— For what purpose did Hitler sign Directive (Richtlinien) No. 11 of March 8, 1944 on the formation of Festungs or so-called fortified cities?
— The Reich High Command had high hopes for the festungs.
The document dated March 8, 1944 describes the functional purpose of festungs and the principle of managing their garrisons.
At the beginning of the document it is stated that festungs "should perform the same tasks as the fortresses of the past."
The point was that the new fortresses are designed to prevent the enemy from capturing locations that are significant from an operational point of view.
Along with this, the Festung garrison had to successfully defend itself, being completely surrounded, thus pinning down significant enemy forces.
The fulfillment of these conditions, as the Nazi command assumed, would not allow the enemy to develop an offensive deeper into the defense.
The document clarified the difference between festungs and strongholds (Ortsstützpunkte).
The latter were formed in the depths of the defense as a place of concentration of forces for counterattacks.
If the enemy managed to break into the defense, then the “strong settlements” became the “cornerstones of the front.”
The leadership of the festungs was entrusted to the commandant, who was equivalent to the corps commander.
All military units on the territory of the fortress and all civilians were subordinate to the commandant.
The commandant himself was subordinate to the commander of the army group or army where the festung was stationed.
The fortress garrison was divided into security formations, which were always in the fortress and were responsible for its engineering equipment, and a “full garrison”, which could be involved in counterattack actions and perform other tasks.
The idea of festungs is based on the experience of the highly successful defensive actions of the Wehrmacht in 1942 in the settlements of Kholm, Demyansk, Yukhnov.
The Nazis occupied a perimeter defense, received supplies by air, made forays and were eventually released.
In general, the concept of festungs seemed quite rational.
With its help, the Germans hoped to take maximum advantage of defensive tactics and thereby prevent the collapse of the front.
The Nazis believed that they could whittle down the offensive potential of the Red Army and the Anglo-American troops, gain time to accumulate reserves and then launch sensitive counterattacks.
Directive No. 11 on the creation of festungs (from the US National Archives)
© National Archives and Records Administration of the United States (NARA)
In addition, the enemy counted on the fact that the Red Army would not be able to fight effectively in urban areas: by the beginning of 1944, the Wehrmacht began to receive Faust cartridges en masse, the use of which significantly complicated the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in populated areas.
— How were fortified cities developed?
— Festung was a system of fortified areas that were built along the perimeter of the city.
Engineering structures and firing points were also created in the city itself, usually in two or three lines.
When engineering the area adjacent to the city, the Germans tried to use its natural advantages: for example, they occupied dominant heights, set up defensive lines along water barriers, and mined flat areas through which armored vehicles could easily drive.
The Germans thought through logistics in order to quickly transfer troops and deliver ammunition to positions in a timely manner, and accumulated weapons and provisions in order to be able to hold the defense for a long time.
Map of the defensive lines of Königsberg and the directions of the Red Army attacks
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
— Which city is considered the first festung? How successful was the Red Army in its assault?
— The first example of the defense of a festung was the battle for Tarnopol (Ternopil).
It unfolded in the first half of the spring of 1944, when the Red Army carried out the Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation.
Tarnopol for the Germans was an important transport hub, ensuring supplies for the troops of Army Group South.
The commandant of the fortress was Major General Egon von Neindorff.
About 16 thousand people were under his command.
To the west of the festung there was a reservoir, which made an assault from this side almost impossible.
Nevertheless, units of the 1st Ukrainian Front were able to surround the city, destroy important defense centers with the help of artillery and aerial bombardment, and repulse the attempt to relieve the blockade.
As a result, the garrison of the fortress tried to break through and was destroyed.
Only 55 people escaped the Soviet encirclement, although more than 4 thousand Wehrmacht troops made the breakthrough.
On April 15, Tarnopol was finally liberated.
Then the Red Army defeated the enemy in the festungs of Kolberg, Königsberg (Kaliningrad), Küstrin, Breslau, Poznan, Budapest and, finally, in Berlin.
In turn, the Allies took Dunkirk, Calais, Brest and La Rochelle in occupied France.
German infantryman with a hand grenade launcher
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
— You said that directive or order No. 11 was a valid and completely rational document. Why were the Germans incapable of truly long-term resistance?
— In my opinion, the main reason for the loss of the Wehrmacht was the degradation of Germany’s personnel potential.
The garrison of fortresses often consisted of poorly trained infantrymen, and not the most capable senior officers were appointed commandants.
Also, the Germans were greatly let down by the possibility of normal supply of the garrison by air, which they really counted on.
In 1944, the enemy lost dominance in the skies and could no longer use transport aircraft en masse.
Instead, the Luftwaffe dropped only food containers into the festung area.
The garrison's hopes for a release of the blockade were rapidly melting away, and he was losing the will to resist.
The situation with personnel and supplies was different in the Red Army.
At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army experienced the flowering of military and operational art.
For example, during the storming of Tarnopol, the military leadership talent of Ivan Chernyakhovsky clearly manifested itself.
The Soviet general perfected offensive tactics using small infantry groups, which were useful in subsequent assaults on festungs, including Berlin.
Artillery crew assigned to the assault detachment of the Red Army in battles on the streets of Berlin
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Soviet generals skillfully managed forward units and reserves, ensuring a constant onslaught on enemy positions.
Reconnaissance worked at a high level, revealing vulnerabilities in the enemy’s defenses.
All this brought significant practical results.
Thus, during the assault on Königsberg in April 1945, the Germans’ game was played after the first line of defense had been broken through.
Infantrymen, tanks, and artillery burst into the city.
The offensive was swift and quickly broke the enemy's resistance.
Very competently, the Red Army cut through the enemy’s defense system in the cities themselves.
In Berlin, this function was performed by tanks and assault troops.
They established control over the main roads and thus cut the Reich capital into sectors.
If the Germans did not surrender, then isolated pockets of resistance were leveled to the ground whenever possible by Soviet artillery, and large-caliber guns were often used.
The Festungs could justify themselves, but under completely different conditions.
Of course, their assault still diverted certain resources of the attacking forces.
The Allies were in a hurry to build on their success - they did not want to leave fortresses in their rear and wait for them to starve out.
Moreover, the assault on the festungs almost always did not last long.
The German garrison often made a breakthrough in desperation, and in the end was exterminated or surrendered.
— Is it possible to draw some parallels between festungs and the cities of Donbass, which Ukrainian militants turned into so-called “fortes”?
— The cities that consistently strengthened the Ukrainian Armed Forces are not mirror images of the festungs, but there are certain similarities between them.
For example, our current enemy built a fortified area near Artyomovsk.
I mean Soledar.
Here the Ukrainian command, apparently, tried to implement something similar to a festung.
However, he clearly did not have enough time and resources for this.
Otherwise, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are strengthening urban development.
They integrate engineering structures into civilian infrastructure, arrange tunnels, underground warehouses and command posts - it’s much easier this way.
And if you don’t release the civilian population, then you can hold back the advance of the Russian army for a long time and attribute the loss of life to it.
Since 2014, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have built many fortified areas in large populated areas in Donbass.
Some were located directly at the front, some in the operational rear.
These are Avdeevka, Mariupol, Artyomovsk, Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Ugledar, Severodonetsk, Lisichansk.
To date, five of them have been released.
These cities were chosen due to the presence of important transport communications and industrial enterprises, which easily turn into powerful resistance nodes.
Here, too, a parallel can be drawn with what the Nazis did.
The recently liberated Avdeevka was the best fortified.
We do not yet have access to enemy documents and materials from the Russian Ministry of Defense about this operation, however, based on open data, it is appropriate to conclude that the fall of this fortress was the result of pushing through the flanks and pinning down enemy forces in urban battles.
In mid-February, the blockade of the city became inevitable, and therefore the new commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Syrsky, ordered the hasty withdrawal of troops.
It is worth noting that during the battle for Avdievka, the Russian armed forces used a large number of non-standard tactics.
In addition, interaction between aviation, artillery and assault infantry, divided into small groups, was organized at a high level.
— Do you think the experience of the Great Patriotic War was useful during the assault on the fortified cities of Donbass?
- In fact, the assault scheme is approximately the same, adjusted for other types of weapons.
Now these are digital communications, drones, a large number of light machine guns, RPGs and ATGMs.
Three factors can be called the main guarantee of the success of assault operations in the city.
The first is cutting off transport communications followed by a blockade.
Now this task is somewhat simplified due to the wider capabilities of artillery, aviation and the proliferation of drones.
The second factor is the staffing and level of combat coherence of the assault units themselves.
The advancing troops consist of assault groups, consolidation, supply, and evacuation groups.
They are supported by artillery and tanks, and are accompanied by aircraft gunners and artillery spotters.
All of them were trained at the training ground before arriving at the front line, they know how to act as a single unit and replace each other.
Infantrymen of the Red Army at the final stage of the Second World War
© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
As during the Great Patriotic War, any assault is preceded and accompanied by a massive fire attack on the enemy.
Therefore, artillery crews are directly subordinate to the commander of the attacking unit - this is the third rule of a successful assault on the city.
It is generally accepted that it is always easier for the defenders.
In general, this is true, but the experience of the Second World War and the Northern Military District suggests that competent assault actions are capable of rendering even the most powerful defense meaningless.