“They put off the beginning of the war for a year and a half”: as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact predetermined the victory over Nazism

The First World War and the series of conflicts that followed it led to a large-scale change in European state borders, which did not always coincide with ethnic ones. In particular, millions of Germans and Hungarians turned out to be citizens of foreign countries. For example, Poland occupied territories that previously belonged to Germany, as well as the lands of Western Ukraine and Belarus.

However, the Polish leadership was dissatisfied with the entry into Czechoslovakia of the Tieszyn region, in which a significant number of Poles lived. All this gave rise to interstate disputes and provoked revanchist sentiments. One of the politicians who tried to play on this situation was Adolf Hitler. He did not intend to confine himself to the seizure of territories previously owned by Germany. The leader of the Nazis did not hide his intentions to take over the lands of Russia. All this testified to the approach of a new large-scale military conflict.

Confrontation

In 1933, the Nazis came to power in Germany, and Adolf Hitler became Reich Chancellor. After these events, Moscow minimized interaction with Berlin by stopping cooperation on most joint military-technical projects. In particular, the USSR stopped training German troops on its territory, and the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union began active work on the creation of a collective security system in Europe.

In 1934, the Soviet authorities invited European countries (Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland and the Baltic republics) to sign the so-called Eastern Pact, which implies non-aggression and mutual assistance, but Berlin and Warsaw did not want to sign a collective agreement. At the same time, rapprochement began between Germany and Poland. In 1934, a declaration on the non-use of force and a number of other bilateral documents were signed between Warsaw and Berlin.

• Hitler at the funeral of Pilsudski
• © Wikimedia commons

In 1936, Germany and Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact, directed primarily against the USSR. Soon Italy joined them. In 1938, Hitler carried out the anschluss of Austria - the Nazis made sure that the Western powers did not intend to seriously oppose their expansionist policies. The next target of Hitler was Czechoslovakia, in the west of which, in the Sudetenland, a significant number of Germans lived. The Nazis combined foreign policy pressure on Prague with provoking unrest in the country.

On September 29-30, 1938, at negotiations in Munich, Great Britain, France and Italy approved the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany.

Czechoslovakia previously concluded mutual assistance treaties with France and the USSR. But Paris refused to fulfill its allied obligations. Moscow, on the contrary, stated that it was ready to help Prague, and began military preparations. However, England and France blocked Soviet proposals for supporting Czechoslovakia through the League of Nations, and Poland said it would not let Soviet troops through its territory. English and French diplomats handed over to the Czech authorities that if Czechoslovakia accepted the help of the USSR, the conflict could take on the character of a “crusade against the Bolsheviks.” As a result, Prague did not dare to formally turn to Moscow for help.

• Munich conspiracy
• © Wikimedia commons

At the same time, Poland, whose interests in Munich was represented by Germany, annexed the Cieszyn region. Hungary, hiding behind the decision of international arbitration, took possession of the territory of southern Slovakia and Transcarpathia. In 1939, Germany completely annexed the Czech Republic and approved the creation of the puppet Slovak Republic.

The Western powers reacted sluggishly to German expansion and even transferred to Germany the gold reserve of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet authorities described the actions of Berlin against Prague as violent and aggressive, but nobody was interested in their position in Europe.

Double negotiation

In March 1939, the Soviet Union proposed the creation of an international conference with the goal of preventing further German aggression. However, in London this idea was called premature. In April, Moscow proposed concluding an Anglo-Franco-Soviet mutual assistance agreement, but France decided to limit itself to a short and practically meaningless declaration of intent to provide military support to each other.

According to Dmitry Surzhik, a researcher at the Victory Museum, candidate of historical sciences, during this period the alignment of forces in the international arena was extremely unfavorable for the USSR. “There was a real threat of a joint campaign against the USSR: both European powers and militaristic Japan with its satellites,” the historian said.

“In 1939, Hungary and the puppet state of Manzhou-go, controlled by Japan, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. There was a European-Asian bloc of aggressors who dreamed of seizing the territories of the Soviet Union, ”added Dmitry Surzhik.

According to the expert, when in May Japanese militarists attacked Mongolia friendly to the USSR, the military threat to the Soviet Union from the west and east at the same time became obvious.

“Tripartite negotiations with the participation of the USSR, Great Britain and France were initiated by Moscow in order to defuse the situation on its European borders and provide preventive assistance to the East European states against Hitler’s aggression,” Boris Sokolov, a Methodist of the Victory Museum, told RT.

During the talks, the representatives of London and Paris categorically refused to accept some Soviet proposals, in particular, determining the reasons for providing military assistance. On August 11, delegations from Great Britain and France arrived in Moscow. Moreover, the head of the British delegation, Admiral Drax, did not even have the written powers for negotiations, which were granted to him only 10 days later.

Germany at the beginning of 1939 began to rapidly deteriorate relations with Poland, which had recently been friendly to her. Berlin demanded that Danzig be transferred to him and that land should be provided for laying communications to the city. Warsaw refused and issued a military convention with London. Hitler announced the withdrawal from non-aggression treaties with Poland and ordered the start of preparations for war.

In early August 1939, official Berlin sharply intensified contacts with Moscow. German diplomats submitted proposals to the USSR regarding their readiness to agree on the distribution of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop gathered for negotiations in Moscow. Hitler insisted that the Foreign Minister be received in Moscow on August 22-23.

Meanwhile, the negotiations of the USSR with England and France came to a standstill. France softened its position over time, however, Great Britain did not want to enter into fruitful negotiations and simply delayed the time. Its purpose was not an agreement with the USSR, but the blocking of negotiations between Moscow and Berlin.

One of the key problems in the negotiation process was the position of Poland, under the patronage of Great Britain, who declared in absentia that she refused to let in Soviet troops through her territory. Although nominally Warsaw was not a party to the negotiations, without its consent negotiations did not make sense, since the USSR did not have a common border with Germany, and the shortest let through the Red Army to the territory of the Reich passed through Poland.

Moscow was well aware that the USSR could become the next victim of German aggression, while the country was not ready for a large-scale war, and England and France stubbornly refused to give guarantees to the Soviet Union about their assistance.

Non-aggression pact

Joachim von Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow on August 23 afternoon. The head of the German Foreign Ministry held talks with the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Joseph Stalin, and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov. In a conversation with representatives of the Soviet political leadership, Ribbentrop said that "there is no problem between the Baltic and Black Seas that could not be resolved."

• Stalin and Ribbentrop
• © Wikimedia commons

On the night of August 23-24, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop signed a non-aggression agreement, which the parties agreed to officially date on the 23rd.

According to its content, the USSR and Germany pledged not to attack each other, to maintain neutrality in the event that one of the parties engages in a war with the third, and not enter into military alliances directed against each other with other powers.

The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol containing the results of agreements regarding the distribution of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe in the event of a territorial and political reorganization. According to this protocol, the boundaries of spheres of influence were to go along the lines of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers. At the same time, Germany refused to intervene in the affairs of Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Bessarabia, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.

It should be noted that the Soviet-German nonaggression pact was the last of a series of similar documents concluded by European countries in the 1930s. Similar documents were previously signed by Germany with Poland, Great Britain, France, Estonia and Latvia.

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“The Soviet-German treaty, signed at the height of the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol, was perceived by Tokyo as a betrayal by Germany and became a prologue to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty in April 1941. In the midst of preparing the Wehrmacht for the war against the USSR, the Japanese repaid Germany with the same coin, ”said Dmitry Surzhik.

According to him, “as a result of the agreements on August 23, the Soviet geostrategic space was advanced up to 350 km to the west, which ensured a more reliable defense of the country. Otherwise, the Finnish-German forces would launch an offensive 32 km from Leningrad, the German 35 km from Minsk, the German-Romanian 45 km from Odessa. ”

“We delayed the start of the war by a year and a half. We got time to re-equip the Red Army, build defensive lines, ”said the expert.

According to Nikolai Platoshkin, doctor of historical sciences, during negotiations with the Soviet Union, German diplomats suggested that Moscow accept into their sphere of influence the territories populated by ethnic Poles, but this proposal was rejected by official Moscow.

“The USSR claimed exclusively in the territories inhabited by the Eastern Slavs, according to the Curzon Line proposed by the British at one time,” the expert emphasized.

“In those conditions, the Soviet leadership was forced to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany, otherwise we might not be here today. If Hitler didn’t start from Brest, but from Minsk, the big question is whether the Soviet Union would survive or not, ”concluded Nikolai Platoshkin.