The Taliban have been waiting for this for a long time.
Since their return to power in Afghanistan, on August 15, 2021, to be precise.
On January 5, the authorities announced the signing of the first major commercial agreement with a foreign company.
The Chinese group Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co (CAPEIC) has obtained oil exploitation rights for 25 years in the region of the Amu-Daria basin, a river which serves as a natural border between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The Taliban, serious partners?
The oil contract "is an important project between China and Afghanistan", insisted Wang Yu, the Chinese ambassador to Afghanistan, during the signing ceremony.
This unprecedented agreement provides that CAPEIC - an entity created in the early 2000s by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the main Chinese oil giant - will invest 150 million dollars in the first year of operation, then 540 million euros over the next three years.
"About 3,000 Afghans will get jobs thanks to this project," enthused Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesman for the Taliban regime.
For the Islamist fundamentalists in power in Kabul, this agreement represents much more than a story of black gold supposed to create thousands of jobs.
It is a "first example that the Taliban can brandish to try to convince other potential partners that they are responsible and can be taken seriously", analyzes Raffaello Pantucci, specialist in China's relations with Asian countries. center at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
Since their return to the head of the country in August 2021, the Taliban, in fact, have not been officially recognized by any country, including China.
An absence of international legitimacy – accompanied by frank hostility from most Western countries – which has largely contributed to banishing Afghanistan from world trade.
However, the Taliban have never ceased to appeal to foreign countries with the "ultimate dream of convincing a Western company to invest in the country", notes Raffaello Pantucci.
But before hoping to land the moon, Kabul above all made eyes at China, perceived as the great power the least hostile to the Taliban government.
Beijing has shown itself to be open in the past to establishing trade relations with these Muslim fundamentalists.
During the first reign of the Taliban - between 1996 and 2001 - Chinese groups were interested in two major projects: the exploitation of the very important copper mine near the archaeological site of Mes Aynak (35 km south of Kabul) , and, already, oil deposits in the Amu Darya basin.
The Taliban hoped for a quick signing for at least one of these two projects with China.
But since 2021, even Beijing seems to be advancing its economic interests backwards in Afghanistan.
“There have been contacts with only a few private companies – nothing with large public consortia – but even these have started to withdraw from the country”, underlines Raffaello Pantucci.
For China, the problem is twofold: almost all the infrastructure has to be built or rebuilt, and the country is still far from offering sufficient stability to guarantee the safety of industrial installations.
Energy Trojan
A Chinese economic timidity which "has greatly frustrated the Taliban", assured the South China Morning Post.
"We have not seen the color of the least penny of Chinese investment," lamented Khan Jan Alokozay, vice-president of the Afghan Chamber of Commerce, at the end of September.
The signing of the oil exploitation project with CAPEIC marks the end of this expectation.
And for China either, it's not just a question of black gold.
Certainly, "with China's dependence on oil imports - which cover nearly 70% of its hydrocarbon needs - Beijing will not miss the possibility of securing a source of supply", recalls Jean-François Dufour, expert on the Chinese economy and co-founder of Sinopole, a resource center on China.
But the Amu Darya basin is not overflowing with oil either.
An American geological study of the potential of this region has concluded that it is of relative interest… for oil alone.
On the other hand, it is an area that is full of gas.
It would be the third most important gas basin in the world after that of Siberia and that of the Persian Gulf, according to a 2019 study by PetroChina.
Paying the price for calm in Xinjiang?
China has also started to exploit the gas on the Turkmenistan side and "there is a very good chance that the engineers told their superiors that the gas field did not stop at the border with Afghanistan", notes Raffaello Pantucci.
In this context, the oil deal with Afghanistan would be a kind of energy Trojan horse.
"If gas is discovered, the Chinese, already present on the spot, hope to be at the forefront to exploit it", adds this expert.
But this is not just an economic issue for Beijing.
The regime also hopes to "buy a guarantee with regard to Xinjiang", notes Jean-François Dufour.
One of the main Chinese fears with the rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan is that the country could become a rear base for operations carried out by Uyghur militants, the persecuted Muslim minority in the Chinese region of Xinjiang.
The Taliban may have repeated that they would not tolerate any attack from their territory towards China, Beijing believes that it must better secure its rear.
"The Chinese hope that by making the Taliban dependent on them for the exploitation of their resources, they will be able to act quietly in Xinjiang", summarizes Jean-François Dufour.
This agreement therefore looks like a win-win operation for both countries, and the Taliban hope that this is only the beginning of a more fruitful collaboration.
In their sights: the Afghan copper mine of Mes Aynak which is supposed to contain on its own "nearly a third of China's current copper reserves", notes Jean-François Dufour.
Will Beijing be seduced by the mining sirens?
This is perhaps the ultimate raison d'etre of this oil contract.
It is less important than a possible copper deal, and China has let a second-tier entity handle it.
This can be a way of testing the reaction of the international community.
If this Sino-Afghan rapprochement causes a stir, the Chinese regime can always use CAPEIC as a scapegoat.
If no one reacts, then it will be time to exploit the Mes Aynak mine.
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