Expectations of the return of tension between the two parties
Joe Biden in front of the dilemma dealing with North Korea nuclear
Biden is not as admired by Kim as President Trump.
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Kim Yong Un offered to shut down the Yongpyeong reactor as a goodwill gesture during his summit in Hanoi with Trump.
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The entry of President-elect Joe Biden into the White House on January 20, 2021, heralds a new chapter in the fraught nuclear relationship between the United States and North Korea.
The administration of President Donald Trump experimented with the diplomacy of holding the summits between 2018 and 2019, after a year of extreme tension in 2017, when the threats of "fire and anger" and the nuclear brinkmanship reached terrifying levels, but summit diplomacy failed, as expected, in Pyeongyang's ceaseless determination to build its nuclear arsenal and long-range ballistic missiles.
As for President-elect Joe Biden, the truth will be that North Korea will not agree under any circumstances to give up its nuclear weapons, regardless of the concessions that the United States can make, as part of any "conditional diplomacy." Biden must act on the basis that Korea North is a nuclear state in every sense of the word.
Strategic patience
Under Biden, a return to former President Barack Obama's style of "strategic patience" is highly unlikely, because he did not provide anything. Rather, it gave North Korea time to develop more effective nuclear powers.
Biden knows that North Korea will not stop developing its new nuclear and missile capabilities.
It seems that the new missiles launched from submarines, or the ICBMs launched from mobile vehicles are the top priorities for North Korean President Kim Jong Un, after he unveiled his "Housing-16" ICBM at the 75th anniversary celebrations of today. The national of North Korea.
Korean officials have described Biden as a "fast dog" who must be "bitten to death", and accordingly Kim is unlikely to send him the love letters he was sending to Trump.
Instead, Kim may test the Biden administration with new missile tests, including the possibility of resuming long-range missile tests, and possibly nuclear tests as well, in the hope that Biden's response will be servile, and he will be forced to use diplomacy that leads to concessions to Pyongyang, which may not be Offer little or nothing at all.
Given that Biden did not show any admiration for Kim as Trump did during summit diplomacy, the best alternative is to respond to North Korea forcefully, and therefore North Korea's conducting any long-range missile tests should push the United States under the Biden administration to act quickly. To stop the deterioration in its relations with South Korea, and to strengthen its relationship with Japan, but in the event of a nuclear test, this should motivate the United States to respond strongly against Pyongyang.
Pyongyang must understand that the costs of returning to missile and nuclear tests will be high, and this is what Biden must do upon entering the White House, and he must move to add action to his rhetoric by strengthening the United States' nuclear deterrent guarantees provided to both South Korea and Japan. And, of course, such a move enhances confidence on the part of US allies regarding Washington's commitment to stopping any challenge that North Korea's nuclear arsenal may pose, and it must send a clear message to Pyongyang to deter it from not acting irresponsibly.
A special challenge
Such a move presents a special challenge to the United States, and Biden has not yet announced his administration’s position with regard to nuclear power, but an expanded and enhanced deterrence will contradict the Democratic Party’s program for 2020, which provides for the adoption of a declared one-goal position for US nuclear powers.
Given that the non-nuclear preemptive strike capabilities of deterrence are not mature enough to offer an alternative to conventional nuclear deterrence, Biden can see that the increased nuclear and missile threat posed by North Korea could reduce the possibility of changes in the US nuclear position.
It is possible that with the Biden administration's efforts to bolster enhanced and expanded nuclear deterrence and repair the damage inflicted on basic defense relations with Seoul after the bickering over financial aspects for hosting US forces in South Korea, Pyongyang will realize that the window it uses for diplomatic engagement with the United States has Close, financial sanctions will remain in place, and there will be no peace agreement, or withdrawal of US forces, and all that Kim will have is his nuclear stick.
For Kim, this would be a trap that he created himself, instead of accepting the opportunity to denuclearize him, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, and the conclusion of a peace agreement that would ultimately lead to reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps one day we will witness the reunification of the two Koreas;
North Korea continues to defy the world without any willingness to give up its nuclear weapon.
In fact, the United States cannot offer North Korea any concessions for free, and making a symbolic gesture, such as Kim's offer at the Hanoi summit in 2019, to close the Yongpyeong nuclear reactor, would be tantamount to trying to sell the same horse twice.
It is not a serious step towards nuclear disarmament.
As for Kim, if he wants to deal with the Biden administration, engaging step by step with the United States based on real and steady arrangements to give up step by step the nuclear weapons, in exchange for engaging economically and politically with the United States and its allies;
It will be a bright path.
Of course, this will not happen, and therefore it is expected to enter a new phase of increased tension in the future.
• Under Biden, a return to Obama’s style known as "strategic patience" is highly unlikely, because he did not provide anything. Rather, he gave North Korea time to develop more effective nuclear powers.
The United States cannot offer North Korea any concessions for free, and making a symbolic gesture, such as the offer by Kim at the Hanoi summit in 2019, to close the Yongpyeong nuclear reactor, would be tantamount to trying to sell the same horse twice.
Malcolm Davis is a defense strategy analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra
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