a meeting Al-Bashir held with Putin in November 2017, the Sudanese president accused Washington of supporting the "rebels" in Darfur, and urged Moscow to intervene to protect Sudan from the supposed American aggression, stressing that his country could be Russia's "gateway to Africa." That meeting was most likely what launched the series of negotiating rounds that ended with Al-Bashir's call for the Russians to establish a naval base on his country's territory.
But the winds coming from Khartoum quickly brought what the Moscow ships did not desire, as the Bashir regime failed to contain the popular uprising that broke out against it in late 2018, despite the Russians deploying mercenaries of the Wagner Company, a private security company linked to the Kremlin, in order to help the regime. Containing troubles.
By April 2019, the army was forced to intervene to topple Al-Bashir, and for fear that political changes in Khartoum would cause the relationship to fluctuate, as Moscow invested heavily in its partnership with the Sudanese army, even with the cost of this negative partnership on its relations with the revolutionary and rising civil currents, those who viewed with suspicion the role The Russian Federation since the last opposition to the Security Council resolution condemning the massacre committed by Sudanese regular forces against peaceful demonstrators in June of the same year.
As a historical agent of Russian weapons (Sudan is the third largest market for Russian weapons in Africa after Algeria and Egypt), betting on the Sudanese army was the safest option for the Kremlin to maintain its influence there, and to ensure that negotiations over the military base did not stop after Bashir's departure, a proven bet. His success - so far at least - with the success of the Russians in convincing the head of the ruling military transitional council, "Abdel Fattah al-Burhan" and his allies within the army of the importance of the Russian presence on Sudanese lands, especially that the new base agreement came accompanied by a series of profitable commercial contracts, and promises of arms deals, likely To strengthen the army's ability to suppress any popular uprisings against it in the future.
There are many justifications that explain the 12 years of Russian attempts to build a naval base near the Red Sea, efforts that culminated in their success in obtaining a logistical facility in Port Sudan.
At the most direct level, Moscow will use its new logistical facility to protect its Sudanese investments and strengthen its relations with the African country, given that Russia already has a security presence in it through Wagner mercenaries formally assigned to guard the Sudanese gold mines run by the "M-Invest" company associated with the group's owner Yevgeny Prigozhin. Close to Russian President Putin, the Russians hope that the new base will allow them to legitimize their military presence in Khartoum, and help them boost their investment in the gold field, as well as upgrade the relationship between the two countries through naked arms sales - Russia controls 80% of arms imports The Sudanese since 2003 - Towards a more comprehensive security partnership.
Moscow will likely use its naval presence in Sudan to enhance its credibility as a reliable partner in confronting maritime security threats in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, given that the Russian naval doctrine formally classifies piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, along with the Gulf of Guinea and the Pacific Ocean, as threats. Serious wish.
Given the growing cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia to maintain the stability of world oil prices, Moscow's direct presence near oil transport routes will also allow it to intervene - if needed - to prevent rebel groups in Yemen or Somalia from disrupting shipping across the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. .
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Vladimir Putin
To the north, Russia will be able to use its facilities in Sudan as a starting point to enhance its ability to project its power in the Mediterranean by easing the resupply commitments of its naval base in Tartus, and to achieve its goal of transforming the Syrian base from a mere supply facility to a multi-purpose naval base. It could change the strategic equation in the eastern Mediterranean by dismantling the quasi-blockade practiced by NATO on the movements of Russian ships, by virtue of the alliance's effective control over the vital straits in its member Turkey.
By providing a more convenient point for the stopping and resupply of Russian surface ships transiting from the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, these ships will no longer be forced to travel along the Red Sea and the Suez Canal towards the Mediterranean to reach the necessary supplies in Syria.
Otherwise, Moscow's positioning in the south of the Red Sea will give it additional influence over traffic through the Suez Canal, which accounts for 10% of global maritime traffic, by providing a naval stronghold for the Russian Navy south of that stranglehold.
On a larger scale, we can consider the new base as part of a more comprehensive Russian strategy to consolidate its influence in Central Africa and its eastern coasts, besides the facility to be built in Port Sudan, Russia intends to build more military bases and installations in the Central African Republic, Madagascar and Mozambique, and it is still striving as well. To acquire a meaningful military presence in Eritrea, and even in the port of Berbera in Somaliland.
Within this framework, the Sudanese base is expected to act as a steadfast center for support of Russian forces and interests across the continent.
For example, we find that Russia is investing in offshore gas reserves all over Mozambique, and at the same time it is deploying Wagner mercenaries in the northern province of Cabo Delgado to confront the violent rebellion that threatens the gas pipelines there.
The presence of Russian warships in Sudan is likely to allow Moscow to better manage its activity on the Mozambican theater by moving ships to strike vital rebel targets on the shore, cut off supply routes, and establish an effective presence to gain more points with the regime in Maputo.
By analogy with the case of Mozambique, Russia's possession of a naval base on the Red Sea can be considered a confirmation of Moscow's desire to re-establish contact with the continent in general, a trend that appears to be receiving high-level Russian attention, as demonstrated during the Russian-African summit held in Sochi in October 2019. In the presence of more than 50 African heads of state and government.
At a time when the United States is reducing its foreign obligations;
Moscow seeks to establish itself as a more reliable source of military support for its allies, and the continued presence of the Russian Navy, along with the activities of the Wagner Group, will contribute to cementing impressions about Moscow as a reliable ally and reliable guarantor of the survival of regimes on the continent of whatever kind.
However, the Russian presence in Sudan does not only serve Moscow's security and military activities in Africa, and it is more meaningful to Russia's ambitions to establish itself as a naval power on the world stage.
According to an assessment issued by the German Foreign Ministry, the expected Russian base on the Red Sea will be the latest link in a series of facilities that extend from Sevastopol in the Crimea peninsula to Syria to Sudan and the Horn of Africa, which will allow the Russian navy to link its activities in the Black and Mediterranean Bahrain with the ocean. Indian and Gulf of Aden, all the way to the Pacific Ocean.
In other words, Moscow hopes - perhaps - that its presence in Sudan near the Red Sea, choke points and pivotal waterways such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal, will give it important privileges on the strategic maritime theater extending between India and the Pacific Ocean, after Sudan was included in the list. Of the countries located on the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with which Moscow has concluded agreements regarding privileges access to ports, as the list includes other countries, on top of which are Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Seychelles and Vietnam (where Russia had a permanent naval facility until 2002).
Moreover, if Al Qaeda in Sudan really proves that it is capable of supporting nuclear powered ships, it could become an important new operational site for Russian nuclear submarines, which would allow Moscow to project more power in the region through ships coming from its remote bases in the Pacific Ocean. .
Despite these ambitious Russian plans, there are factors that push us to doubt the possibility of the Kremlin's success in achieving its dreams of exercising an effective naval presence in the Red Sea region.
At the forefront of these factors are the conditions set out in the Sudanese base agreement itself, which limits the number of ships that Russia can operate to only four units, which will determine the actual role of the facility in logistical support activities without expanded operations to project influence, as well as the relatively limited economic and logistical capabilities of the Russians that make The Kremlin's plans to develop and rebuild its four main fleets are proceeding very slowly, which casts doubts on the amount of resources that the Russians would be able to harness to develop their Sudanese base even if they were able to relatively amend the conditions restricting them in the current agreement.
Otherwise, compared to the facilities that the Soviet navy used in the region in the past, such as the old operating base on the Yemeni island of Socotra, Port Sudan is not a geopolitically ideal location, as Russian ships will have to sail through the Bab al-Mandab Strait before entering the Indian Ocean, as well as that Russian influence will remain vulnerable to risks associated with internal fragility and political unrest in Sudan, including in hotspots such as Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
There are also technical obstacles that may stand in the way of operating the facility effectively, the most prominent of which is related to the way in which the energy supplies needed for operation will be provided, as the city of Port Sudan contains only one diesel power plant with a capacity of 337 megawatts, which means that Russia will have to operate the facility through Diesel generators use fuel that is transported directly from their core, which means significantly higher operating costs.
Moreover, the clause included in the agreement allowing Moscow to operate nuclear powered ships at the facility only sounds good in theory, but in practice the infrastructure of Port Sudan and the Red Sea in general is not well equipped to dock and service nuclear powered submarines, as well. Russia has only one nuclear fuel surface ship, a Kirov-class cruiser named "Pyotr Veliki" or Peter the Great, which has not been deployed outside Russian seas for a long time, and is expected to soon enter a long renewal process, which means that No Russian nuclear-powered units will be available to operate in Sudan anytime soon.
Even with logistical obstacles being overcome, there remains a bundle of political risks associated with Moscow's ambitions to strengthen its presence around the Red Sea, and most of these risks are linked to the expected competition with other players in the region.
In its quest to re-establish itself as a powerful force in East Africa, Russia is stepping into a hotly contested arena between the United States and China, where the two countries have two military bases in Djibouti, only 15 minutes apart by car.
While Washington already has concerns about Beijing's intentions to disrupt the port of Djibouti and choke off military supplies heading to Camp Lemonnier, these concerns will be exacerbated by the docking of Russian warships on the coasts of Sudan and the expected ignition of maneuvers in the congested waterways of American, European and Chinese ships, which means adding A new layer of complexity to the challenges of navigation in the Red Sea.
Nevertheless, Moscow is unlikely to seek to provoke the United States early on, given the strong American presence in the region, in comparison with which the Russian presence will become relatively dim.
On the other hand, expectations indicate that Moscow's moves aim - in the short term at least - to compete with smaller regional powers, led by Turkey, which is engaged in diplomatic battles against the Russians on a number of theaters, especially since the decision to establish the Russian naval base came at a time Ankara is struggling to regain its influence in Sudan after the departure of Al-Bashir, while the fate of the logistical facility project that Ankara intends to construct on Suakin Island remains ambiguous at best, although Turkey is still continuing to restore artifacts dating back to the Ottoman era on the island.
Moreover, Port Sudan is located on the opposite bank of Mecca in Saudi Arabia.
From this angle, the kingdom can easily view Moscow's moves as destabilizing, especially since Russia is likely to deploy reconnaissance assets, special forces and mercenary soldiers in its Sudanese facilities a few kilometers from the kingdom, concerns that are exacerbated in view of the existing military cooperation between Russia and Iran. The arch-opponent of Saudi Arabia, in some regions of the Middle East, especially Syria, and in light of this, it would not be unlikely that the Kingdom would use its financial influence over the Sudanese regime to limit the Russian military presence near its shores.
Saudi pressures will not be the only ones that Sudan will endure due to the Russian presence.
With the United States removing the country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and Khartoum's readiness to integrate into the international community, it would not be unlikely that Washington would ask the Sudanese regime in return to reduce its relations with Moscow, or threaten to re-impose sanctions again, and at that time Sudan may decide to reverse its decision. On the Russian base, hitting the Kremlin’s ambitious plans.
Moscow's grand ambitions then reveal the limits of its power and its inherent vulnerability at the same time.
Nevertheless, Moscow does not seem reluctant to embark on a new round of dangerous power adventures, this time on the coast of Africa, in the hope that the power vacuum and Western hesitation will benefit it again, as happened before that in Ukraine.
Deep down, Vladimir Putin believes he is an accomplished geopolitical chess player, but the main reason for his ingenuity is that his opponents often decide to withdraw, leaving the board empty for him to play alone again and again.