The Carnegie Middle East Center published an interview with the center's principal investigator Yazid Sayegh, whose topic was developments in Libya and the possibility of Egypt's military intervention there, especially after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s statements days before he opened the door to the possibility of Egyptian forces ’intervention in Libya, if government forces crossed National Accord supported by Turkey, the current frontline of Sirte-Jafra.
When Sayegh was asked about the possibilities of Egypt's military intervention in Libya or entering into a direct confrontation with the Turkish-backed forces there, he stressed that these possibilities are increasing, but he believes that the Sisi regime does not prefer this, and he wants to keep it as a last option.
He added that in the event that Egypt interferes, then this does not have to be complete in order to be effective in discouraging the forces loyal to the Tripoli-based National Accord Government and its Turkish supporters from progressing to or crossing the Sirte-Jafra Line. Moreover, the Egyptian army does not need to advance to this line on its own or directly confront Turkish-backed forces.
Sayegh expects that the first step for Egypt will be to cross the border aggressively, in other words through a large military deployment, and then pause. This step will highlight Egypt's seriousness and convince the other side to stop its progress. But in the worst case, Egypt has the ability to move a large number of troops to Libya because it is next to it. At this point, its capabilities are greater than those of Turkey. But until then, Egyptian forces will likely remain in the eastern border region of Libya.
Egyptian interests,
and about the possibility of Egypt seeking targets in Libya that go beyond security concerns on their common borders, Sayegh explained that Egypt's main interest in Libya is to protect its security on those borders. As it does not trust the government of national reconciliation and sees Turkey's intervention as a serious threat to it. However, Egypt's support for the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Hifter stems only from the hope that Marshal can establish safe and stable common borders. Egypt has economic interests in Libya, as it provides a market for Egyptian workers and contractors. However, these goals are not of great importance and Cairo will not risk deploying its military forces for them.
When Sayegh was asked about Egypt's chances of getting out of the intervention process as a political or losing winner, he stated that it is possible for the state to win locally, because it controls the public media and can manipulate how citizens view its actions and results. Moreover, the Egyptians have a growing perception that Libya is a threat and they will view the government's behavior as legitimate. Perhaps there will also be a certain amount of international sympathy and even open support to Egypt from Russia and some European countries.
The United States and major European countries are likely to express their understanding of such a move, but they will not express unconditional support, because they will worry about the possibility of further military escalation in Libya, conflict in the Mediterranean, and enhanced Russian influence. So we are likely to see diplomatic efforts to ensure that Egyptian intervention is defensive, limited, and progressive.
Commenting on the ability of Egyptian military intervention to weigh the scales in favor of Haftar's forces after the recent major setbacks, Sayegh said that Egypt was already supporting Haftar's forces. In fact, direct intervention will help them greatly by securing their backs and liberating the forces to redeploy in central Libya and boost morale. It will also reduce the growing discontent with Haftar in the east as well as inside the Libyan National Army, unless the Egyptians also decide to sponsor a successor.
Curbing Haftar
In all cases, it is very likely that Egypt will seek to curb Haftar and prevent him from making a second attempt to seize western Libya and Tripoli, a move it opposed last year. Sayegh believes that Egypt will make clear to Haftar that any future support, including intervention, is aimed at preventing its collapse, but not more, and that he must accept a new political process to resolve the conflict. For Egyptian intervention, it will not be a blank check for Haftar.
Regarding the possibility of assisting the declared support from the Emirates and Saudi Arabia in pushing the Egyptian military intervention in winning the war against the Turkish-backed forces in Libya, Sayegh indicated that there will be no all-out war in Libya. The UAE can resume and expand arms supplies and the combat role of its air force to support Haftar’s forces in coordination with the Egyptian army, but the UAE is unlikely to balance more than it did in the past.
Sayegh believes that Saudi support will be mostly media and propaganda. And most importantly, Egypt will not fight a major war in Libya merely to achieve the strategic agenda of the UAE or Saudi Arabia. We saw this by the Sisi administration’s refusal to join the joint Emirati-Saudi war efforts in Yemen, despite their strong political relationship and the huge financial and economic investments that the two Gulf states made in Egypt. Consequently, the result of the Egyptian intervention will be a strategic stalemate, which we hope will lead to a more serious diplomatic effort by the international community to find a lasting political settlement to the Libyan conflict.