Since the birth of the modern Salafi version at the beginning of the twentieth century, and in the context that followed the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and the emergence of a number of different Islamic revival movements;
The Salafist movement in general has become mainly preoccupied with advocacy and religious educational work, and politics has not had a prominent place in its list of priorities, neither in thought nor in action.
In general, this can be attributed to the nature of the influence and influence of the Wahhabi call and its extensions in the Arab world within the Saudi expansion project through competition for the authority of Sunni Islam.
This though not the only reason;
It is of great relative weight and effective in the equation of forming the Salafi intellectual imagination throughout the Arab and Islamic countries.
In view of Egypt's location and its geopolitical and historical importance;
Talking about any transformations or intellectual stations in it is like talking about one of the central regions in the Arab world whose influence extends to distant countries, and history always tells us about the impact of reform and modernization movements in Egypt and the limits of their influence on the Arab and Islamic world, especially in the last three centuries.
With the events of the 25 January 2011 revolution and its aftermath;
The Salafists found themselves facing a suitable opportunity to fill part of the political and social void that was left after Mubarak's resignation, and for various reasons they rushed to exploit this vacuum in a way that serves their reform vision, especially since the space for political competition at that time was inflamed, and many Islamic and secular trends entered it.
Sectors of the Salafi currents in general, and in Egypt in particular, dealt with the model of modern political practice (elections - parliaments - the constitution - political parties) according to the famous saying of the Salafi Sheikh Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani: “Politics is leaving politics,” and the broader sectors of the Salafis remained in a form. It deals with politics on two levels:
The first
sets out a specific Islamic conceptual framework for the term;
It is all related to managing people's political, social, economic and religious affairs. Salafi literature often issues the goals of politics in Islam with the function of "arbitrating Islamic law" and preserving the "Islamic identity" as it is the major goals pursued by Islamic movements in general, in light of man-made laws, according to what he sees A large sector of Islamic trends.
The second
level is the modern level of politics, a level that is treated as an importer, alien to the Islamic environment, and an outsider to it, and thus it becomes among the ideas and practices that are dealt with with apprehension and concern from a religious standpoint as it is "the last Western".
The Salafis then start from an "Islamic identity" with a special conceptual framework that places a special meaning of politics in its religious vocabulary, and deals with a logic that breaks down to a large extent with incoming Western concepts.
The Salafi theories inform us of the content of their view of the idea and practice of politics with its modern Western model, as most of them agreed before the January revolution that it was not permissible to participate in elections in all their forms, because of their uselessness, from their point of view, in achieving political and social change towards the Salafi Islamic model, and the necessity to make "legitimate" concessions On the constants of Islamic law, in addition to their historical interest in their missionary and educational function as a basic function to achieve the political and social perception of the Muslim state.
Despite the foregoing, it is necessary to look more deeply into the motives that prevent Salafis from participating at some point.
Salafi thought in general pays great attention to what he calls "the method", which means the best way they see to practice and manage the affairs of life and society, which must be according to the vision they see that the "method of the Prophet and his companions" developed it through their interaction with the Qur'anic and prophetic text, which is the approach that According to the Salafi vision, it is necessary to avoid any action or idea outside the permissible conceptual framework, especially with regard to modern Western concepts and practices.
This “curriculum” was formed on the basis of an interpretive model that deals with the interpretation of religious texts as requiring the determination of the special method and the necessary distinction between them and others who did not adhere to this interpretation (1).
With the development of this interpretive context historically, a state of increasing discrimination arose based on this "method" with the Wahhabi revival of "Ibn al-Qayyim" and "Ibn Taymiyyah" literature, and Saudi policy until a decade ago adopted an expansionary pattern through the spread of Salafi thought regionally.
The effect of exporting the pattern of Saudi religiosity on the structure of the Salafist perception towards the state and political action is shown by marketing the idea of the Saudi model of governance as it combines a faction that manages political affairs without democracy, and a faction that manages religious affairs with great powers that include the social life of people, as this helped to standardize a concept. He is political in the Salafi imagination, and the traditional approach to politics in the Salafi concept has been limited to the Saudi experience without other more modernized models at the level of the governance model.
With regard to Salafism in Egypt;
The Salafi currents agreed before January 2011 to adopt a blocking or conservative stance towards democracy. The “Salafi Call” in Alexandria showed a stance that prohibits participation, without denying the participants, because participation requires concessions on religious constants that they cannot compromise.
Yasser Burhami, one of the most important theorists of Salafism in Egypt, mentions two clear statements of the Salafist stance towards democracy, saying: “The truth is that words like political action, democracy, and pluralism are glamorous words that have no truth, and they have no share of application even among those who claim to embrace them. And defending it "(2), and Burhami adds that they" see that politics be practiced with a kind of what he called "conservatism" or "resistance", in order to expose and expose corruption instead of decorating and legitimizing it "(3).
Yasser Burhami
The “Salafi Dawa” was not unique to this position on political action. Rather, most of the positions of other Salafi currents towards political action are converging, and most of them agree that the concept of democracy, for example, means: the rule of the people or the sovereignty of the people. These reports are frequently mentioned in the lessons and articles of symbols. Egyptian Salafism.
And because the formation of Salafi attitudes towards political action requires the presence of an ideological legitimacy characteristic;
Looking at democracy results in describing it as inviolable, because it places the sovereignty of the people above the sovereignty of Sharia, and that expanding the powers of parliaments to enact legislation that may violate Islamic law, which is unacceptable from the Islamic ideological perspective.
Noting that some Salafi currents decide that there is a significant difference in the stance on democratic practice, but they restrict it to certain restrictions and not on its launch, and in that it relies on the fatwas of two major Salafi figures, namely Sheikh "Abdul Aziz bin Baz" and "Muhammad Saleh Al-Uthaimin," which is what It indicates the extent of the symbolism of the Saudi Salafi references on Egyptian Salafism.
There is a stance taken by the activist Salafists in Egypt regarding the state in general, and the regime in Egypt in particular.
It is that the system of government depends on man-made laws, and that the general ruling of non-Islamic Sharia is considered an infidelity, and some of them decide on special conditions the extent to which the same person can atone or judge the act of “ruling by other than what God has revealed” in general without specification.
This issue is precisely the center upon which these people build their stance on tyranny, as it is a secondary characteristic of what they describe as a "tyrant", a religious term that refers to a despot who rules without Sharia, and not in the political sense typical of social sciences, and therefore the position of the most prominent salafist symbols in Egypt towards "Despotism" is based on their legal meaning of the concept of "tyrant" (4).
The new situation produced by the January Revolution in Egypt resulted in a "temporary" political openness, during which hundreds of currents, parties, coalitions, and groupings moved in, and each sought to reserve political space in the new situation in Egypt after the revolution.
The Salafist current was one of the most prominent emerging currents at that time, and according to the relative weights in the first election test;
The Nour Party followed the Brotherhood in the number of seats in the first post-revolution parliament.
An important and central question arises here;
What is the reason for the migration of the Salafists to politics after the revolution?
To answer this question, it is necessary to dig into the roots of the Salafi political consciousness and how it works and reads the reality with which it interacts. The level of interest in political issues has varied, theoretically, in contemporary Salafi literature, but it also remains derived from the reference and intellectual constructs from the Sunni heritage and the major Sunni references such as Imam Ahmed bin Hanbal Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Kathir, in addition to a number of contemporary references, such as Ibn Baz, Al-Albani and Ibn Uthaymeen.
With regard to the Salafi situation in Egypt;
The Salafi currents maintained a state of political retreat until 2011, and according to literature that deals with politics, theoretically and practically, as religiously forbidden or disliked, and relies in it on the principle of considering legitimate interests and corruption and preserving the tenets of the Islamic faith, which used to see in the foundations of modern politics many Ideas and practices that contradict Islamic law, even as a matter of necessity, and therefore the position on the legitimacy of the modern state is one that rejects the structure of the modern state to a large extent, and desires to restore the historical model represented by the "caliphate" and its procedural values such as shura, the people of the solution and the contract (5).
However, it is possible to exclude the so-called "Salafi entrance" current because it deals with the current political reality with a different logic, as the birth of this current ideologically took place in Saudi Arabia, and its inception was based on the accumulated theorizations since the inception of the third Saudi state, the marriage between the rule of the House of Saud and the legitimacy of the family of Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Wahhab , Which established a religious legitimacy for the form of this system, and later moved to the Saudi Salafist export to the rest of the Salafis in the Arab region.
A sector of activist and revolutionary Salafists quickly interacted with the revolution, such as Cairo's Salafism (6) and the seeds of the Hazem Abu Ismail revolutionary movement and the Qutbists, and they were present in the early days of the Egyptian uprising, and they looked at it and its legitimacy, and they pushed the arguments of those who say that its corruption prevails or that it is a departure from the ruler, thus becoming the rest of the Salafist sectors Inside Tahrir Square and among the participants in the revolution.
This difference in attitudes towards "the revolution" expresses two important matters regarding the framework of Salafi political thinking and interaction towards political modernity:
The first: It
is the qualifying nature of the radical difference between the Salafi currents in general, as there is a subjective feature within the Salafi practice of religious interpretation that makes Salafism as a contemporary application of an ancient perception and reality always vulnerable to internal disagreement and conflict, and it is frequent with everything related to the concepts and manifestations of political, social, economic and intellectual modernity (7).
The second:
the knowledge gap that characterizes the Salafi political thought, which stems from the long dependence on the codes of jurisprudence and the traditional Sharia policy, and the lack of interaction with modern theoretical literature related to politics and society, which made the question of public policy a "no-thought" status for them, and then Making the Salafis self and in the eyes of society "sheikhs and preachers", and self-reliant on a "symbolic capital" that was formed on the basis of this presbyterian phenomenon.
These two matters gave birth to the Salafism this characteristic of Salafi-Salafi relations, but it remains within a converging political intellectual framework in terms of the resource of ideas and texts, the mode of treatment and its philosophy of political issues.
On a theoretical level;
The Salafi discussions about the revolution remained confined to the debate about the “legitimacy of going against the ruler.” This heritage dimension reflects the problematic nature with which all Salafis received the idea and event of the revolution, which in fact is primarily a modernist event and practice.
After the January 2011 revolution in Egypt, a sector of Salafists hesitated to enter the battlefield of politics despite their previous position, and every part of the movement of movement and scientific Salafism dealt with this hesitant behavior, while other activists participated in the revolution from its beginnings far from any horizon of political action.
But this hesitation and lack of political imagination did not last long, as the Salafists found the opportunity to achieve a greater expansion in the new Egyptian reality, as there are two main concepts that explain this Salafi departure towards modernist political practice:
The first is the
concept of "movement - countermovement" (8), which explains the motives of the movement of the kinetic Salafism specifically towards establishing the many parties and coalitions that were born after the January revolution, and with a rational desire that makes the importance of the Salafi presence in the empty political spaces present at the time A necessity to compete with the Brotherhood’s rise to some degree, and fears of the secular and Christian rise.
The second: the
concept of "the struggle of religion - the state", a concept that reflects a belief present in the Salafist conscience that the modern state, and in Egypt in particular, always seeks to nationalize religion in general in society, and believes that the state has succeeded in nationalizing the Al-Azhar institution and endowments, and it was seeking through Years to define the expansionist Salafi project as being a pure and purposeful one that calls for the return of Muslim societies to pure Islam, and it will threaten the secular state as seen by the Salafists.
The Egyptian Salafism then moved from the time of the "sheikhs" to the time of the "political sheikhs" under the coercions of the revolution in Egypt, and most of the Salafist currents, and the rest of the Salafists, by extension, lost a large balance of their symbolic presbyterian capital in the eyes of the new society after the revolution, as they were involved in the political space.
Islamic movements always emphasize the principle of the unity of the Islamic nation as a final and historical goal, and despite the fact that this principle has been entrenched in Islamic thinking every year, and in the Salafist of course (9), Salafism was more opposed to it in reality.
This inclined nature of fragmentation was reflected in the reality of the Salafists after the revolution, and during this period several entities and parties were born, some of which expressed the desire to ignite the political space in front of competitors, the Brotherhood and the secular, and others expressed their preoccupation with educational, research and advocacy work through official institutions that adopt prestige and presence Socially and politically, too, amid liquidity in the entities, institutions and societies that spread in Egypt after the revolution.
Four things emerged that were the main concern of the Salafi currents after the revolution:
The first:
Preserving the Islamic identity of Egypt, as it is a central determinant of political decision-making.
Second:
Preserving the wording of Article Two of the Constitution, as it is a major goal of accepting the Constitution, as well as rejecting any supra-constitutional provisions or documents that threaten the effectiveness of this article later.
The third:
standing before secular and Coptic ambitions and limiting their role in the new phase that Egypt is going through after the revolution.
Fourth: To
stand up to the Brotherhood’s expansion politically and socially, considering the Brotherhood an existential threat to the advocacy and political gains of the Salafis.
The Salafist position on democracy after the Arab Spring started from a legal determinant, which is "the assessment of interests and corruption," a criterion based on the sheikhs ’assessments of these interests and corruption and the possibility of pushing the contradiction between them, or the preponderance of one over the other (10).
On the conceptual level, however, the Salafism did not provide much cognitive progress, and the goal of the progressive Salafism brought about is acceptance of the mechanisms of the democratic process, not its philosophy, and adding an identity dimension to their practice so that they are not accused of relinquishing the constant "sovereignty of Islamic law."
This was clearly evident during their participation in the Constitutional Drafting Committee in 2012, where the Salafists insisted on adding an article explaining the second article that stipulates the reference of Islamic law, and states: “The principles of Islamic law include its comprehensive evidence, fundamentalism and jurisprudence rules, and its considered sources, in the doctrines of the people of Sunnis and the community "(11).
There has also been a shift in the Salafist position on Al-Azhar, and the Salafists who participated in the drafting of the constitution recognized the necessity of making Al-Azhar a major Islamic reference for Muslims in Egypt, and despite the conservative doctrinal position towards Al-Azhar, the Salafists considered that their battle with the secularists in the new Egyptian political space is more dangerous than their ideological differences with Al-Azhar. An article was added stating: “The opinion of the Council of Senior Scholars in Al-Azhar is taken in matters related to Islamic law” (12).
With the first sessions of the New People's Assembly after the revolution, and the Salafists obtaining approximately 25% of the total seats, the members affiliated with the various Salafi currents, the majority of whom were members of the Nour Party, added during their swearing-in the phrase "in a way that does not contradict the law of God" as a new tradition and they set it to avoid The ideological embarrassment that they may fall into if laws are passed which they consider violating Islamic law.
And because Egypt was on the threshold of the transition to the stage of democratic transition at that time, political practice in general was characterized by randomness and non-political competition, and Salafists of all kinds were involved in this randomness, and to a greater extent is the apparent cognitive deficiency in the social sciences, and the complete lack of political experience in exchange for a group. Brotherhood that practiced a long political struggle before the revolution.
Given the non-regulatory nature of Salafi movements;
It took the Salafis a long time to absorb the changes and transformations they took or were forced to after the revolution, and because the counterrevolutionary forces did not allow anyone more time to take a breath, the Salafists found themselves facing a moral and political dilemma with the dismissal of President Morsi, then the constitution was suspended, and the president was appointed. The Supreme Constitutional Council became an interim president in June 2013, and the Salafists became here before a test of their doctrinal concepts, as their concept of a "tyrant" did not help them to confront the new position, being the opposite concept they had of tyranny, and they were forced to find a new treatment for this scene. They are choosing between the necessity of finding a legitimate justification. A religious regime that establishes its existence on an undemocratic path according to well-established democratic rules, and between standing with another Islamist faction, with differences and tensions between them.
Since the events of July 2013, Salafi positions began to be sharply differentiated and dealt with the concept of the nation-state more in line with modernity, as Salafism was divided into three camps:
The first: He
took a tactical stance against the escalation of the Brotherhood and the army during and after the events of Rabaa al-Adawiya and dismissed President Mohamed Morsi, the Salafi Dawa movement and its political arm, the Nour Party.
This current looked at its political gains, albeit in a simple way, within the new political equation in Egypt, and chose not to be drawn into the Brotherhood’s battle with the military, and it aligned cautiously with the secular and liberal forces that opposed the Brotherhood’s rule, and dealt with the logic of the state as an entity whose stability and sovereignty should be preserved.
The second: He
chose to continue the battle with the Brotherhood because they represent the sovereignty of the new state in the rule of Morsi, and they have integrated consciously in the case of “the state, its sovereignty and its legitimacy” in the case of the Brotherhood, and they mobilized their bases and symbols in the sit-ins of Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda, as they were later forced to leave Egypt into Turkish exile And complete the opposition's efforts to the Egyptian regime from there.
This current represents Cairo's Salafism, Revolutionary Salafism, and some Qutbists.
The third:
He returned to the advocacy barracks that were allowed to him, or he chose to withdraw completely to those who were not allowed to do so with the new regime, the most prominent of which are the symbols of the Jami Salafism and the al-Alamiya da'wa.
The real paradox here lies in the transformation of the Salafists from permissible or future to the revolution and the modern state with the logic of interest and corruption and the necessity to preserve the identity and the Sharia to the logic of the sharp struggle over the state, the constitution and the revolution in its Brotherhood status, or in its new status after June 30, 2013, and entered the Salafi dictionary a lot. Among the modernist vocabulary that crowded the traditional legal lexicon, such as preserving the state and its stability, preserving Egypt's sovereignty, or legitimacy in its modernist political meaning in the context of talking about Morsi's legitimacy, or the military coup, and other vocabulary and concepts inherent in the modernist lexicon.
We are here, then, in a new debate about the perception of the “state” in the Salafi imagination, and how Salafis can create justifications for its legitimacy or illegitimacy in light of this contradiction between its most prominent currents, and how some can consider that what happened on June 30, 2013 was a revolution against the rule The Brotherhood, or at the very least, a popular movement against it (the Salafism of Alexandria), while others considered it an arrangement from the forces of the revolution to counter the military coup later (Salafiya Cairo and others).
Since 2011, the Military Council in Egypt has been closely monitoring the Islamists ’movement, and it seems that it has had a degree of awareness that it is the next genie. This is indicated by what one of the attendees said at a meeting of the“ Sharia Commission for Rights and Reform ”in mid-2011, in a special statement to“ Maidan ” Dr. Said Abdel-Azim, one of the leaders of the Alexandria Salafist Call and a member of the Commission, received a call from Major General P.
One of the members of the military council at the time.
While Dr. Muhammad Abdel Maqsoud stated that Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, Director of Military Intelligence at the time, would meet the Sheikh with great hospitality and excessive reverence if he met him in the Republican Palace (13), so much so that he used to perform group prayers with them and intentionally show that he was fasting supererogues during meetings to export a picture. In the Salafist evaluation it is considered essential for judging a person's religion.
And in a special statement to "
Maidan
";
Dr. M.Y.
That in one of his meetings with Sisi after the revolution, Sisi advised him of the necessity of establishing a strategic research center for the Salafist movement, and that Sisi reviewed it and rushed him over the matter more than once.
Indeed, in one of his speeches after the July 3 coup, Al-Sisi himself mentioned that in a meeting he had with Sheikh Abu Ishaq al-Hawaini and a number of Salafi leaders he did not name;
The sheikh asked him for his advice on whether or not they could present a presidential candidate, and Sisi answered him no (14).
Al-Sisi stated at the time that he had had frequent meetings ex officio director of Military Intelligence with the most leaders of Islamic currents.
Following the Egyptian presidential elections in June 2012;
The controversy arose about the movements of Yasser Burhami and his companions prior to the announcement of the election results, especially since the tension and polarization had reached its end between the Brotherhood and the military and their allies in the deep state, and the Nour Party's predecessors felt at the time that the battle and its results might not be in their favor in both cases, if Mohamed Morsi won Or Ahmed Shafiq.
And in view of the size of the Alexandria Salafis, which was more dynamic among the Salafists at that time;
Burhami moved to secure the Salafi call in the event of Shafiq's victory, a pre-emptive tactical move, and the man secured his position and the position of his movement, even relatively from the side of Shafiq camp, and for motives related to the Alexandrian Salafist position which is wary of the Brotherhood, where he met Burhami and one of his aides with Lieutenant General Ahmed Shafiq at his home and discussed the scenarios for his arrival to the chair And they clarified their position on siding with the Brotherhood.
Burhami's meeting with Shafiq was preceded by a meeting with Burhami and his colleagues with representatives from the military council to discuss what Burhami mentioned in one of his lessons that he received information about the Muslim Brotherhood’s intention to go to the streets by force if Shafiq was declared winning the elections (15).
These few signals tell us about the nature of the entire Salafist movement’s stalemate between proximity and distance with the Military Council until 2013, but with the advent of the events of June 2013 and the dismissal of Dr. Mohamed Morsi - may God have mercy on him - and then the events of the dispersal of the Rab'a sit-in Al-Adawiya and Al-Nahda
Egyptian Salafism was divided more sharply in front of the position on the events, and then the position on the new July state that was formed after that under the leadership of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, as the Salafists of Alexandria found themselves facing a difficult moral and political test, and given the nature of the determinants through which they move politically;
They chose to stand in a safer area for their calling and their movement, and they took sides, optionally and urgently at other times, to calm down with the army and the forces loyal to it, while they withdrew early from the Brotherhood camp and their allies and tried to spare themselves the damages of the bloody battle that they anticipated, regardless of the evaluation of this situation.
On the other side;
Part of the dynamic and traditional Salafism took a hostile stance to varying degrees to the army and the military council, and some of them, like Muhammad Abdel Maqsoud, Omar Abdel Aziz and others, lined up with the Brotherhood in their verbal and media battles, and after intense security pressure after the 2013 coup they were forced to travel to Turkey and actively participate in the Brotherhood’s media work from there, while A sector of the activist and traditional Salafists remained in a neutral area, hoping to maintain a minimum of his advocacy and educational work, such as Mustafa Al-Adawi, Ahmed Al-Naqib and Muhammad Hassan, but the policies of the new June state were according to strategies of comprehensive nationalization of the religious space, regardless of the type of his speech.
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Margin
The Salafis rely on two hadiths of the Prophet in the context of developing the concept of "the method", the first is called the hadith of "the surviving group", the second is called the hadith of "followers."
“The Position of the Salafi Da'wa on the Egyptian Revolution between Curriculum and Application,” first edition, (Alexandria, Asas Academy for Research and Science, 2914), p. 38.
For more, see: Moataz Zahir, “From the Mosque to Parliament: A Study on the Salafi Dawa and the Nour Party,” first edition, (London, Takween Center for Studies and Research, 2015).
Previous, p. 43.
See, for example, Yasser Burhami's theorizing about the issue of “ruling by other than what was revealed” in his reference book for his movement “The Manna Sharing the belief of Ahl al-Sunnah”, and the recordings of “Muhammad Abd al-Maqsoud” and “Fawzi al-Saeed” on the concept of “Hakimiyyah”. Significantly, on the fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Research and Issuing Fatwas in Saudi Arabia, and separate fatwas by Sheikh Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthaymeen, as major Salafi references they have.
For more details on the level of internal Salafi texts and differences, see: Muhammad Tawfiq, “The Salafists in Egypt: The Pragmatism of Religion, Politics and Power,” in: Mustafa Abdel-Zahir (ed.), “What is the Political in Islam: Islamic Movements and the Clamor of Politics”, First Edition, (Cairo House of Mirrors for Cultural Production, 2018).
See: “Contemporary Political Participations in the Light of Sharia Politics,” Dr.
Muhammad Yusri Ibrahim, first edition (Cairo, Dar Al-Yusr, 2011).
And Muhammad Abd al-Wahid Kamel, “The Balancing of Interests and Evil and Their Impact on the Egyptian Public Affairs After the Revolution,” First Edition, (Cairo, Dar Al-Yusr, 2011).
And Mamdouh Jaber, “The January 25 Revolution: A Shari'ah Vision”, first edition, (Cairo, Dar Tahrir Al-Watan, 2011).
This can be clearly seen in the passing of the various Salafi literature related to modern political and social ideas and practices, as the different positions of Salafism do not come outside the framework of rejection, apprehension, or questioning of the legitimacy or usefulness of these ideas and practices which they consider alien to the Islamic lexicon, and contradict in some way or At the end, with the constants of the Islamic faith, but it remains interesting to look at the differences between the various currents regarding these concepts and practices, to the extent that is suitable for the extent to which the Salafi dissenters are devoted to each other.
Among the examples of that grinding struggle that the Salafism experienced in the entire Arab world regarding the permissibility of some Salafi currents of the Brotherhood to enter political competition through elections and parliaments (Harakish Salafism), which Salafism faced violently in its writings and religious lessons.
See, for example, the book “Modarak Looking at Politics: Between Legal Practices and Enthusiastic Emotions,” by Abdel-Malik Ramadan.
David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.
101, No.
6 (May, 1996), pp.
1628-1660
The Salafis pay more attention in their literature with regard to the concept of the Islamic nation, and they pay more attention to the concept of “Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah” as a comprehensive concept of a doctrinal framework that includes specific ideological statements, and those who do not speak of them emerge from the surviving sect as in the hadith.
For more on this, see: Ahmed Salem and Amr Bassiouni, “After Salafism: A Critical Reading in Contemporary Salafi Discourse”, first edition, (Beirut, Nama Center for Research and Studies, 2015).
See: Muhammad Abd al-Wahid Kamal, “The Balancing of Interests and Evil and Their Impact in Egyptian Public Affairs after the Revolution,” first edition, (Cairo, Dar Al-Yusr, 2011).
The book contains the most disciplined Salafi theories within the Salafi framework regarding the issue of interests and corruption and their relationship to political action.
Article (219) of the Egyptian constitution, which was approved in 2012.
Article (4) of the Egyptian constitution, which was approved in 2012.
The statements of Mohamed Abdel-Maqsoud on the fourth channel on the link.
Sisi's statement link
Link to Yasser Burhami's statement with the details of his meeting with General Ahmed Shafiq.