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In the end it got hectic.

Negotiators from Brussels and Beijing had been negotiating an investment agreement for almost seven years.

And then, in the last few weeks of 2020, things suddenly happened very quickly.

A video conference at the highest level had to be hastily organized for December 30th, in the period between the years when Brussels and the European capitals normally stand still, in order to seal the negotiators' outcome.

This graduation on the penultimate day of 2020 bears the signature of Angela Merkel.

Even before the corona pandemic, she had made relations between China and the EU a central topic of the German EU Council Presidency.

She stuck to this despite Corona and pushed the deal with China to the end.

Against the opposition from countries like the Netherlands, which have warned that China's commitment to more workers' rights and against forced labor is only lip service.

And against the concerns, not only in Eastern Europe, that it is unwise to confront future US President Joe Biden with a fait accompli by concluding the contract.

The skeptical heads of government in other European capitals finally approved the outcome of the negotiations;

this even applies to Emmanuel Macron.

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How Merkel persuaded the French president to do so remains her secret.

A deal is conceivable that provides that the German Chancellor can get the agreement wrapped up in her Council Presidency, but that the agreement will only be ratified under the French Council Presidency in the first half of 2022.

Macron would then have the option of exerting pressure on Beijing so that something really happens with the promised ratification of workers' rights - or otherwise the ratification will fail.

Désolé!

Despite this back door, has Brussels been ripped off by pressure from Berlin?

In terms of trade policy, the negotiators from Brussels deserve praise, after all they have succeeded in making it easier for European companies to invest and do business in China;

especially in some areas of the economy that were previously closed to foreign investors.

Anyone who represents a car manufacturer like Volkswagen or a supplier like Bosch and can therefore look at the agreement in such a pragmatic way will also allow the negotiators to get the best out of the rules of the game in the Chinese market.

It was clear from the start that anyone who believed that they could deprive state-owned companies of their benefices and thus fundamentally change the Chinese economic system was an illusion.

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But if you see the treaty as part of the much broader relationship between China and the EU and not just from a mercantile perspective, the agreement is an unreasonable expectation at this point.

After a year in which Beijing put down civil rights demonstrations in Hong Kong, tightened the repression there with a security law, promoted the spread of corona worldwide with a slice of information policy and also reportedly spread false news about the pandemic with a targeted campaign in Europe - according to one Such a year the Europeans hand the Chinese leadership a trade-policy success.

And that although Brussels never tires of emphasizing that its own trade policy should spread European values ​​worldwide.

Is like an outstretched middle finger

In geopolitical terms, Merkel risks hindering the restart with the USA with the agreement.

Just a few weeks ago, the EU signaled with a new transatlantic agenda that it was looking forward to a US president who would again listen to allies and take partnerships seriously.

Brussels stresses that the relationship with the US must be renewed in order to work together with China.

Signing a treaty with China a few days before President Biden's inauguration, however, is like holding out a middle finger to signal that when in doubt, market access is so important that we cannot wait for Biden.

The geopolitical thinking that Ursula von der Leyen has prescribed to the EU Commission has apparently not yet fully arrived at the powerful authority.

In fact, the negotiators under the responsible German General Director Sabine Weyand could feel like the leading actress in “Goodbye Lenin”.

The woman falls into a coma in the GDR and wakes up months later.

The turning point has taken place and she now lives in a completely different world.

The EU negotiators had been negotiating a simple investment deal for seven years;

largely beyond media coverage and public perception.

When Beijing made decisive concessions in December and a deal seemed possible by the end of the year, the negotiators were suddenly criticized.

The world around them had changed.

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The Chinese state is now more repressive internally and more aggressive externally than at the beginning of the negotiations.

For the time being, observers have given up hope that capitalism could also establish democracy in China.

The EU declared China a systemic rival in 2019;

similar to the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

And today, European managers no longer only have euro symbols in their eyes when they think of China, but fear Chinese companies are now highly innovative competitors.

The fact that Merkel pushed ahead with the deal also shows that she is pursuing her own line in politics with China.

That should be fine with the German auto industry.

VW sells every second car in the People's Republic, and China is the most important market for Daimler.

Thanks to the agreement, they will also be able to get involved in electric vehicles in the future.

With the strategic decision to rely so heavily on the Chinese market, Volkswagen in particular has maneuvered itself into a dependency that barely leaves the German government the choice of being critical of China.

Merkel is known to believe that a fundamental shift in global power relations in the direction of Asia is inevitable.

China is going up and Europe is going down - that is a strong argument for a quick deal if Beijing offers the opportunity.

The prediction, however, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy when Europe no longer insists on its values.