More than half a century after the defeat of 67 .. Seven puzzles remain unanswered

Ahmed Hamoush

Hussein al-Shafi’i, a colleague and former vice president of Gamal Abdel Nasser, continued to demand the opening of all the files of the 67th defeat, and revealed all their details, warning of the danger of continuing to blank their papers.

Like other prominent military leaders, among them the late former chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces, Saad Eddin Al-Shazly, who has been calling for the establishment of a committee to investigate what happened in the October 73 war, and before that he talked about many facts and events that took place in the 67 war and are still mysterious and have not been highlighted. , She remained, with the passage of contracts, unknown details.

Al-Shafi’i died in 2005, and after Al-Shazly in 2011, before them, most of the Egyptian army leaders who participated in the two wars met their Lord and many mysterious events remained, which remain difficult to explain, despite the issuance of books and memos that tried to touch them.

Destruction of aircraft in 67
Among those puzzles linked to the defeat of 67, which are still obscure, is the success of Israel in destroying the Egyptian fleet while it is in its shelters in record speed and throughout the entire Egyptian territory.

Hussein Al-Shafi’i, Vice President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the time and one of the leaders of the 1952 coup, confirmed in an interview with a witness to the era on the island, that when he arrived at Fayed airport along the bitter lakes minutes before the attack, he was surprised that the planes were lined up “as if they were ready for automatic slaughter ".

Note that the Egyptian administration had decided immediately after the tripartite aggression in 1956 to build fortifications to spare the Egyptian aircraft for destruction, but the target was not fully achieved, and the Egyptian fleet of planes was destroyed until it became without air defense. Why were the military fortifications not built, and who allowed the planes to lie side by side without the slightest protection ?!

The destruction of airplanes and air defense sites made the sky of Egypt without protection, and the situation lasted for almost two years and did not end in 1969 except for Israel to demobilize and frolic in the sky of Egypt without the slightest problems, which prompted Nasser to go to the Soviet Union to bring experts and weapons to protect Egypt from the continuous Israeli air violations .

Strange meeting
On the morning of the war day, June 5, 1967, the military leaders of the Sinai Front were invited to an emergency meeting bringing them together with Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer at Fayed Military Airport.

All the military leaders in Sinai, without exception, arrived at the airport, and everyone was still waiting for the Field Marshal Amer plane that was in the air when Israeli aircraft attacked the Egyptian lands, so she was forced to return to Cairo.

While the military leaders gathered at Fayed Airport were surprised by the Israeli attack, and if Israel knew the location of their meeting, the bombing intensified and killed in one stroke all the Sinai leaders.

War of 67 broke out and no Egyptian military commander was in position with his soldiers!

Who invited the meeting? And who arranged for him at this exact time? Did the matter coincide with the outbreak of war, or was it planned to be? And if the direct accusation fingers were far from Field Marshal Amer because he was also in the air going to the meeting and his plane was in danger, then who threw the Egyptian army in this Holocaust?

The date of the war
It has been proven beyond any doubt that President Gamal Abdel Nasser was aware of the date of the Israeli attack days before it occurred, and his ambassador with strong ties to the Soviet Union at that time, Murad Ghalib, told him, and so did his friend Joseph Tito, the former President of Yugoslavia, and possibly other allied intelligence sources. .

Abdel Nasser spoke about this at a meeting of military leaders prior to the war, and some of those attending the meeting spoke of the president asking the commander of aviation, Lieutenant General Sidqi Mahmoud, to prepare to receive the first strike, stressing that Egypt would not initiate a strike against Israel!

Why did Egypt not move then to abort the Israeli attack days before it occurred? Why did Abdel Nasser want to receive the first strike, is it only to show Israel an aggressor, or to weaken the thorn of his companion Abdel Hakim Amer, who kept him out of the army and controlled him since 1962, or are there other reasons?

Was it really expected that the strike would be limited only and not destroy the Arab armies combined and control the Sinai and the Golan and all of Palestine before them?

Is it true that Abdel Nasser talked about a plan to confront an Israeli attack at the moment, and Amer and his team, Shams Badran, struck the wall?

Sardine cans
Shams Badran, Minister of War and the right hand of Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, who was appointed by President Abdel Nasser in his position to spy on Amer, so he ended up serving the mentor who was the owner of a nice, captivating family, with the expression of those close to him.

The Egyptian official went to the Soviet Union a week before the 67th war, and on May 28, 1967 he met with the Minister of Defense, Marshal Gretchko - one of the heroes of the Second World War and the leader of the expulsion of the Nazis to Berlin - and after that he met Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, and discussed with them the developments in the region Middle east.

According to the testimonies of Egyptian Ambassador Mourad Ghaleb, who attended the meeting, to Al-Jazeera, both Grechko and Kosygin advised the Egyptian official to assure Cairo that it was not in their interest to enter the war with Israel, and advised him to mitigate the escalation that was carried out by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had begun to mobilize the Egyptian army in Sinai, and he requested the departure of the international forces from it, and it had not yet closed the strait of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships.

Soviet officials assured Shams Badran that Israel announced that it did not want to attack Syria as it was then popular, as it announced that it did not want to enter into a war with Egypt, and therefore significant political gains were made to Cairo, and the escalation led by the Nasser regime did not make sense.

The letters of the Soviets to Egypt through Shams Badran were that Moscow would not fight alongside Cairo, but the Egyptian official returned to his country and assured everyone that the Soviets revealed to him that they were with them heart and soul, and that if the United States entered the war, it would make Moscow one of the ships of the Sixth American Fleet in the Mediterranean. Sardine cans!

Badran spoke to them about "the ladder of the plane", and how Gretchko told him, as he was saying goodbye to him in front of the plane, that Moscow would stand with Egypt and that the relations between them would always be strong.

All of this contradicts what happened in the official meeting in which the Soviets asserted - clearly - that they would not participate in the war. As for what Gretchko said in front of the plane, it was nothing but courtesy, according to what Gretchko himself confirmed to Mourad Ghalib.

Why escalation?
President Gamal Abdel Nasser assured him that the Soviets would not participate in a war that Egypt is entering with Israel, and he was assured to him that what was stated by Shams Badran everywhere regarding "sardine cans" is not correct, as the results of the official meeting between Badran and the Soviet Defense Minister Gretchko and President Minister Kosygin, by Ambassador Mourad Ghalib, immediately after the meeting.

Even when the War of 67 ended, and Mourad Ghaleb came to Egypt at the request of Abdel Nasser, the Ambassador asked him during his meeting with him about the reasons for Cairo's dependence on the Soviets at the outbreak of the war, while the Soviets clearly stated that they would not participate in it.

At that moment, the ambassador was surprised by Gamal Abdel Nasser telling him that he was not dependent on Moscow for the war.

Here, many people wonder about the reasons that caused the Egyptian president to continue escalating the drums of war, and to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel, despite everyone's warnings about the danger of this step.

What makes the matter more mysterious is Abdel Nasser's knowledge of the timing of the Israeli attack.

Israeli crowds off Syria?
During the aggravation of the situation between Egypt and Israel, dangerous information was received stating that Tel Aviv mobilized its forces off Syria in preparation for its invasion and occupation of Damascus.

The news came from the Soviet Union, Egypt's ally, and was above suspicion, but despite that, Cairo sent the then chief of staff Mohammed Fawzi to Syria to see the situation closely.

Fawzi's report was clear, that there were no military build-up off Syria, but the Soviet version was the most credible.

Murad Ghalib, to whom the news was leaked and transferred to Egypt, tried, in one of the witnesses of Al-Asr with Al-Jazeera, to explain what happened based on evidence and not evidence.

He said that the indications confirm that the Israeli leadership deliberately leaked the news of the crowds to the Soviet Union through its known spies in Israel, and it knows that it will deliver them to Cairo and it seems that this happened.

Once again, the following question arises: Why did the Egyptian political and military leadership go on escalation, mobilizing soldiers in Sinai, and demanding the withdrawal of international emergency forces, then closed the Gulf of Aqaba in the face of Israel, knowing that there were no crowds on Syria and was the main argument for the escalation?

Note that a large percentage of the Egyptian army was still in Yemen.

Strange signal
In late 1966, the congestion continues between Egypt and Israel, Arab media against Abdel Nasser transmitted Israeli threats to attack Syria, and began mocking the Egyptian regime and said that he threw his army in the Yemen war, and he continues to threaten every opponent in Egypt and abroad, while he is unable to Deterring Israel and saving an Arab capital from an anticipated Israeli aggression.

At this time, Shams Badran sent - and he was in Pakistan - a reference to Cairo calling for deterring the Arab media, which questions Egypt's ability to deter Israel, and confirms that Cairo is hiding behind the international emergency forces in Sinai so as not to get involved in a war with Israel.

And deterrence is to confirm that Egypt is able to enter the war and hit hard without fear.

Badran disclosed a statement during his trial after the defeat, and many felt that he had no reason, and he could wait for him to reach the country, so he would inform him of his leadership.

Why did Badran hurry and send a dangerous message revealing Egypt's strategy regarding dealing with Israel?