Given the circumstances surrounding the visit, the lukewarm reception in Abu Dhabi by Mu'in Abdul Malik Saeed, an architect who was appointed a few months ago as Yemen's prime minister, was not surprising or surprising, albeit contrary to the established protocols. Abdul Malik was not received by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, or even Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed. Reem al-Hashimi to receive the Yemeni Prime Minister and take him to the palace To a sea where he was scheduled to meet with senior Emirati officials.
This was Abdul Malik's first visit to Abu Dhabi since he was appointed prime minister in mid-October 2018, replacing former Prime Minister Ahmed Obaid bin Dagher, who was dismissed on the grounds of government corruption and failure to address the crisis of the collapse of the Yemeni rial and contain the consequences of a hurricane. However, Yemeni sources confirmed that the dismissal carried more dimensions and that it came in response to a punitive veto from the UAE in response to Bin Dagher's handling of the crisis triggered by the UAE presence on the island. "Socotra" last year when Abu Dhabi deployed tanks in the port "Had" Bo, the main port on the island, coincided with the visit of "Bin Dagher" to the archipelago, motivating the Yemeni government to denounce the Emirati "colonial" moves in Socotra and resort to the Security Council to prove the Yemeni archipelago, which forced the UAE to retreat in the end and abandon the command on the island in favor of Saudi forces, While continuing to control the main port and airport there.
Socotra was not the first confrontation between the UAE and the Saudi-backed authority in Yemen led by Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi since the Saudi-Emirati military intervention in the country in 2015. For nearly two years, relations between the UAE and the Yemeni government have been strained following an indictment. President Hadi in 2017 for Abu Dhabi to act as an "occupation force" in Yemen, forcing the Kingdom to intervene and mediate between the two sides, but the Socotra confrontation was apparently the sin of Hadi and Bin Dagher, never forgiven by Mohammed bin Zayed, and within a few days of that confrontation in the Security Council The government of "Ben Dagher" was forced to leave p He was sent to Riyadh because of the harassment of militias loyal to the Abu Dhabi-backed Southern Transitional Council and the blockade imposed by the militias on the Ma'haiq palace in Aden, through which the government operates.
The scenes of these nearby confrontations were present in the minds of Mu'in Abdul Malik in the first moments of his assumption of office, and the Yemeni engineer was probably quite certain that while his decision to appoint him to the post was signed by Yemeni President Hadi, it was Riyadh and Abu Dhabi who wrote the decision. It was ratified by him, so he made sure from the very first moment to assert that his government would assume only the administrative and economic part of the government work and would not manage political and military matters, in a letter that appeared to be addressed to the two Gulf capitals, and to Abu Dhabi in the first place. Listening ears, after a few hours From the remarks of "Abdul Malik" was announced the return of the Yemeni government to exercise its functions again in Aden at the end of last October.
But it took eight full months to take office before Abdul Malik decided to go to Abu Dhabi, or before the latter decided to receive him precisely. The prime minister knew he had to ignore much of the coldness and coldness that UAE officials would face in the hope of achieving his goal. He eventually extracted as much financial pledges as possible from the wealthy Gulf capital to finance his government and pay the bills of the more than four-year-old war.But what the prime minister did not realize was that Abu Dhabi had resolved its position on Yemen since Socotra, and decided that it should Simply stop the game dancing on To sling up their own interests and the attempts to meet the requirements of its alliance with Saudi Arabia.
Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi
Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE was not at all concerned with the legitimacy of Hadi or its governments in the first place, and Abu Dhabi was never satisfied with Hadi's allies and Saudi Arabia, led by the Yemeni Reform Group, the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the UAE sees as its first adversary. Abu Dhabi has more than a secondary threat, while the interests of the UAE in the war have always been linked to Aden and the South and to secure influence over the ports and shipping chains in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, which do not require Abu Dhabi to invest a lot of fixed military assets after it has succeeded in training and gaining loyalty more than 90 thousand Yemeni tribesmen, former security personnel and members of the Southern Militia who can take care of their interests without a significant military presence.
Abdul Malik was on a shocking date (1) when UAE officials told him during the visit that they had decided to start withdrawing their troops from Yemen by the end of the month, and that the decision had already been taken and that there was no point in discussing it. By the end of June, the UAE had announced its decision. Indeed, it immediately began withdrawing its troops from the main confrontation points in Yemen, replacing them with tribal militias and Saudi forces.
Things did not stop there, and over the following weeks it became clear that the UAE's decision to withdraw from Yemen was not only a unilateral decision pertaining to Yemen alone, but was part of a major review of Abu Dhabi's position towards many conflicts in the region, particularly the wider conflict with Iran. This is evident following the involvement of Abu Dhabi and Tehran in sudden direct negotiations on border security culminated in an agreement on border cooperation between the two countries on August 1st.
This meant that the shocks of the UAE political reviews would not be confined to the Yemeni prime minister and his cabinet members who had just returned from Abu Dhabi to Aden with two nostalgia, but the effects would affect the entire region, and would be reflected more clearly on the UAE's closest ally, Saudi Arabia and its crown prince, Mohammed bin Mohammed. Salman, "the actual leader of the Yemen war, who not only suddenly finds himself alone in a win-win war that is under increasing international criticism and is far from winning, but has been surprised, most likely, that he is also alone and isolated in his" great holy battle "against Iran. , Which means that although the withdrawal For Emirati from Yemen was the most prominent stab in the body of the Saudi-UAE relationship in recent years, it is clear that it will not be the only stab that will affect the body of the dominant coalition in the Middle East since the beginning of this decade, in light of the divergent views and interests between the two allies, and tendency Abu Dhabi is pursuing its own agenda, even at the expense of its Saudi ally.
All the bets of Abu Dhabi
Since the end of 2010 and the beginning of the Arab Spring, and the growing demands for democratic change in the Arab world; a special relationship has developed between Saudi Arabia and the UAE based on the common interests of the two countries in the face of the Arab Spring and their desire to restore stability to the authoritarian regimes in the region, which the goal of "spring" to overthrow them The first fruits of this special relationship were the military coup led by General "Abdel Fattah al-Sisi" in Cairo in mid-2013, while the joint military intervention in Yemen in 2015, under the guise of confronting the Houthis and the return of President "Hadi" to power in Sanaa; The most prominent of these Relationship, where the war has deepened its fourth year, which exceeded the common interests between the two countries, and strengthened the sense of common destiny between the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, "the son of Zayed", the young Saudi crown prince "son of Salman."
While Yemen remained the most prominent field of the Saudi-UAE alliance, it was at the same time the scene that showed the early cracks in the body of that alliance and highlighted the differences between the two countries since the first months of their military intervention, particularly since the battles of Taiz at the end of 2015, when it appeared. The first disagreement between the two allies in dealing with the Yemeni Reform Group, the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the main actor in Taiz, while Riyadh tended to cooperate with Islah because of its long-term relations with the leaders of the Yemeni organization, Abu Dhabi refused to engage Islah. Minister of State for UAE Foreign Affairs "Anwar Gargash" attack on members of the reform, accusing them of treason and collusion with the Houthis.
Little by little, the UAE's differences with reform have evolved into fundamental differences with the authority of Saudi-backed President Hadi, who has seen Abu Dhabi's many members of his government and internal circle as heavily linked to reform, and with the Gulf allies unable to reach a common approach on who should Working with him in Yemen, they reached a tacit agreement to divide influence, with Saudi Arabia taking the lead in the northern areas near its border, where most of the confrontations with the Houthis are taking place, while the UAE took command in Aden and the South and took responsibility for what it called "counter-terrorism."
Within a short period of time, the UAE succeeded in consolidating its hegemony as the de facto ruler and kingmaker in southern Yemen, and organized and supported political entities and militias opposed to the authority of the Hadi government in the south, led by the Southern Transitional Council led by the Governor of Aden, Aidroos al-Zubaidi, who Hadi dismissed from his position. Because of its association with the UAE, the latter secretly supported the activities of the Southern Council, which demands the secession of southern Yemen from the north, a trend that Abu Dhabi does not seem to mind since the presence of a pro-UAE state in southern Yemen may be ideal to ensure Abu Dhabi's control of the Strait of Bab al-Mandab and the oil movement at sea. a Red.
The UAE has transformed the Yemeni Transitional Council into an unofficial and effective leadership of the South, and the South itself has become a base for Emirati influence in the Horn of Africa, but this has come at no cost, and unlike the UAE's loss of the highest number of casualties in any military confrontation since the country's founding in the early 1970s, the war It quickly became a major burden on Abu Dhabi's international reputation due to the heavy casualties caused by military operations among Yemeni civilians, particularly by the Saudi air force's shelling, and by the world's most disastrous humanitarian crisis. Intensified by the beginning of the battles of "Hudaydah" mid-last year, this is in contrast to the resistance and criticism that Abu Dhabi from ordinary Yemenis in areas where the UAE forces are located.
Abu Dhabi, therefore, had to change its strategy (4) and abandon its explicit military approach to the Yemeni conflict in order to adopt a more diplomatic approach by reducing its military presence, especially as Abu Dhabi, unlike Riyadh, may see that it has already achieved its own objectives in Yemen, and should not invest Abu Dhabi understands that Saudi Arabia, despite its anger at the UAE withdrawal, will not be able to deny the UAE access to the strategic naval facilities that the latter will cede to Saudi forces. Moreover, Abu Dhabi has suggested that the inevitable end Of the current conflict in To Yemen would be divided through, a scenario that sees the UAE that it will protect its vital interests strategy in the south, which has invested a lot, and at the same time would make them relatively isolated geographically coming from the Houthis in the north threats.
At the same time, a number of factors from outside the Yemeni theater, which in turn reinforced the decision to withdraw the UAE from Yemen, led by the recent Iranian activities in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, which include targeting ships and tankers of US allies, led by the UAE, while Washington seems unwilling to engage in a military confrontation with Tehran, which has become particularly evident after President Donald Trump backtracked on hitting Iran after shooting down a US spy plane. Abu Dhabi believes it cannot rely on US protection to contain any collateral damage from Tehran. N, which drives her to hedge 5 and assemble her soldiers near home.
Similarly, Emirati leaders appear to have become more concerned about their close association with Saudi Arabia, especially as Riyadh stands at the center of the US political storm as congressional lawmakers try to pass legislation to halt US arms exports (and the UAE, by extension, in some proposals). The legislation failed to be enforced due to Trump's veto, and the UAE is aware that it cannot bet on Trump's support and his administration in Washington and the loss of support for influential congressmen, especially as the 2020 elections approach and the possibility of Trump leaving office in favor of an expected Democratic president. N be more assertive in dealing with the hostile policies of Gulf allies.
Repositioning
Commander of Iranian Border Guard Qasem Rezaei, with UAE Coast Guard Commander Mohammad Ali Musleh Al Ahbabi
These rapid developments on the regional and global scenes are driving Abu Dhabi relatively hedging its bets, a policy that has not stopped at the borders of Yemen. In the last week of July, less than a month before its controversial decision to withdraw from Yemen, Abu Dhabi made a new and equally controversial political move when it sent two consecutive official delegations to Iran on 26 and 30, the last one. Particularly important was the leadership of UAE Coast Guard Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Musleh Al Ahbabi, who met with his Iranian counterpart Brigadier General Qasem Rezaei to discuss Iran's border security. These talks were already culminated on August 1. The current two countries announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding on border security friendly.
The UAE's engagement with Iran is surprising in many respects. (8) First, it may be the first contact at this level between the two countries for more than three years, particularly since early 2016, when Abu Dhabi reduced its diplomatic representation in the Iranian capital after the attacks of protesters. After the Saudi execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nemr al-Nimr, the UAE was at the forefront of supporting the administration's "maximum pressure" campaign against Tehran, and before that was one of the first to welcome Washington's withdrawal from the agreement. WWE in May / May 2018, and no other reasons surprising that the UAE itself was targeted at the head of the hostilities waged by low-intensity Iran on oil tankers in the Gulf.
However, this sudden Iranian behavior is not difficult to explain, and in the broader context these developments seem quite logical. From the UAE's perspective, the conflict with Iran remains primarily geopolitical rather than sectarian or ideological as in the case of Saudi Arabia. The UAE has historically adopted more than diplomacy in its dealings with Tehran, although the conflict between the two countries dates back to the first day of the establishment of the UAE when Tehran took over The three Gulf islands, which Abu Dhabi claims to be Emirati, Abu Dhabi's current hostile policies in dealing with Tehran remain the result of its alliance with Saudi Arabia in the first place and have been reinforced with a US administration totally hostile to Tehran. Amia gestating between Abu Dhabi and the rest of the UAE Federal, especially Dubai, about the country's policy towards Iran.
Unlike oil-rich Abu Dhabi, which views Iran as a foe in the first place, Dubai's economic prosperity relies heavily on trade and tourism, and the emirate has maintained trade with Iran for decades. Dubai also has an important and relatively influential Shia minority and a large number of successful businessmen of Iranian origin. Dubai's financial institutions have historically served as Iran's back channel to circumvent Iranian sanctions, and as a result Dubai has often played a counterweight to Abu Dhabi in shaping UAE policy. Before Iran lost much of its financial and political weight when Abu Dhabi intervened to save it from collapse in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis.
As a result, Dubai has been politically depressed in previous years, and Abu Dhabi has dominated the UAE's foreign policy-making. However, the political adventures of the rulers of Abu Dhabi in recent years, led by the war in Yemen, the hostile policy towards Iran, the intervention in Libya and others, seem to have infuriated Dubai and the rest of the marginalized rulers of the UAE. Intelligence sources (10) indicate that the opposition of the Emir of Dubai, "Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum" has played a major role in the recent Emirati withdrawal from Yemen as well as in the more flexible Emirati policy recently towards Iran.
Otherwise, it seems that all the rulers of the UAE have come to the conviction that their country could be the biggest and most fragile target in any regional or international conflict against Iran, which could threaten to squander the political and military gains the country has accumulated in recent years, both in terms of trade and influence. Although the UAE has a strong army, Iran can be outdone in any direct or indirect confrontation, which may explain why Abu Dhabi avoided accusing Tehran of sabotaging ships in the Gulf, in contrast to the sharp and direct accusations of Washington and Riyadh. .
As in Yemen, the UAE is aware that it will not be able to bet on the continuation of the current US policy towards Iran if a democratic administration comes to the White House in 2020, knowing that the Trump administration does not seek war with Iran and Trump himself declares that the goal of his current policy is to bring Tehran back. To negotiate unconditionally, (12) Abu Dhabi seems to conclude that Washington does not mind a degree of direct contact between it and Tehran, where through these talks the UAE could provide an additional channel to ease US-Iranian tensions while fostering its own interests with the state. Persian and at the same time Abu Dhabi, the failure to do so will not affect sensitive accounts for the US administration in the crucial elections before.
Alliance of enemies brothers
In light of this, the only loser of the new UAE policy remains Abu Dhabi's closest ally, Riyadh, where the Saudi government does not consider the recent UAE moves as positive developments. Contrary to the UAE's claims that the withdrawal from Yemen was fully discussed with Saudi Arabia, the New York Times (13) noted that Saudi officials tried to dissuade their UAE counterparts from the withdrawal but failed to do so, prompting Ibn Salman to invoke Trump to make up the large military difference left by the withdrawal. However, his demands were met with great cold in Washington.
In fact, Saudi Arabia has every possible motivation to be concerned about recent UAE policies, particularly those related to the withdrawal from Yemen, given the significant military threats posed by the Houthis on the country's borders, and the qualitative development of the capabilities of UAVs and Houthi ballistic missiles targeting the depth of Saudi territory and the latter seems powerless. To deal with it even with the UAE presence, as well as the major military gaps left by the departure of the UAE from the theaters of direct confrontation such as peaches and the southern coastal city of Mocha and the coastal areas adjacent to Hodeidah and Hizira. Prem and even Aden itself, all sites where the kingdom finds itself forced to deploy rapidly to prevent its recovery by the Houthis or use as infiltration routes, which seems too costly given the Saudi economy's fiscal deficit.
It seems that Saudi Arabia did not give much time before its fears materialized. On August 1, the Houthis launched their strongest attacks in Aden since it fell into coalition hands in 2015. The attack was aimed at a military parade in the coastal city via a ballistic missile and a drone left behind. More than 40 people were killed, and the attack appeared to be an attempt by 14 Houthis to demonstrate their asymmetric capabilities in coalition-controlled theaters and demoralize them after the news of the UAE withdrawal, but it was a clear reminder to Saudi Arabia of the consequences awaiting confrontation there.
The repercussions of the attack were not confined to its immediate effects, but he also drew an additional wedge (15) if the pro-Saudi Yemeni government, which operates a large part of its activities in Aden, and the pro-Emirati Southern Transitional Council security belt forces targeted in the Houthi attack, On the 7th of this month, Yemeni separatists launched an attack on the Presidential Palace in Aden to overthrow the government.
The security belt forces and the pro-Emirati southern separatist militias are another headache in Saudi Arabia. Although these militias are supposed to operate under the leadership of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government loyal to them, they do not really trust Riyadh or Hadi's government, and they serve their own agenda of secession and self-determination. Saudi Arabia is expected to struggle to secure the loyalty of these militias. Between nationalism such as the Hadrami, Thammite, and Salafi elite forces such as the Abu Abbas Brigades, or pushing them to cooperate with the government as well as manage internal disputes between them.
At the field level, it is clear that Saudi leaders, especially Ibn Salman, will have to pay the price for overlooking the real objectives of the UAE intervention in Yemen, which were not identical to those of Saudi Arabia at any time. On the political level, Saudi Arabia will find itself laden with political bills for military intervention. Harsh for more than four years, including not only the bill for the search for a political way out of the war that does not harm the image of the Kingdom or its national security, but also includes addressing the biggest effects of the war in Yemen on the image of Saudi Arabia after the UAE officially transformed it into a war Man "special.
On a broader strategic level, Saudi Arabia will also pay the biggest costs of any political shift in the Western stance toward Iran.After the UAE withdraws from the theaters of confrontation with Tehran in Yemen and around the Gulf's waterways, Saudi Arabia has no choice but to observe the US 2020 elections in the hope that Trump will win a mandate. The US administration has become the last and only ally of Riyadh in this confrontation.
On the one hand, the two countries still need to cooperate with each other in theaters of different confrontations against their eternal enemies of political Islam and revolutionary forces of change in the Arab world from Libya to Algeria. On the other hand, the recent changes in the UAE's policy towards Iran cannot be regarded as radical shifts, as much as they can be considered a strategic repositioning of the Reduce the bill of conflicts. In the end, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh realize that they need each other, but they also recognize that their alliance will get its fair share of conflicts and cracks, and that in the near future it will not be as effective as it was before and in recent years, an activity that has had a major impact in protecting the two countries. The Gulf's effects are reckless and often unaccounted for in the Middle East.