Russia's annexation of Crimea in early 2014, the ensuing crisis in its relations with European neighbors and the Western world, and Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis since the end of September 2015, raised questions about Moscow's long-term foreign policy ambitions, especially given the Some Western writings are happening as a new "cold war."
The Chatham House Institute has published a book, “Moscow Rules: What Makes Russia Face the West?” By Kiir Giles, a leading expert on Russian affairs.
The book discusses the values and ideological trends that govern Russian foreign policy, the assessment of Moscow's vision of itself, and its relationship to the outside world, which, if taken into account, may help avoid excessive mistakes and unwanted escalation in the West's relations with the heirs of the former Soviet Union, from the standpoint of Author.
The book included four parts, during which the author reviewed Russia's global status, its rules of procedure, the historical background of Russian policy, the prospects for change and the future of the relationship with Moscow.
Russia's position globally
Initially, Giles explains that Russia and the West are like neighbors unable to understand each other. The main reason is that Western leaders tend to believe that Moscow should act as a rational Western state, despite the centuries-old orientations and decisions of Russian leaders. Several were based on established traditions.
In this context, the author asserts that the West's attempt to deal with Russia without trying to understand how the Russians view the world, is the cause of repeated crises between the parties, where Russian leaders (not only the current President Vladimir Putin, but also his predecessors, as well as his successors in the future) used tools A strategy consistent with the rest of the world, albeit seemingly alien to the Western perspective, its understanding is essential for successful engagement with Moscow and developing a more productive and less crisis-prone relationship.
Giles points out that the assumption that Russians are not completely different from the United States and the West, and that they see the world and react to events in the same way Westerners do, has hampered the understanding of the ideals, values, hopes, fears, and motives shared by most Russians, and those that characterize Moscow for Western countries and Washington.
A key element of Russia's vision of its status, which determines how it interacts with the outside world, is Moscow's belief in its right to be treated as one of the world's two or three most important countries. Western analysts may point out that Russia is far from being a world leader, especially when looking at indicators such as relatively small GDP, its underdeveloped economy, and the limited influence of its influence in the world. This is true, but it is not necessarily the standard by which the state is viewed by the Russian leadership, including President Putin.
From a Western perspective, Russia's recent foreign policy decisions have been so irrational that German Chancellor Angela Merkel has described Putin as living in a different world. Yet Giles believes that Moscow's decisions and reactions follow a consistent internal logic, based on a solid foundation. It is the restoration of Russia's power, prestige and influence in the world, and the development of defense tools to secure its security needs, no matter how unaware that perception from the outside.
Another important difference in perception between Russia and the West, which resonates in Russian politics today, is the question of how the Cold War ended. And whether it was a defeat for the Soviet Union by the West, or whether Moscow voluntarily withdrew on its own?
Russia from within
The form of government in Russia has been relatively stable throughout its history. Giles explains that only since the end of the Soviet Union have some modifications of the “authoritarian” style of government begun with a small, upper-class constrained, negligible middle class, supported by an unknown and oppressed bloc. From its earliest stages, Moscow has harnessed all its meager resources in defense, war and colonialism.
One of the most consistent features of the Russian system that clearly distinguishes it from the European is the relationship between the state and nationals. In Europe, particularly in parts with a long tradition of civil liberties and democracy, the balance of interests between the state and nationals is based on generally accepted principles: respect for rights and responsibility. However, Russia has never experienced such a balance. Civil society has not been formed as understood in the West, and the main principle of social organization is collective, founded on the idea of subordination to the interests of the group. In this sense, Russian leaders are engaged in foreign adventures to strengthen internal legitimacy, a notable example of which is Russia's intervention in Syria.
With regard to opposition positions, the West overestimates the extent and importance of popular protests and organized political opposition in Russia. Giles argues that most of the large-scale protests that took place in the country this century have nothing to do with calls for political change, as much as they can be considered events. Individualism is associated with living problems, such as trucker protests that peaked in 2016.
The historical heritage of Russia
Giles points out that the role of church and religion in Russian society and politics is complex and often incomprehensible from the outside, as evidenced by some puzzling foreign policy statements. For example, in late April 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, “Refusing to return to business as usual with Europe, because Russia is very Christian, and normal dealings with the West would mean that Moscow has become like Europe, and this runs counter to the foundations Our culture ».
There is an ongoing trend to draw historical similarities in today's Russian-Western relations and periods of the Soviet and imperial past.These comparisons date back not only to the Cold War but also to the beginning of World War I, the aftermath of the Crimean War, and many other historical episodes. The author explains that it is difficult to think of a period of Russian history since the late 18th century, which was not mentioned as a precedent for what is happening today. It confirms a mistake that is being made repeatedly in Western dealings with Moscow, assuming that the state of confrontation with Russia is temporary, and that things will necessarily improve.
The author adds that continuous expansion through direct invasion or colonization has always been Russia's default choice throughout history. The rationale for the legitimacy of expansion may change over time, but the ambition of expansion has remained unchanged.
Prospects for change
Some Russian analysts tend to assume a pessimistic outlook, and, by contrast, Russia's expectations in academic and journalistic societies tend to be held hostage to optimism. Giles asserts that Russian attitudes are not unexpected, as is often said. In 2008, the Finnish observer of Russian affairs, Hannah Smith, compiled surveys on development in Russia over the past century and found common threads linking the past to the present. She even concluded that "perhaps it would be safe to assume that it would also be valid for the future."
Russia will not live in complete peace, either with its neighbors or with its partners and adversaries, and the optimistic notion that Russia will not seek to harm the West for no reason is not supported by many current indications of sabotage campaigns and attempts to destabilize the United States and a number of Western countries. While there are some excuses for Moscow's hostile behavior, there are no excuses for some other activities, such as supporting the worldwide anti-vaccine movement, with adverse effects on health care.
It may be cautiously optimistic - from Giles' perspective - that the liberal opposition in Russia plays an effective and realistic role, which could pave the way for serious political change, but it must be borne in mind that the Russian government and the entire administrative structure are more flexible and powerful than Many of its critics believe this leads to another question: Did the West have a problem with Russia or with Putin?
Giles claims that Russia is not represented by one man. President Putin is not the source of all security concerns, but works to adopt long-standing Russian views on how to deal with the world around him, and certainly with his internal system, and thus optimism is dangerous, and lead to repeated political mistakes .
The future of the relationship with Russia
Giles raises the question: What can be done? How can we improve the relationship with Russia if there are many challenges, which means it will not be a smooth and comfortable relationship? He argues that besides abandoning optimism, where it is unwarranted, one must try to understand how Russia views the outside world, and the West in particular, recognizing that there is a fundamental conflict, not only from a moral and ethical perspective, but also from the perspective of geostrategic interests between The parties.
Giles does not believe that the world is in a new cold war at the moment, but he sees that there are many features in common with the latter stages of the Cold War, for example, the growing ideological difference, and the increasing isolation of the Russian people from external ideas, opinions and news, which The regime considers it harmful to its advantage.
In this light, the author calls for a return to the rational attitudes that characterized the Cold War in its later stages, where the parties reached an understanding and a method based on the recognition of differences.
Chances of change are slim
Giles concludes his book by saying that the chances of change in Russia are slim, at least in the short and medium term, adding that President Putin's eventual departure from the scene will not change things, because the problem lies in what he calls the toxic mix of paranoia, deception, isolation and inability to adapt. With the idea of cooperation for the common good, opportunities may arise to improve relations, but these opportunities are rare, and entirely dependent on Russia's internal conditions. On the other hand, Giles laments the neglect of Russian studies in the West and the consequent limited ability to understand Russian behavior.
The assumption that the Russians are not completely different from the United States and the West, and that they see the world and react to events in the same way that Westerners do, has hampered the understanding of the ideals, values, hopes, fears, and motives shared by most Russians, and those that distinguish Moscow from Western countries and Washington.
One of the most consistent features of the Russian system that distinguishes it from the European is the relationship between the state and nationals. In Europe, especially in parts with a long tradition of civil liberties and democracy, the balance of interests between the state and nationals is based on the principles of respect for rights and responsibilities. This balance is never.