Translator Introduction
By divine judgment, the trial of former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi (the first elected president in Egypt after the revolution of 2011) was brought to an end after his death during his trial in the case of "contacting Hamas" after he fell unconscious according to the Egyptian authorities. But the wheel of time is little changed and we analyze what was said about the late president of the myths that changed the Egyptian political path and sentenced him to six years of solitary confinement, away from his family and then death alone in the courtroom.
the article
On July 3, 2013, Egyptian crowds rejoiced at the news that the army had agreed to dismiss President Mohamed Morsi from office. Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time, was only one year in office. Mursi's opponents argued that he was destroying the [Egyptian] nation, which calls for exceptional, undemocratic action, but despite many of Morsi's mistakes, many of the justifications for the military coup in Egypt are based on superstitions that are more than real.
Was Mursi a dictator?
One of the myths that spread widely with the approaching coup in Egypt was that Morsi had become a dictator no different from his predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, who presided over Egypt for 30 years before ousting him in a popular uprising in 2011. As evidence of the Morsi dictatorship, Which was published by Mursi in November 2012 and which temporarily placed Morsi above judicial supervision, and to say that Egypt was "lingering" under his rule.
| The late President Dr. Mohamed Morsi (Reuters) |
The allegations that Mursi's decision in November 2012 makes him an unconvincing dictator for several reasons. First, Morsi's decision was temporary; its duration was only three weeks and was canceled seven months before the coup. Second, from the perspective of purely political science, Morsi's policies were not in line with the policies of an autocratic ruler. Shadi Hamid and Meredith Wheeler devoted a full academic study to this subject, in which their quantitative analysis concluded that Mursi was more democratic than most of the leaders of states in the midst of "Social transformation". Thirdly, the decision came to push the democratic transition in Egypt, where Mursi wanted to hold parliamentary elections and hold a referendum on the new constitution.
In order to understand Morsi's decision, it is necessary to look at the context at the time. It must be borne in mind that the Egyptian judiciary is highly politicized and obstructed the democratic movement during the transitional period in Egypt. In 2012, the judiciary dissolved Egypt's first constitutional assembly and the first ever democratically elected parliament. More importantly, the judges appointed by Mubarak vowed to dissolve the second constitutional assembly in Egypt and to cancel a previous decision by Mursi that prevented the army from playing a dominant role in politics , Before Morsi issued his decision.
Canceling the resolution would then put the draft constitution, which is nearing completion, at risk, prevent parliamentary elections and, most importantly, perhaps restore Egypt to a paramilitary rule in which the president is no more than a puppet in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Harvard University law professor Noah Feldman, as well as Mohammed Fadel, a professor of law at the University of Toronto, and others, defended the decision as essentially democratic. Morsi's decision was wrongly handled, but he did not qualify to become a dictator.
"The bottoms?"
As with all the elected leaders, Mursi had the right to appoint party members and others who could assist him in implementing his political program. However, many of his opponents in Egypt opposed Morsi's appointments to members of the Muslim Brotherhood, claiming that the appointments were proof of the nation's "stalemate." Al-Akhunah's argument was quickly ruled out. Al-Ahunah's claims were misplaced and exaggerated. Eleven out of 35 members of the Egyptian government and 10 of the 27 governors belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. These are not unreasonable figures, especially with the Brotherhood's dominance over the elections, given that Mursi was facing systematic threats of overthrowing (which culminated in an eventual overthrow).
Since the beginning of Morsi's mandate, non-Islamist politicians have systematically refused to participate in his government. The long list included those who rejected Nasserite political posts and 2012 presidential candidate Hamdine Sabbahi, who rejected Morsi's bid for vice president and April 6 founder Ahmed Maher, who refused to serve as presidential adviser. There has never been a "brotherhood" of any of the main state institutions in Egypt, whether in the army, the police, the judiciary or the media, and if so, the military coup did not happen so easily.
"Constitution of the Muslim Brotherhood"
In December 2012, Egypt held a referendum on a new draft constitution written by a democratically formed body during the latter half of the same year. Nearly 64 percent of voters approved the constitution and was signed into law on December 26, 2012. At that time, a series of myths about the draft constitution itself and the process through which it was written was launched. One of the main myths is that many of the opposition in Egypt believed that the Muslim Brotherhood was the only one writing the constitution.
In fact, the independent Egyptian media often referred to it as the "Brotherhood Constitution." Of course, the process of building the constitution was fraught with shortcomings, but it was not as much as the anti-Muslim media. It is true that the Constitutional Assembly had more Islamic members than non-Islamists, and that some non-Islamists withdrew from the Council, but the withdrawals came late, after the writing of the Constitution is nearing completion.
It can be said that the withdrawals were a political motivation, part of a greater effort to suspend formal democratic procedures. The Egyptian political spectrum in 2012, consisting of 22 Egyptian political parties, agreed to the basic composition of the association, which included a slightly larger number of Islamists than non-Islamists, in line with the results of the assembly. Many elections.
According to one of the Liberal members of the association, Mohammed Mohieldin, non-Islamist grievances and withdrawals were politically motivated, and there were no fundamental concerns about the composition of the assembly or the content of the fledgling constitution. In terms of content, the draft that eventually emerged through the 2012 constitution building process was far from perfect, but it was also far from being an Islamic statement. The constitution demanded regular presidential elections, limits on presidential term, demanded political inclusion for all Egyptians, added accountability, and emphasized the balance of power among other things.
The concerns about the spread of Islamic influence were lacking for real reasons. Concerns over Article II, which stipulates that Shari'a is the main source of legislation in the country, are often unfounded; this article has already been part of the Egyptian constitution since 1971, The new constitution adopted after Morsi in Egypt also includes the provisions of Islamic Sharia. Liberals also complain about article 4 of the 2012 constitution, which gave al-Azhar University scientists supervision of some issues of Egyptian legislation.
It is worth mentioning that this article was not proposed by an Islamic member. Rather, it was proposed by a liberal member of the Assembly as a means of protecting Egypt from the extreme application of Islamic law. At the request of the four members of the Egyptian Christian Association, an article was included exempting Christians and other non-Muslims from Islamic law. Mohieldin pointed out that this article was accepted by the Assembly as it was literally. The Four Christian Association.
Mursi and the Brotherhood are not really Egyptians
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in the 1920s, and its members fought alongside other Egyptians against the British occupation and in several wars against Israel. Although it is clear to some extent that they are Egyptians, many Egyptians announced in 2012 and 2013 that the Muslim Brotherhood is a client group and a traitor to the country. In fact, one of the well-known writers claimed that the Brotherhood's election constituted a "foreign occupation" of Egypt.
There were rumors about the Brotherhood's lack of loyalty to Egypt during Morsi's presidency. Articles, newspapers and television programs devoted considerable attention to Morsi's alleged ties to Israel, Hezbollah, Hamas, Qatar and Iran. More importantly, many Egyptians view these diverse political entities as enemies of Egypt. What is surprising is that Mursi's actions could have been interpreted as normal diplomatic relations for a head of state in any established democracy, but the anti-Mursi Egyptians interpreted them as acts of treachery, given the extent to which discussions over Mursi's alleged relations took place. He is tried for communication.
Besides, they produced fairy tales about Morsi's plans to sell the pyramids of Giza and the Suez Canal and to abandon the Sinai peninsula to the Palestinians. To illustrate the nature of Morsi's treachery, the Egyptians referred to Morsi's speeches, which they said provided important evidence of his inclination. In particular, the media and prominent political figures criticized Morsi's use of the phrase "my family and my family," which they argued was a hidden reference to the Muslim Brotherhood That Morsi had intended to exclude non-Muslim Egyptians from his political program.
But an examination of Morsi's presidential speeches reveals that Morsi did not use the term "my family and my family" as an exclusive reference to the Muslim Brotherhood even once, but his speeches were produced, debated and divided on television news programs to make them appear as if they bore this meaning. The anti-Muslim media took the first official letter to Mursi as one of the most prominent examples of Mursi's alleged intentions. For example, the prominent television network "OnTv" edited excerpts from the speech to make it appear as if Mursi was using "my family and my family" And the exclusion of the rest of Egyptian society.
Returning to Morsi's speech, a look at it all shows that Mursi included all Egyptians within his "family" and "clan." He said: "The great people of Egypt, the joy of the day and the celebrants of the day of democracy and standing in all fields of Egypt ... Dear friends, my family and my brothers, my brothers and sons and daughters, you who look forward to the future and you who wish good and progress and growth and stability and prosperity for our Egyptian nation ... "I say to all the segments of Egyptian society, my family and my family, I say to all Egyptians on this great day, with your will and choice ... I am the president of all Egyptians, regardless of where they are, inside Egypt and outside of Egypt. , In all provinces. "
"The nation" did not reject Morsi
Egyptians who supported the major protests against Morsi held from June 30, 2013 to July 3, 2013 greatly influenced Egyptians' opposition to Mursi. Egyptian media and political figures have referred to anti-Marxist protesters as "the nation", perhaps in an attempt to justify illegal and undemocratic actions, arguing that tens of millions of Egyptians gathered in the streets to protest Morsi's rule.
The famous 33 million estimate was appropriate, of course, as was widely reported in the Egyptian media. This number represents more of the total number of Egyptians who voted in the 2012 elections that led to Morsi taking office. The prevailing thinking, nauseatingly, was something like this: "Because the numbers of protesters were very large and represented the majority of the 52 million voters, it was acceptable to go beyond democracy in this one exceptional case."
Media personalities such as Amr Adib, Lamis Hadidi, Mahmoud Saad, Yusuf al-Husseini and Khairi Ramadan have confirmed, among others, that more than 30 million Egyptian protesters have poured into the streets across the country. Naguib Sawiris argued that 30 million Egyptians protested in Cairo alone. An article in the Wall Street Journal, written by a leading Egyptian politician, argued that the Brotherhood and Morsi had less than one percent support in Egypt. Riham Saeed raised the figure to over 60 Million protesters in the streets in June and July 2013.
Tahrir Square, the largest protest site against Mursi, is the size of a small football field and can not contain millions of protesters. Between 30 June and 3 July 2013, there were about 20 protest sites around Egypt. Using the census methodology, assuming a generous estimate, there may be between one million and two million Egyptian protesters (of the total of 84 million at that time), the protests were already large, but not as large as they claimed, and should not be considered as an excuse to bypass official elections.
Scientific survey data provide better indicators of popular support. According to the data of the only reliable scientific surveys available, Morsi received more than 50% support among Egyptians before the coup, maintaining a support rate of more than 40% following the coup. Pew's survey showed Morsi's acceptance rate was 53 percent in the months leading up to the coup, while Zogby's survey showed that Morsi's support rate was 42 percent as of September 2013, two months after the coup. A study in the spring of 2014 showed that Morsi's acceptance was 42 percent among Egyptians, and said that nearly half of Egyptians opposed the military takeover of power in 2013.
Refuting myths
The myths presented here, along with other myths about the opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood to the January 2011 revolution against Mubarak, formed ammunition for the protest movement of June and July 2013, in the end, whether deliberate or not, these myths were tools to pull Egypt away On the democratic track. In the post-Mubarak Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won five free and fair elections in succession, four of which were landslides.
The Egyptian opposition has chosen to ignore domestic and international warnings about the dangers of taking over the army, and are now reaping the rewards of their choice
The Egyptian anti-Meretz opposition had to wait a few months until the parliamentary elections. If the opposition really believed that it had a majority, it meant that it could have won the majority of parliamentary seats in those elections. The opposition could review the constitution and, if necessary, isolate Morsi by using the 2012 constitution's isolation mechanism (as described in Article 152). Instead of competing with the Muslim Brotherhood, the opposition against the Brotherhood in Egypt chose to undermine established democratic norms and principles, Of course, competition and democracy were the best option.
At the time of Egypt's military coup in 2013, there were more than 40 registered Egyptian political parties, signs of a dispute over political legitimacy, and indications that the Muslim Brotherhood was losing popular support as a result of clumsy politics and a series of mistakes and misjudgments. Instead, the Egyptian opposition chose to ignore domestic and international warnings about the dangers of taking over the reins of the army, and beyond democracy, and unfortunately now - and with them all Egyptians - are reaping the rewards of their choice.
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Translated by Sarah El Masry
This article is from Middle East Eye and does not necessarily reflect the location of Medan.