Imagine with me if the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had come to power in the 1950s or 1960s, what would its economic policy be ?! Would it not be of a socialist nature, or what Mustafa al-Sibai, the Brotherhood's general observer in Syria at the time (1960) called “socialism of Islam”, instead of the neoliberal nature that it followed during the short rule of Morsi 2012-2013.
What we will try in this article is to present an explanatory model of the nature of socio-economic policies to an ideological group that played an important role in modern Egyptian life and remains, but I suspect that its experience in this field can extend to other powers and parties, because I see that the social issue has become one of the most important priorities of the citizen Al-Arabi is ahead of other topics that have gained priority in past years, such as identity issues.
Rather, I claim that the Brotherhood's lack of awareness of the nature of the January revolution in which a large segment of Egyptians attended the political (democratic) and social (social justice) dimensions far from the identity (Sharia) dimension, was one of the main reasons behind Morsi's fall and the end of Brotherhood rule.
In my view, the social issue of the Brotherhood can be understood in light of the following five determinants:
First : the lawsuit
One of the characteristics of this discourse is that it is a paradox of classes, in the sense that it does not recognize class contradictions nor does it occupy weight in its priorities. It is in its nature that it penetrates all classes by a desire to express the whole society, and as Wael Jamal sees in his paper (Lost Capital), "These movements claim that they represent All society, and avoided all approaches that might highlight class differences or social conflicts. This relative blocking has historically allowed the Brotherhood to be a magnet for groups with incompatible interests, which enabled the movement to attract diverse individuals. ”
The scourge of opposition politics in Egypt is that it is cultural in nature and does not move on a social ground
However, at the same time, it made her fail to express her electoral base, which was mainly concentrated in the middle and lower classes, which lost her popularity during the rule of Morsi Qusair.
The advocacy discourse is liberated from the social ground and from the existing material relations. The scourge of opposition politics in Egypt is that it is of a cultural nature that does not move on a social ground, in the sense that it was reduced to issuing statements or resorting to the judiciary to resolve political battles, and not changing the balance of political and economic forces and dismantling the structure of tyranny, exploitation and corruption.
Second: an ethical discourse
By moral discourse, talk or about the social, political, economic, and even cultural structures that produce poverty, differentiation and class contradictions in society are transcended or wasted. Therefore, there is no talk about public policies, especially if it accompanies or is mixed with talking about charity, charity and alms.
Charitable work in one of its aspects easing the severity of social contradictions without changing the elements of economic power and wealth in society, and, for example, during Mubarak's era, it turned into an unwritten understanding with the Brotherhood to allow them to mitigate the impact of the neoliberal policies that his regime pursued since the 1990s. In return, the group gained a great deal of support and political influence, especially in the elections.
Charitable work without changing relations of power and wealth turns into washing of sins and sometimes washing of reputation and money, and leads to dealing with social justice not by redistributing wealth, but through its mechanisms that lead to the continuation of what exists.
One of the paradoxes that we mention here is that the Brotherhood's awareness of the social issue before 1952 was greater than their awareness of it in what some call the second foundation stage in the seventies (Sayed Qutb published 1951 while I mention a number of articles on land reform published in the Journal of Dawah and have not been published in a book yet Despite its importance), this may be due to the weakness of "Islamic thought" in this field, in addition to the rivalry that arose between it and the leftist movement, despite the unsuccessful attempts to establish what was called Hassan Hanafi and Muhammad Raza Muharram of the Islamic Left in the 1980s.
Third: The sacred organization, the paradoxes of its membership
Since the early 1990s, the maintenance of the organization has gradually become a goal in itself as the sacred tool whose mission was to fulfill, fulfill, and implement Islam.
Although many studies explain why the Brotherhood spread in specific social classes of the middle class, the prevailing organizational culture that charts the nature of the relationship between the individual and the group makes the organization a paradoxical tool for its members with their social and economic pluralism and contradictions. The individual does not have a separate existence within the group but rather is controlled in all aspects His life is through what is called education, and here is one of the major paradoxes. At a time when the group pursued neoliberal policies centered - on one of its philosophical foundations - on believing in the capabilities of the individual and his capabilities to prove himself, the individual existence within the organization is crushed by multiple mechanisms.
It deepens the transcendence of social contradictions that the organizational consideration requires more continuous recruitment of members by what it means of expansion in the classes and social groups affiliated, but it is also paradoxical that this sacred organization separates membership and even the Egyptian nation itself as Hahud pointed out in his research (Brotherhood ideology in testing the revolution Its ideological tendencies are reduced to a limited number of Temple Guardians who are usually called members of the Education Department, and leadership that turns into an unidentified, absolute entity with full knowledge of the interest of the organization and its members as well.
Hence, I agree with studies that indicate the role of some leaders who belong to the bourgeois classes in determining the neoliberal tendencies of the group, but at the same time I cannot agree with these studies when you see that the structure of membership and the nature of social affiliations are major determinants in shaping the group’s policies. The Brotherhood Trevi - for dear friend Hossam Tammam, may God have mercy on him - can only be understood in a cultural context that relates to the conservative religious pattern only, and has no effect on the social biases of the group.
Fourth, a mysterious ideology mixed with pragmatism
The Brotherhood's ideology has a number of features. It is, though, that it was launched from the authority of Islam as a religion, but the religious framework has always and always has multiple aspects of interpretations and interpretations that often reach contradictions and rivalries among its followers.
Rather, I would argue that one of the main conflicts that took place and is still in Egypt now revolves around the various patterns of religiosity in society, especially since behind it is a momentum of internal and external institutions, interests and connections.
Throughout its long history, the group has been careful not to choose specific economic, social or political policies except compelled, as it has consciousened itself as an independent party outside society and the state with abstract ideas without social implications
The nature of the ideology emanating from religions is open to various interpretations and interpretations and interacts multilaterally with the contexts in which they move, as religious quotations are used to justify economic and social choices and biases, and in many cases they go beyond biases without a sense of contradictions between them, indications for example of social justice with faith in the free market at the same time .
I understand the discourse of identity in the context of the social issue as a way of civilized distinction and its ability to produce an independent developmental pattern - not only in its economic dimension but also in its component and philosophy on which it is based also - a pattern that rejects the consumptive and market principles as guiding values for our entire life, but I claim that without this emancipation The social issue will not be solved and we will not be able to bring about development.
Throughout its long history, the group has been careful not to choose specific economic, social or political policies except compelled, as it has consciously recognized itself as an independent party outside of society and the state with abstract ideas without social implications, as Hudhud mentioned.
The neoliberalism that links the Brotherhood to the outside world and the global economy, and I add that it also links them with local elites who are keen to deal with them for their economic and political influence.
It mixes with this characteristic that practical practice is the one that depicts the features of ideology, so it is a systematic mistake that researchers have the ability to analyze texts without following practical practice, as the practice among Islamists - in many cases - precedes theoretical vision, and this makes the Islamic idea have an empty vaguely empty container without content Specific, and lead to them being influenced by the contexts in which they operate.
This has led to their ability to adjust their ideological positions to keep pace with the changes that are taking place. They have moved - or more precisely coexist and transcended - from socialism of Islam to capitalism to neoliberalism, and from anti-partisanism to the belief in liberal democracy, and every time it justifies it with religious arguments.
But at the same time it led them to appear pragmatic, their neoliberal policies after 2011 can only be explained by their search - as Khalil Al Anani sees - for Western acceptance and illegal courtship of the big business class from Mubarak's era, despite presenting itself as a sponsor of the poor in the absence of the state.
Neoliberalism, according to Al-Anani, is what links the Brotherhood to the outside world and the global economy, and I add that it also links them with local elites who are keen to deal with them for their economic and political influence.
Here lies the great irony, because a large part of the January 2011 revolution was a protest against Mubarak's neoliberal policies, but the Brotherhood in power followed the same policies, which led to their mass isolation, and this facilitated their blockade and then beat them.
The absence of the ruling vision produces multiple contradictions. They criticized - during the Mubarak era - the state's retreat from performing its economic and social roles and at another time they abandoned its interference (see a statement of these contradictions in Khalil Al Anani's article).
Some researchers offer the concept of pious liberalism (see al-Anani) an explanation of the Brotherhood's neoliberal policies ... pious liberalism is a phenomenon in which its religion, charities and economic activities interact in its bosom.
In my view, this concept is an explanatory concept of the nature of the phenomenon and not an explanation, in other words, in the absence of a ruling vision, the predominance is to respond to contexts with the use of religious preambles to legitimize behavior and ideas.
The context is firstly governed by evidence that the Brotherhood bourgeoisie has been overwhelmed by the characteristics of the Arab bourgeoisie, which was characterized by the rentier economy dominated by oil, speculation, import, and the financial economy (and hopes with me how to use the term Islamic economy to describe the financial component only) and is absent from investment in industry or advanced technology.
Fifth: the protests prevailed over the presentation of policies
This characteristic does not belong to the Muslim Brotherhood alone, but extends to all Egyptian opposition forces. The Mubarak regime deprived them of the mere imagination of reaching the seats of government, and the January revolution surprised them as it surprised everyone.
The matter exacerbated the Islamists' denial of their assumption of any significant positions in the state apparatus, so they did not realize the meaning of the state and how its apparatus functioned and sometimes acted - and they were in power - with the logic of the opposition party or according to the civil society mechanisms!
In conclusion, when the government came to power, the movement had no solutions for how to deal with Egypt's chronic problems, and it lacked a coherent socio-economic strategy.