Iran was one of the first hands to support the Assad regime in Syria after the peaceful protests against it in 2011. The Iranian influence in Syria expanded until it outperformed all foreign parties that intervened in the Syrian conflict, including the United States, which the US President’s administration did not pay attention to. The outgoing Donald Trump, despite all the strongly worded speeches he made, threatening Iran, its presence and influence in Syria.

But what can the administration of President-elect Joe Biden do to displace the Iranian forces and their various arms in Syria?

Taking into account the external actors on the ground there: Moscow and Ankara.

On this topic, Elizabeth Dent, a non-resident researcher in the Middle East Institute's Program for Combating Terrorism and Extremism, and Arian Tabatabaei, a fellow for Middle East affairs in the German Marshall Fund's Coalition for Democracy, wrote a report published by the American magazine Foreign Affairs.

In early December, the Iraqi authorities announced the killing of a commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in an air strike. This commander had entered Syria via Iraq on November 29, and was in possession of a shipment of weapons.

This news came days after an assassination took place near Tehran and affected another high-ranking official in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who has long been viewed by the intelligence agencies as the mastermind of Iran's previous secret nuclear program.

Although Israel has remained silent as usual, its intelligence service is widely suspected of involvement in the two operations.

Iranian officials were quick to hold Israel responsible for the killing of Zadeh and vowed revenge, but they refused to admit that there had been an attack in the first place against the Revolutionary Guards, not to mention that it had killed a prominent leader near the Iraqi-Iranian border.

A day after the funeral of Fakhrizadeh, which was broadcast on state television, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman mocked the reports of the killing of a commander in the Revolutionary Guard in Syria, describing it as a "media bang."

Iran has a strong justification for avoiding attracting attention to its activities in Syria, as the Iranian regime has always downplayed its role in that conflict.

In mid-December, US analysts focused on whether Iran's promised retaliation for the killing of Fakhrizadeh could derail President-elect Joe Biden's hopes to revive the Iran nuclear deal.

However, the connection between Tehran and Damascus remains a threat to the stability of the region, as tensions between Iran and Israel in their conflict over Syria are accelerating, which may force the Biden administration to act there soon after he takes office.

For years, Israel has routinely struck Iranian sites in Syria, and in the past few months, Israel has targeted sensitive Iranian sites with strikes that have raised tensions between Iran and the United States.

And news sources reported that US President Donald Trump gave his hard-line Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, the green light to punish Iran, as long as the attacks "will not spark a third world war."

The White House did not confirm this news, but it seems that the Americans are sleeping in the Iranian government with the idea that the United States will continue to give Israel the green light for its actions or even to take matters into its own hands targeting Iranian sites.

Biden indicated that confronting Iran's presence and influence in Syria would be a priority for his administration, as Tehran contributes to destabilizing the region by supporting the regime in Damascus, which brutally oppresses its people, and also by pumping weapons and equipment to its allies and non-governmental partners in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.

The Trump administration diagnosed the problem correctly, but it pursued an all-or-nothing policy that greatly overestimated Washington's influence over Tehran.

This approach helped establish ISIS in Syria and expand its influence.

If Biden wants to go against this trend, his foreign policy team will have to work with partners in the region and Europe, and realize that Iran is almost certain to maintain a degree of influence in Syria.

In addition, the US influence in Syria is limited, but it includes air power, presence in the northeastern part of the country, and control over oil fields.

American influence also includes the possibility of easing sanctions, which is what Iran and Syria badly need.

Since its Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran's relations with its Arab neighbors have been full of obstacles.

During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, nearly all Arab countries sided with Saddam Hussein, while Syria was a clear exception as it helped Iran.

During the next two decades, during the eras of Hafez al-Assad and his son and successor Bashar, Syria remained among the Islamic Republic's only loyal allies in the region.

At the beginning of the movement in Syria in 2011, Iran extended its hands to the regime to help it crush it, and what Tehran initially saw turned into a swift campaign that will end into a full-fledged military intervention that included members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in addition to the conventional military forces.

Iran was also gradually mobilizing its non-state allies and partners to support Assad.

It is difficult from publicly available information to estimate the number of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces still operating in Syria.

Many Iranian forces left the Syrian lands after Assad tightened his grip, but a number of military commanders and agents remained in order to protect Iranian interests and oversee ongoing operations.

Tehran sees Syria as a crucial component of the "resistance axis", and an important route for the transfer of weapons and other equipment to the Lebanese Hezbollah.

Also, any government that might come in the post-Assad era may not favor Iranian influence, and it may even be the majority of it Sunnis, and thus it may line up with Iran's regional enemies such as Saudi Arabia.

And with Iran's few allies in the region, it sees a friendly Syrian government as essential to its presence and strength.

Over the past four years, the Trump administration has pursued a careless policy in Syria that destroyed the credibility of the United States and worked in favor of Iran, as the United States repeatedly announced the withdrawal and gradual reduction of its forces, and disregarded its obligations to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is its partner in the fight against ISIS.

These and other decisions in Syria lied to Trump's strongly worded speeches, which suggests that fighting Iran was not really a priority for the President.

The new administration led by Biden needs to acknowledge that its options in the face of Iranian influence in Syria are limited, but it can still take some immediate steps. For example, the "SDF" forces are currently facing an order from Washington to stop talks with the Syrian regime, and the new administration must remove this stumbling block and allow With greater participation by the "SDF" with Russia as a mediator.

If there is one regional player who strongly opposes Iranian influence in Syria, it is the "Qasd" forces, as Iranian-backed militias exhausted the "Qasd" forces along the Euphrates River, and they did the same with the population in the cities of Deir Ezzor and Qamishli.

The "SDF", especially if it negotiates with Russia, can help remove the militias linked to Iran from the areas that the United States and other parties are working to stabilize.

The current US policy is to refuse to normalize relations with the brutal Assad regime, while many Arab countries are already seeking to restore diplomatic ties with Syria, with or without the knowledge of the United States.

Recently, Oman reopened its ambassador to Damascus, and earlier in 2020 the United Arab Emirates reopened its embassy there.

The United States can influence these talks by involving the Gulf states in them, as well as hinting that it will allow their back channels with the Syrian regime to continue.

The United States has always maintained a diplomatic channel with Russia on the Syrian issue.

While the United States is aware of Russia's limited influence and the latter's desire to partner with Iran, it must continue to cooperate with Russia where their interests coincide.

On the other hand, Moscow and Tehran seek to declare Assad's victory and to benefit from that, and the United States must take advantage of the growing gap between Russia and Iran, so America can pressure Russia to help remove Iranian forces and their militias from the adjacent areas along the Euphrates River, It is those close to Israel.

In return, it can surrender to Moscow areas that are not important to the United States, but Russia sees it as important for its goals of restoring the Assad regime's control over all Syrian lands, such as the American base in Al-Tanf.

Moreover, the United States must cooperate with Ankara and Moscow to exclude Iran, and one possibility is that America will start tripartite talks on terrorist cells in Idlib, the last remaining stronghold of the Syrian opposition, and it is clear that it is home to some of the "Islamic State" and "Al Qaeda." And some other violent extremist groups.

This task will not be easy, as US-Turkish relations are not at their best, and Moscow and Ankara do not basically agree on what groups should be considered terrorist, in addition to that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has shown his ability to engage with hot files, from Eastern Europe. And even North Africa.

Nevertheless, Washington can strengthen the US presence in northeastern Syria, while working to uproot terrorist cells and re-insert itself as a key player in the future of Syrian diplomatic efforts.

The United States must continue to work closely with Israel to ensure two things: that Israel has the freedom to defeat threats near its border with Syria, and that it has a role in any negotiations over Iran and its arms.

The United States may be able to use the talks it has with Israel and Russia separately as a starting point for tripartite negotiations, in which the United States and Israel can hold Russia responsible for any promises it makes.

In addition, the tripartite negotiations may prove useful in sharing intelligence efforts regarding Iranian weapons, Iran's moves and its threats to Israel.

The Middle East issue that the Biden administration inherits will be a complex one, the least of which is the tensions between Iran and Israel, including their conflict over Syria.

The current US policy aimed at addressing the Iranian role in Syria overestimates the influence of the United States and its ability to outpace Iranian influence.

The new US administration must accept this situation at the present time, as Iran will not leave Syria completely, nor will it completely lose its influence there, but a realistic and gradual US policy in Syria will help reduce tensions and reduce its losses.

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This article is translated from Foreign Affairs and does not necessarily feature Maidan.