Addis Standard newspaper published an article by an Ethiopian academic in which he addressed the problems that prevent Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan from reaching a solution that satisfies the three parties regarding the filling and operation of the Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River.

The reasons for the disagreement between the three countries - according to the author of the article, Mahmoud Tekoya, a former lecturer at the University of Deir Dawa - are directly attributable to the treaties concluded regarding the exploitation of the Nile waters during the British colonial era.

In 1902, Britain and Ethiopia reached an agreement whereby the latter agreed not to block the flow of the Nile's waters.

The year 1929 witnessed the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty between Britain (on behalf of its colonies in Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) and Egypt. The treaty prevented the British colonies in East Africa from exploiting the waters of the Nile without Egypt's consent.

As for the third agreement, it is the Nile Water Treaty concluded in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan, whereby the two countries shared all the quantities of water flowing from the Nile, without regard to the interests of the upstream countries, which vehemently rejected this and demanded the equal exploitation of the river’s resources.

In 2010, all the Nile Basin countries reached what was called the "Cooperative Framework Agreement between the Nile Basin Countries". However, Egypt and Sudan refused to sign it on the pretext that it did not recognize their rights stipulated in previous treaties.

Mahmoud Tikoya believes in his article that, given that legacy of treaties, Ethiopia found no choice but to start building the Grand Renaissance Dam on its own, which would effect a change in the status quo that these agreements had led to.

The writer claims that the dam will provide Egypt and Sudan with great benefits. It will ensure an even flow of water, prevent silting, reduce evaporation rates and provide cheap electrical energy.

According to the article, Sudan has always supported the dam project since 2012 because of those benefits that it will reap from it. As for Egypt, it sees that any dam erected on the upper reaches of the Nile threatens the flow of its waters to it.

The Renaissance Dam can store more than 70 billion cubic meters of water, and Egypt initially rejected the project altogether before asking later to reduce its volume, says Tequia.

Declaration of Principles

However, Egypt returned in 2015 and signed the Declaration of Principles; Then it agreed to build the dam. This declaration, also signed by Ethiopia and Sudan, represents a framework for negotiations on the first phase of filling the dam and the mechanism for its annual operation.

After the adoption of the Declaration of Principles, however, Egypt's concerns appeared to have changed, as it wanted guarantees that the dam would not affect its current use of the Nile. In its recent speech to the UN Security Council, Cairo called for the necessity that any new projects - such as the Renaissance Dam - should not have any impact on its current and existing uses of the river's resources.

And since Egypt - in the opinion of the author of the article - is currently benefiting about 61 billion cubic meters of Nile water, which is more than its quota of 55.5 billion cubic meters, Sudan, in turn, considers Cairo's demand for the necessity to preserve its "current and existing" share in violation of the concluded Nile water treaty 1959 year.

Addis Standard newspaper indicated in an article by the former professor that Sudan benefits only about 12 billion cubic meters of its total share of 18.5 billion stipulated in the 1959 treaty.

Tequia touched on the benefits that accrue to Sudan from the Renaissance Dam, as he believes that it will increase Sudan's ability to irrigate its agricultural lands, but will allow it to exploit more water by more than its estimated share of 18.5 billion cubic meters.

And the writer went on to say that the Renaissance Dam is widely accepted by the current Sudanese authorities, despite the existing tension between its civil and military sides, due to its importance to Sudan, just as the importance of the High Dam in Aswan to Egypt.

The article goes on to note that Ethiopia is not a party to the Nile Water Treaty of 1959, and therefore it does not recognize the distribution of water quotas between the two downstream countries (Sudan and Egypt).

And since the Nile is a river that is being overexploited - in the words of Mahmoud Tekoya - taking into account the current uses means that Ethiopia, although it contributes more than 85% of the water flows, does not receive any share of the Nile.

However, international law states that all countries of the Nile Basin have equal rights, and thus Ethiopia is entitled to equal and reasonable use of the Nile water.

Accordingly, as the writer says: It is impossible for Addis Ababa to agree to any treaty that implies a hint that legitimizes the existing exploitation of the water or the quotas contained in the 1959 Nile Water Treaty.

Two options

Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have been awash in negotiations over the past five years regarding filling and operating the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, but they have not been able to strike a deal between them, and have not yet been able to resolve the outstanding issues regarding drought mitigation and future conflict resolution mechanisms.

The writer is likely that the three countries will not agree on how to reduce the severity of the drought phenomenon in the future. Given Addis Ababa's objection to the proposed measures.

And since it is unlikely that the three countries will be able to solve this unresolved dilemma, there are two options - despite the few chances of achieving them - to reach an agreement:

The first is that the three countries must conclude an interim agreement governing the first phase of filling the dam over a period of two years, which would build confidence between them, and put points on the letters regarding the mitigation of drought and conflict resolution.

The second option is for the next treaty to be limited to the mechanisms of filling and operating the Renaissance Dam annually, leaving the issue of sharing water during droughts and other pending issues for a later stage.