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The most recent program party congress of the Greens was dominated primarily by domestic and science policy issues.

The arguments included the 1.5 degree target for climate protection, the demand for an unconditional basic income and genetic engineering.

In the end, the more than 800 delegates mostly agreed on compromise formulas that leave room for interpretation.

When it comes to genetic engineering, the Greens moved away from their fundamental opposition, but once again emphasized “risk research”.

The 1.5 degree target became a “1.5 degree path”.

The “unconditional basic income” is now, to the displeasure of the federal executive committee, in the basic program - but as a “guiding principle”.

That means: We think it's good, but doesn't come immediately.

So far, little attention has been paid to the party's foreign and security policy decisions, which have set out to create government participation in the coming year.

Here, too, some things remain vague in the new basic program, some appear contradicting itself.

In the chapters on “Multilateral Relations” and “Global Security”, the Greens primarily outline how they would like the world to be.

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The UN Security Council and other organs of the United Nations “must be adapted to the realities of the 21st century”, it says, for example.

Or: "The EU must be capable of global politics in order to help shape the rules and realities of the international environment in the sense of universal values ​​and the interests derived from them."

But what does it all mean in concrete terms?

The party used to discuss these issues vigorously

When the Greens first took part in a federal government in Bonn in autumn 1998 and Joschka Fischer moved into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, very robust questions were quickly on his desk.

As early as March 1999, Kosovo was about war and peace.

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The Bundeswehr's first armed deployment abroad was also due to a party which always attached great importance to its pacifist founding myth and which in the early 1980s had largely drawn from the German peace movement.

The fact that the party was not completely torn apart by the Kosovo conflict and two and a half years later by the Bundeswehr's mission in Afghanistan, which was also supported by a majority, was primarily due to Joschka Fischer's persistence.

He had already asked his party very unpleasant questions in the early and mid-1990s against the background of the bloody Balkan conflict.

He had not only learned the slogan “Never again war!”, But also “Never again Auschwitz!”, He emphasized again and again.

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At the time, the Greens did not take the debates about military interventions for humanitarian reasons easy.

Fischer regularly suffered voting defeats before becoming foreign minister.

At the 1999 party convention in Bielefeld, a paint bag was thrown at his head and his eardrum tore.

Joschka Fischer (Greens), shortly after he was hit by a paint bag at the special party conference on the Kosovo war in May 1999

Source: picture alliance / Bernd Thissen

The fact that he drove his party to the fore on important foreign policy issues came at a price.

The incumbent party chairmen Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck, on the other hand, are pursuing a course of conflict avoidance.

If you look at the program today, you come across many formula compromises - and open questions.

Formulations that are suitable for free interpretation

Peace operations of the United Nations are a "central instrument of collective peacekeeping," it says.

But what happens if the UN Security Council disagrees, for example if China or Russia block necessary interventions?

"If the veto right in the Security Council is abused to cover the most serious crimes against humanity, the world community faces a dilemma because inaction damages human rights and international law just as much as acting," says the basic program.

And how do the Greens then want to resolve this dilemma?

There is nothing to do with this.

Everyone can read into this formulation what they want.

Fundamental programs are not just daily political instructions.

But the fact that the Greens have not become more specific is - as with other issues - mainly because the different wings of the party could not and did not want to agree.

The question of what would follow from such a “dilemma” has been postponed at best.

These vague formulations basically run through the entire foreign policy part of a program that, according to the firm will of Baerbock and Habeck, is to demonstrate the ability to form alliances and govern.

For example, the Greens are calling for “a Germany free of nuclear weapons and thus a speedy end to nuclear participation”.

The claim is “nothing less than a world free of nuclear weapons”.

In the practice of all previous governments, Germany has never acceded to the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty - nor did it intend to do so as long as nuclear weapons pose a threat in the hands of unpredictable states.

So far, the line has been: Yes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, no to the Prohibition Treaty, but the compromise is nuclear participation in NATO.

The Greens now want to end them "quickly".

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De facto, however, the next federal government will not be able to philosophize about "Nuclear Zero", as was still possible at the beginning of the term of office of the former US President Barack Obama.

Rather, it will have to decide on the imminent necessity, already announced by the late Obama, of modernizing the US atomic bombs stored in Büchel.

How do government greens behave then?

That too will probably not be decided until the topic is on the table.

In any case, the program does not give an answer.

"The federal executive dares to lose debates too"

Due to the corona pandemic, the Green Party Congress took place largely virtually.

That served the objectivity, thinks Robert Habeck.

You can see the results of the party chairman here.

Source: WORLD

The Greens describe a military “coalition of the willing” as “unconstitutional”.

This contradicts their own realpolitical experiences in the Schröder / Fischer government - because in real life a coalition of the willing is often needed before anything happens in the UN.

At the same time, the Greens are in favor of the majority principle instead of unanimity in EU foreign policy.

But what does that mean for EU military operations?

The French President Emmanuel Macron advocates that "willing" in the EU take the lead in military missions.

The Greens obviously don't want that.

On the other hand, the party relies on the Franco-German tandem on European policy issues.

What realpolitik could look like remains in the green fog here too.

What Baerbock plans to do with the Bundeswehr

Overall, the foreign policy program is aimed more at the contradicting mood in the party than at the real problems in Europe and the world.

The situation is similar with the Bundeswehr.

If, for example, a higher defense budget is needed, Baerbock was just asked in an interview with the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”.

Your answer: "Yes, in some areas you have to invest more so that rifles can fire and night vision devices work."

Not at all.

Because Baerbock goes on to say that “a lot of money in the military budget is thrown out the window”.

Bavaria's Prime Minister Markus Söder (CSU) is promoting "a large air defense system - not for security reasons, but to strengthen Bavaria as an industrial location."

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It is true that one of the industrial suppliers has its headquarters in Bavaria.

On the other hand, that procurement has nothing to do with security reasons is a brisk assertion.

The German air defense, which still exists at all, is getting on in years.

And if, as Baerbock explains elsewhere, “your own alliance defense ... is about flexible, quickly deployable units in the alliance area”, then this relocation is not possible without protection against attacks from the air.

In any case, the Green Chairwoman leaves the question of how much money the Bundeswehr needs in the rough.

In any case, it shouldn't be two percent of the gross domestic product, such a “theoretical” goal doesn't help, she says.

Instead, it must be about “NATO's capabilities and the concrete distribution of burdens”.

Now the current capability profile of the Bundeswehr is precisely based on this.

For years, however, the Bundestag has been approving funds - despite all increases - that fall short of the needs of this capability profile.

In 2021, for example, it will be a respectable 46.93 billion euros.

But far more than 50 billion would be needed.

What the Greens would spend in a government - you don't know.

And apparently you shouldn't even know.