Russia: what strategy in sub-Saharan Africa?
Russian President Vladimir Putin with heads of countries attending the Russia-Africa Summit 2019 at Sirius Science and Art Park in Sochi, Russia, October 24, 2019 REUTERS / Sergei Chirikov
Text by: Arnaud Jouve Follow
14 min
Since its return to the African continent in 2014, Russia has affirmed its presence in sub-Saharan Africa by relying mainly on the strengthening of its official and unofficial military cooperation through the intervention of private military companies to achieve its geoeconomic and political objectives.
A strategy that questions the future of a changing continent.
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“
For African leaders, emphasizing their rapprochement with Russia is a way of putting pressure on Western countries and of staging the diversification of their foreign policy;
but this is not for all that a fundamental tendency called to register in the long term
”, analyzes Sergey Sukhankin, researcher at the Jamestown Foundation and adviser to Gulf State Analytics (Washington DC).
When the USSR took an interest in Africa
Relations between Africa and the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) have long remained marginal.
They really developed under the impetus of Nikita Khrushchev (1958-1964) and Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) who saw it as an opportunity to export the ideology of the regime, by supporting emancipatory struggles and by offering support. to the new nations which had just been liberated.
Never having envisaged a colonial expansion in Africa and justifying its commitment on the continent by principles of internationalism and solidarity, the Soviet Union will be strongly involved on the continent.
As the researcher Sergey Sukhankin explains in the report of Ifri (French Institute of International Relations) entitled
Russian Private Military Companies in Sub-Saharan Africa
-
: assets, limits, consequences
: “-
During this period, the African policy of the Soviet Union reached its peak ... by allocating considerable resources which were devoted to military-technical cooperation (delivery of weapons; training; (re) organization of local armed forces).
Direct economic support (loans and credits; delivery of food and strategic products; aid for major infrastructure projects).
Indirect economic assistance (training of African civilian experts / specialists)
- ”.
An investment that will lead the Soviet Union to train, before 1991, nearly 240,000 students in Africa and 60,000 Africans in the Soviet Union, indicates the newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
.
During this period, the Soviet Union will establish bases in Guinea, Angola, Somalia and Ethiopia.
In Angola, according to some estimates, between 1975 and 1994, the total number of Russian soldiers may have reached 11,000.
In Sudan alone, according to Global Security, the Soviet Union will deliver around $ 150 million worth of weapons, to name but a few examples.
But as Sergey Sukhankin sums it up, “-
these extremely costly efforts have yielded little economic dividends.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Africa
de facto
disappeared from the field of view of Russian foreign policy
- ”.
Russia's return to Africa
Russian interest in the continent will be revived in 2006 with a visit by Vladimir Poutine to South Africa.
As Sergey Sukhankin comments, “-
the visit of the Russian president responded to a set of geoeconomic and geopolitical calculations, in particular linked to the informal group of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), but did not however take place. not translate into significant concrete measures
- ”.
This trip will be followed in 2009 by a presidential tour of Dmitry Medvedev in Egypt, Nigeria, Angola and Namibia where he will declare: "-
From now on, our duty is to make up for all that has been lost
-".
However, it is really from 2014 that this rapprochement with Africa takes place, indirectly following the crisis in Ukraine.
The annexation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia and the Russian counter-offensive in Ukraine create a deep crisis in Russian-Western relations.
Russia is looking for new partners on the international scene and turns to Africa.
Arnault Ménatory explains in a communication from the Resource and Information Center on Economic and Strategic Intelligence that “-
while the movement of decolonization of the continent had enabled the USSR to establish solid relays there by supporting the movements of national liberation, Russia intends to take advantage of the opportunities offered by Africa to break its isolation.
Surrounded and handicapped by Western sanctions, the Russian economy looks very favorably on the opening of African markets to its exports
- ”.
To meet its geoeconomic and political objectives in sub-Saharan Africa, Russia will reinvest the continent in multiple ways, affirming in its speech its adherence to the principles of justice, international law, respect for human rights and the sovereignty of African nations as opposed, she said, to the West, which would seek only to appropriate Africa's resources and to strengthen its sphere of influence there.
A return that wants to be long-term and whose culmination will be, in October 2019, the first summit in Sochi where Vladimir Putin will gather around him around fifty African heads of state and government.
Russian President Vladimir Putin with heads of countries attending the Russia-Africa Summit 2019 at Sirius Science and Art Park in Sochi, Russia, October 24, 2019 REUTERS / Sergei Chirikov
The attraction for Russia in Africa
Russia has several attractive competitive advantages in Africa, even if its presence on the continent is still very limited and much less important than at the time of the Soviet Union, and even if its political model is not the more sought after as shown by the Afrobarometer, indicating that Africans consider the American (30%) and Chinese (24%) political models as the most attractive.
Beyond its positioning as a partner, which during the time of the Soviet Union accompanied the peoples to free themselves from colonial domination and which denounces the Western postures, described as predatory and lesson-givers, it also presents itself as a alternative to China, felt like a new dominator.
Its prices are cheaper than American or European equipment and Russia can provide sought-after technologies, for example by providing cooperation in the nuclear field to Algeria, Nigeria, Zambia or by launching the construction of a nuclear power plant in the Dabaa region of Egypt.
In addition, it is not perceived as a pillager of raw materials, even if it is very present in the exploitation of minerals, oil and gas.
Its expertise is recognized and its companies such as Gazprom in the Sahara, Rosneft in North Africa or Lukoil in Nigeria and Ghana are very active.
Exporter of cereals in Egypt and many other services, it is nevertheless especially with its security component that it appeals.
Russia as a security provider
As a Russian study cited in Ifri's report indicates, "-
security cooperation is historically one of the most important elements of collaboration between Russia and African countries
-".
Between 2014 and 2019, Russia signed nineteen military-technical cooperation agreements with African countries.
This demand for security assistance is expected to increase depending on the development of factors of insecurity (terrorism, insurgencies, conflicts, etc.) and some of these agreements made in particular with Angola, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Mauritania are of particular concern to the West, because, as Sergey Sukhankin explains, they aim to "-
take advantage of the military aid granted to obtain in exchange mineral rights and partnerships in the field of mining. energy
- ”.
This assistance, known in Russia as “security exportation”, has become a central element of Russian foreign policy in Africa.
It is expressed first by the sale of armaments where it positioned itself between 2014 and 2019, according to Sipri (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), as the leading exporter of arms to from Africa mainly through his company Rosoboronexport.
These armament contracts attract the favors of the regimes also requesting assistance and Russia provides for this by setting up legal cooperation programs (supply of arms, training, protection of infrastructures, etc.), and by the more murky intervention of private military companies (SMP).
Companies like SMP Wagner, which has a strong presence in Africa, whose actions have the advantage of leaving Moscow the possibility of denying any possible government involvement.
The power of the Russian army, its expertise and its solid reputation in the fight against terrorism, forged in the North Caucasus and in Syria, is particularly appreciated in Africa and Russia is making use of it to increase and consolidate its presence on the continent.
Russian military consultants set up training for the Central African Armed Forces and internal security forces after delivering weapons to the country.
In Berengo on August 4, 2018. AFP / Florent Vergnes
Official and unofficial interventionism
To develop in this part of the world and to achieve its geopolitical and economic objectives, Russia has stepped up its interventions
through
its Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian President's special envoy for the Middle East and Africa.
Between 2014 and 2019, he made more than 50 trips in Africa.
This Moscow policy is also unofficially carried out by a businessman from Saint Petersburg close to Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Prigojine.
A top-secret figure, presumed to be the head of the SMP Wagner and known to be the big player in "—the troll factory—" of anti-Western disinformation particularly important on the continent.
These devices are used in particular to influence the elections in certain countries, for example by financing in Madagascar the presidential campaign of several candidates as revealed by a BBC survey [https://www.bbc.com/news/av / world-africa-47830161], by supporting,
via
his embassy in Guinea, President Alpha Condé to obtain his third term, or more visibly by delivering about twenty light armored vehicles (LAVs) of recognition to the government Central African (10 were delivered urgently on October 14, the others will be delivered in December) to "—controll" the street revolts that could take place in the perspective of the election deadline of December 27, 2020, as well as other services rendered in exchange notably (as is the case in other countries) for mining permits granted to Russian companies associated with Evgueni Prigojine.
A double-sided policy supported by Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, but also by Evgueni Prigojine who probably participates in the same strategy because, as Sergey Sukhankin emphasizes, “-
even if it is difficult to determine the exact degree of proximity between two men, many credible sources have reported the existence of these links
- ”.
Yevgeny Prigojine.
Reuters / Reuters / Sergei Ilnitsky
From the Central African Republic to the Sahel?
This Russian offensive in Africa continues in many countries where it was not historically the main partner.
The case of the Central African Republic (CAR) is emblematic in this sense and could herald other initiatives as currently in the Sahel.
Neither the USSR nor Russia have ever shown any particular interest in the CAR, or even since the civil war that has developed there since 2012. It was on the occasion of the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2017 that links were built between Russia and the President of the CAR, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, who came to ask for help.
This meeting will result in 2017 in the lifting of the arms embargo (UN resolution 2127) and in the first shipment of arms and 170 military instructors.
Assistance which was considerably strengthened thereafter with the official appointment of a former Russian intelligence officer, Valery Zakharov (close to Prigojine) to Touadéra, to the chagrin of the French.
Today, it is estimated that a thousand men, mostly members of the SMP Wagner, are deployed in the CAR.
Military cooperation continues to grow in strength and the government has just received its first delivery of 10 Russian armored vehicles (see previous chapter).
A situation which led Viatcheslav Tetekine, Russian conservative expert and member of the Duma's defense committee, to announce that “-
Russia has,
de facto
, excluded France from the Central African game […].
From now on, it is Russia and China which play the leading roles
- ”.
For Sergey Sukhanki, mineral resources are not the main motivation: Russia's investment in Central Africa can allow it to extend its influence in the rest of the region and to continue its deployment in Africa.
“-
The actions of Russia in general and those of its PMCs in particular in sub-Saharan Africa could lead to serious collateral damage.
The gradual weakening of European players and the United States, Russia's actions aimed at marginalizing Western countries, including France, pave the way for a greater hold by third countries over the region
- ”.
The discussions undertaken with Chad, the military cooperation agreements with Mali, while the French military presence in Mali is called into question by a part of the population which shows in the streets its support for Russia and the probable arrival of Russian mercenaries in the Sahel-Sahelian zone may mark the beginning of a new zone of expansion.
The Kremlin continues its deployment on the continent.
However, notes Sergey Sukhanki, “-
Russia does not have a comprehensive African strategy (it is essentially seeking to seize the opportunities that present themselves in certain countries), which means that in the long term it will not be able to 'make decisive advances on the continent ... At this point, Russia's return to Africa, particularly marked after 2014, appears as a reaction [to the presence of other powers] rather than as the manifestation of a strategy global forward
-
looking
- ”.
A presence that must nevertheless be taken seriously, concludes Sergey Sukhanki.
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