Despite the apparent intimate appearances that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are keen to show in their public meetings, things often appear different behind the scenes, as the Russian Tsar does not stop humiliating his Syrian ally in various ways by reminding him that he would not have remained in his seat until Today if Russia had not intervened militarily to save it from the fall of 2015, and unfortunately for Assad, some manifestations of this humiliation are leaking - by mistake or intentionally - in front of the cameras, as happened during the Russian President's visit to the Hmeimim Air Base in Syria in December 2017. When a Russian officer stopped Assad to prevent him from walking alongside Putin, and as happened repeatedly in the joint meetings between the two presidents when the position of the Syrian flag in the background of the meeting was ignored, as is known in the protocols of meetings between the leaders.
It is likely that these humiliating gestures would certainly upset Assad, but the Syrian dictator would not have allowed these passing gestures to disturb his relationship with his most important ally at all, especially in light of the international isolation the regime has been undergoing for a decade, but the dose of humiliation and humiliation that Assad was exposed to him by his Russian ally weeks ago, which were completely different and unprecedented. Bashar Assad did not expect in his worst nightmares to be subjected to a systematic media attack against his regime, and against his person, too, from Russian and semi-official Russian media, an attack that Assad realizes that he did not. It would not have happened without instructions, or at least in the green light, from Vladimir Putin himself.
The so-called Russian media uprising against Assad began in the first week of April, with the Russian state news agency TAS publishing an editorial in which it confirmed that Russia had suspected Assad's ability to lead the country, and warned that the head of the Syrian regime might drag Moscow Towards a "new Afghan quagmire", and more than that, the Russian agency attacked Iran - Assad's most important ally and Russia's hypothetical friend - directly, when it claimed that the Islamic Republic had no interest in stabilizing Syria or the Middle East because it considered it a "battleground" Against Washington. "
Over the next more than 12 days, dozens of Russian media close to the authority launched an organized campaign, which included dozens of news coverage, analysis, and opinion articles that accused the Assad regime of corruption and incompetence, and challenged Assad's eligibility personally after it revealed that he had purchased a 30 million-art painting. Dollars to gift her to his wife, but the worst was yet to come. On April 17, the Russian Federal News Agency, owned by Yevgeny Pregenugin, published the president of Wagner Military Services, which provides mercenaries to fight alongside the Syrian regime, nicknamed " Chef Putin, "I published three articles in less than three hours that seem to have shaken the Syrian regime's reach to the core.
We are all partners,
according to a Russian newspaper.
Bashar Al-Assad bought for his wife a painting by British artist Hockney "Splash" for about $ 30 million.
The painting was bought by a bidder whose name has not been announced at the auction company Southeby. According to Arab media sources, the Syrian president bought the painting for one of his wife's palaces //t.co/fj7kjBe6tV
- Faisal Al Qasim (@kasimf) April 17, 2020
In the first article, the Russian agency accused the Syrian regime of corruption and lying to its citizens about the scarcity of oil and gas to justify the outage of electricity for long hours, not to mention the use of Russian financial aid to finance corruption networks and achieve the personal interests of the regime's symbols, while the second article focused on the results of a survey conducted by a Russian institution that cited There is an unprecedented decrease in the popularity of the head of the Syrian regime, indicating that only 31% of Syrians said they are ready to choose Bashar al-Assad in any electoral election, compared to 56% who said they could not vote for Assad at all, while the last article went further. He focused criticism on the person of Assad himself, accusing him of being weak in the face of corruption networks.
Later, the Russian agency deleted the controversial articles, claiming that its website was hacked, but the articles were already being discussed on dozens of other Russian and international websites over the following days, until April 30, when Russia crowned its anti-Syrian campaign with a report issued by The Council of International Affairs (RIAC), a research center of the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed that Russia is in talks with other parties on the Syrian scene to agree on a political solution that may not include Bashar al-Assad staying in the presidential seat, and the report highlights Russia's alleged efforts to compel The regime is committed to a ceasefire with both the US-backed Kurdish Democratic Forces of Syria on the one hand, and the Free Syrian-backed factions backed by Turkey on the other, as steps begin to form a national unity government that includes representatives of both.
Apparently, the media campaign against Assad and his regime has raised many speculations and questions, chief among them a question about whether Russia is already reviewing its options in Syria, or is it already ready to negotiate a political solution that does not include Bashar Assad, or is this flow of writings and references The critic of the regime was only aiming to send a clear message from the Kremlin to Damascus, but in a slightly noisy language, and whatever the answer to this fundamental question, the fact that cannot be ignored remains that Moscow is feeling a great frustration with the policies of its Syrian ally, and that it has already begun to search for ways Different and unconventional to express this growing frustration.
Russia's relations with the Al-Assad family have always been volatile and complex, although the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognize Syria's independence and establish diplomatic relations with it in 1944, and despite the major push that relations got after Hafez Al-Assad came to power in 1970, the partnership between the two countries was More complicated than it is sometimes recognized, as Russian officials were concerned about Hafez al-Assad and believed that it was impossible to control him, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early nineties, relations between the two countries almost faded - with the exception of Russia maintaining its access to the port of Tartus - before being restored again in the mid-decade The past (in the year 2005), when Moscow's desire to pursue an independent foreign policy interrupted, with Damascus searching for strong allies to use in the face of Western pressure.
With the outbreak of the Syrian uprising against the Assad regime in 2011, Russia's support for the Syrian regime increased significantly, a support that culminated in September 2015 when Moscow decided to intervene militarily in Syria to save its last allies in the Middle East region from falling, and to maintain its last foothold on The shores of the Mediterranean, besides proving their worth as a great power and their ability to defend their interests in a region that has long been described as American with distinction, of course, Moscow was not reluctant, besides that, to achieve a bundle of side benefits that were closer to the goals of pirates than to the goals of the great powers, at the head Testing new Russian weapons in actual conflict on the ground, and exploiting corruption networks across Syria and Lebanon to invade the black market for weapons in the Middle East.
Russia did not wait long to achieve its goals, and in conjunction with the brutal bombing campaign it led against opponents of Assad, which quickly succeeded in breaking the siege on the Syrian regime and helped it regain many areas, Moscow began weaving its own networks of corrupt military and businessmen, both Russians and Syrians alike. At the heart of the patronage and corruption environment that the regime reinforced, and in conjunction with Moscow setting up its camps on the coast of Latakia, Russian weapons such as "Viking MP466" pistols, sniper rifles and even portable rocket launchers invaded the markets in neighboring Lebanon, while Russian private military companies and their armies of mercenaries began to pour in. To Damascus, but what Moscow probably did not expect is that its black investment on the coasts of the Mediterranean will face very intense competition from Russia's only and primary partner in the Assad Friends Association.
At the time when Russia arrived in Syria, Iran was already there, and although the headlines of the political agenda for Tehran and Moscow were almost identical, the competition was raging between the two parties over who enjoyed real dominance on the ground, and at that moment it seemed that Iran was clearly winning The dominant figures in the Assad family were already leading Iranian-backed militias in Qirdaha and strongholds of regime support in Latakia governorate, benefiting from the long-standing alliance that Hafez Assad established with the Iranian Islamic Revolution regime 40 years ago.
Russia and Iran have cooperated, then, to prevent the fall of Assad, but they have competed vigorously about who will own the top word and the real keys to influence, and who will achieve the greatest benefit from systemic corruption. It was not surprising or surprising that this competition often turned into armed clashes, a phenomenon that worsened Clearly, with Maher Al-Assad, brother of Bashar Al-Assad, assuming command of the Fourth Armored Division of the Syrian Army, which is one of the oldest and most equipped brigades in the country, the division has since assumed control of all smuggling operations inside the country, from Albukamal on Syria's eastern border with Iraq And, to Latakia on the Syrian coast, where Iran obtained the concession to use the famous port in October 2019, and has since become one of the largest export centers for smuggled oil products, and even drugs, to Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.
These field developments did not satisfy Moscow mostly, not only because it strengthened Iran's influence in the networks of Syrian patronage at the expense of Russia, but also because it caused great embarrassment for Putin and Russian diplomats with more than one state announcing that it had seized drug shipments coming from Latakia, including that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Greece, which announced in July 2019 the implementation of the largest drug control operation in the country's history, which included 5.25 million tons (33 million tablets) of the Captagon drug valued at $ 660 million hidden in shipping containers coming from the port of Latakia, but matters It entered an unprecedented phase of escalation in early 2019 when the Fourth Armored Division began launching armed attacks on Russian-backed Tiger units, in an attempt to wrest control of the smuggling route linking the regime-controlled lands and the lands under opposition control in Idlib Governorate, which resulted More than 70 people were killed.
In response, Russia launched a major arrest campaign for the most prominent leaders of the Fourth Armored Division and other Iranian-backed units across the country allegedly involved in drug trafficking, and the Russian campaign has already succeeded in targeting many middle-class officers linked to Iran, and was among the targets In the campaign, Bashar Talal al-Assad, one of Bashar al-Assad's cousins, but managed to escape, targeting the squad that sought to arrest him in the Qirdaha area, and vowed to attack the Russian Hmeimim air base, 17 miles east of the city of Latakia, if the regime sought to arrest him again.
For Russia, the threat of attacks on its military infrastructure was a real concern, especially since the Hmeimim base, through which Russia directed its entire military campaign in Syria, had already been subjected to a limited series of attacks by pro-Iranian militias in 2018, and had worsened Moscow feels threatened by Tehran's previous acquisition of the port of Latakia, and its announcement of the start of the implementation of the Shalamjah railway project, which aims to link the Iranian Gulf ports to the port of Latakia on the Mediterranean Sea through Basra and the lands of Iraq, giving Tehran direct access to the Syrian and Lebanese coasts, and most importantly For Moscow, it will isolate the Hmeimim base from Russian forces in central and southern Syria, and provide Tehran with an open way to deliver weapons to its proxies in Assad's strongholds.
From Moscow's point of view, these developments combined meant that the Russians were on the way to lose much of their influence in Syria in favor of Iran, and more importantly, Putin was certain that this was being done with the blessing - or inaction - of Assad and the powerful wings of his regime that tilted clearly to Tehran over Russia’s calculation, and allowing this situation to continue meant that Russia would continue to lose its political capital and influence over the regime in Damascus at the critical stage in which it was preparing to reap the ripe fruits of its intervention in Syria, so, at this point in particular, Moscow decided that it must express its frustration. From the behavior of the Syrian regime in the language that he understands well, and this was clearly demonstrated in Russia's implicit blessing of the strikes launched by Israel on Iranian sites in Syria, and Putin's rush to agree with Turkey on a cease-fire in Idlib province, despite the regime's desire to continue military operations to control the province .
Obviously, Russia was concerned that while it took the decisive part in efforts to rescue the Assad regime from the fall, Iran would be the biggest beneficiary thanks to its strong relationship with the regime and various parties on the ground, and its possession of a large number of troops on the battlefields, unlike Moscow, which does most of the work from the air, which made matters worse that both Moscow and Tehran were aware that they had already reached the point of separation in their policy towards Syria, after the regime's survival became a clear reality, Iran began focusing its efforts on reproducing the Iraqi model by integrating Its militias are inside the Syrian political and military system, while Russia is now seeing the time to plan for Syria’s future after the war.
In the first place this meant rehabilitating the Syrian regime, washing its reputation from the crimes it committed and presenting it as a pillar of stability in a way that could persuade the international community to pump more than $ 300 billion for the reconstruction of Syria, which is the money that Russia hopes its companies will take a large share of, but Moscow I was surprised at how difficult it is to change the mafia behavior of the Syrian regime and its associated Iranian militias, which continue to use Syria as a base to target American, Western, Israeli, and even Gulf interests, which will make these countries unwilling to pump their money into the country as long as the current regime headed by Assad remains in power.
In other words, the Assad regime has done nothing that could help Russia to resubmit it to the world, whether economically, politically or even militarily. In the economic aspect, the regime’s policies in the country's economy have caused a deep crisis over the past six months, as inflation rates have risen Unprecedentedly, the wheat crisis has challenged the ability of Syrians to buy bread, government support has been lifted for many basic commodities, and the small business sector has completely collapsed, while the country's oil and biogas sector has remained almost idle due to sanctions, and also due to warlords' conflicts and elites Corrupt business that insisted on selling oil on the black market through Lebanon.
On the military level, the Assad regime has continued to prioritize costly military campaigns to restore the rest of the country rather than focus on improving the lives of people in areas it already controls (more than two-thirds of the country), and it continues to rely in its campaigns on militia leaders linked to Iran, While the Syrian army that Moscow desires to depend on is virtually being dismantled, and politically, Assad has been rejecting all pressure to engage in serious dialogues with his opponents, which has undermined the modest prospects for a United Nations-sponsored constitutional reform process backed by Russia.
Otherwise, Russia was facing challenges on various fronts that hindered its efforts to achieve the expected victory in Syria. On the one hand, there is the United States, which maintains a considered military presence in the country and has a critical word in passing any deal for political transition, and there is also Turkey, which established a near-permanent military presence In Idlib governorate and still sponsoring armed opposition factions there, and they deny the Assad regime access to oil and gas resources in the east, and they will certainly also have a voice in any future negotiations.
Simultaneously, Russia finds itself in the face of great internal pressure, after its adventure in Damascus has become less popular, and as a poll conducted in April 2019 indicates, popular support for Russian intervention in Syria decreased by more than half compared to its rates in August. August 2017, has become a candidate for further decline in light of the economic downturn associated with the outbreak of the Corona virus, and the sharp collapse of oil prices.
But all of this means that Russia is on the way to abandon Assad or that it is seriously considering it anyway. Instead, it is likely that the Russian media’s attack on the Syrian regime was intended to exert as much pressure as possible on Assad to compel him to submit to Moscow’s will Either by showing more political flexibility by responding to Russia’s efforts to move towards negotiations, or by doing more to limit the political patronage networks associated with Tehran and give Moscow a fair share of influence, which Russia appears to have already acquired following the Moscow Declaration on 29 May its intention to expand the Hmeimim air base and naval facility in Tartous, and negotiate with the government in Damascus to build military bases in other regions of the country.
These developments send an unequivocal message about Moscow's long-term commitment to using Syria as a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy, but paradoxically, Putin is well aware that he cannot do this at present without Assad himself, and that the importance the head of the Syrian regime holds in relation to Russia His system is just as important, and it is not just a name substitution game, as some media outlets have tried to portray the matter over the past few weeks.
First of all, Moscow understands that any attempt to oust Assad will be resisted not only by the president and his junta, but also by Iran and its militias, and even if Iran recognizes that the time has come for Assad to leave in principle, it is highly unlikely that Tehran and Moscow You can agree on who will succeed him, which foreshadows the intensification of the battle for power in the camp supporting the regime itself, where Iran and its allies enjoy a strong influence and a much larger direct military presence than Russia.
Otherwise, it is clear that replacing Assad alone will not change matters much for Russia, where all the centers of power, warlords, and shadow institutions within the regime are currently not interested in giving up their huge economic gains in the hope of Moscow’s satisfaction, and it is unlikely - in the foreseeable future - Any new president can stand up to these lobbies that have accumulated a lot of wealth and influence over the years of the war, but on the contrary, it is expected that the power that anyone else will exercise will be weaker than the power that Assad already does.
In the same context, both Moscow and Damascus realize that the Syrian regime has today enjoyed an unprecedented amount of confidence that has been granted to it by the victories of the past years, and has seen itself as an independent force capable of making decisions, engaging in adjustments and biases away from Russia's orbit and even from Iran itself, For example, the regime makes good use of the differences between Iran and Russia to seek independent policies from the two countries, and this is clearly shown in the emerging rapprochement between Damascus and a number of Gulf capitals such as Abu Dhabi and Riyadh against the background of joint hostility towards Turkey, where these capitals today are leading efforts to reintegrate The Syrian regime and its return to the Arab fold.
Finally, the idea of abandoning Assad appears illogical from the point of view of Russian policy itself, as Russia's intervention in Syria at any time was not only related to saving the regime, but was also intended to send a message to the countries of the Middle East and its authoritarian regimes to the effect that Moscow is an ally that can Trust him, and that it can become an alternative to the United States, and abandoning Assad and allowing a change of leadership in Syria would erode this reliability and bring to mind facts the United States has abandoned its dictatorial allies, such as Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt during the spring uprising Arabi.
According to Russian calculations, therefore, Assad remains the preferred partner of Moscow in Syria, and even if this partner is extremely deficient and often frustrating, Putin realizes that he must swallow his frustrations, and faces the fact that Syria has become a failed state ruled by a militia regime led by him. A dictator obsessed with power and full of pride, and that Russia itself was not far from that, but that does not prevent the Tsar from exhausting his papers to pressure the Syrian tyrant, and to express his displeasure and anger from time to time, in the hope that this will be sufficient to prevent Assad from thwarting his plans again and again.