Ten days.

This is the number of days that elapsed between the capture by the Taliban of the first provincial capital, Zaranj in the southwest, and that of Kabul.

In this interval, the Afghan government army has never seemed able to slow down the advance of the Islamist group, highlighting the mistakes made during twenty years in Afghanistan by the United States and the Pentagon, which have spent lavishly. and without success. 

"Nobody expected the Taliban to go so quickly," recalls Bruno Daroux, international columnist for France 24. 

Equipment that cannot be maintained 

Since the beginning of its occupation in Afghanistan, the United States has spent 83 billion dollars to create from scratch an army like that of Washington, that is to say dependent largely on air support and a communication network in good condition, in a country where only 30% of the population has electricity 24 hours a day.  

Planes, helicopters, drones, armored vehicles, night vision goggles: the United States has stopped at nothing to equip the Afghan army.

They recently handed him some state-of-the-art Black Hawk helicopters.

But the Americans ignored the fact that the majority of Afghan soldiers were illiterate, that the country lacked the infrastructure to maintain such equipment. 

The US military would have knowingly chosen to overestimate the Afghan army 

When it came to evaluating the Afghan army, "the military changed their objectives to make it easier to claim success. And when they could no longer do so, they classified the objectives secret-defense," he said. recently highlighted the Inspector General for Reconstruction of Afghanistan (Sigar), John Sopko.

"They knew how badly the Afghan army was going," he added. 

"The advanced weapons systems, vehicles, logistics used by Western armies exceeded the capabilities of largely illiterate and poorly educated Afghan soldiers," also indicates the latest report from Sigar, charged by the US Congress with overseeing the action of United States in Afghanistan. 

Overestimated workforce 

Pentagon officials have not ceased in recent months to underline to what extent the Afghan forces (army and police), more than 300,000 strong, had an advantage over 70,000 Taliban. 

"The Afghan government has regularly [underlined this balance of power of 4 against 1], but it is not certain that the Afghan forces were as important", explains Frédéric Grare, researcher at the European Council for the international relations, questioned by France 24. "Lying allowed them to get more financial support from the United States than it should have been." 

"Lying allowed the government to get financial support"

10:32

According to the "Combatting terrorism center", of the prestigious West Point military school, out of the 300,000 people, only 18,000 were placed in July 2020 under the authority of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (army, army of the air, special forces). The rest were police and other members of the security services. West Point analysts also estimate that just over half of the Afghan army's strength were combatants. If we exclude the 8,000 men of the air force, the capacity of the Afghan army does not exceed 96,000 men, they concluded. 

Desertions have also been a problem, according to the Sigar report.

"In 2020, the Afghan army was to recruit 25% of its troops each year, which the US military had come to consider as normal."

Desertions were "one of the main" factors explaining this very high turnover rate.  

A too rapid withdrawal of the Americans 

According to the agreement between the Trump administration and the Taliban, the total withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan was to take place on May 1.

His successor Joe Biden postponed the date to September 11, but he also decided to withdraw all US nationals from the country, including civilian contractors who play a key role in the logistics of the US military. 

He has also repeatedly stated that he is committed to continuing to support the Afghan army after August 31, 2021, but without putting in place the logistics to do so. 

During his last visit to Kabul in May, Lloyd Austin, the American Defense Minister himself, raised the possibility of helping the Afghan Air Force remotely to ensure its own maintenance of its planes. which he called assistance "beyond the horizon".

This concept involved virtual training, via the Zoom online video conferencing platform.

An approach that appears illusory unless the Afghan soldiers could not be equipped with high-performance computers or smartphones and connected to a Wi-Fi network in good condition. 

According to Ronald Neumann, a former US ambassador in Kabul, the US military "could have taken more of their time." 

Corruption that directly benefited the Taliban

For years, the US government has published reports detailing the extent of corruption within the Afghan security forces.

Commanders regularly pocketed money for their troops, sold weapons on the black market, and lied about the number of soldiers in their ranks.  

According to the Washington Post, this corruption directly benefited the Taliban.

Even before the launch of their offensive at the end of May 2021, they undertook methodical work of undermining the rural regions of the country.  

The Taliban have made deals, billed as ceasefires, with a range of people ranging from rank and file soldiers, to local officials to governors.

The Islamists offered money against the surrender of arms from government forces and, later, against a quick and unresisting surrender. 

04:49

The Taliban have found fertile ground, especially among ordinary soldiers.

The salaries of the Afghan army had been paid for years by the Pentagon.

However, from the moment the American army announced its withdrawal in mid-April, the funds were paid to the government in Kabul.

Numerous testimonies from Afghan soldiers on social networks show that they have not been paid for several months and that they have not been supplied with food, or even ammunition. 

To this was added a command by civilians of the presidential palace without military experience and aging generals more involved in futile political struggles than in the current war.  

"The announcement of the withdrawal has undoubtedly had a demobilizing effect," explains Frédéric Grare.

"The prospect of fighting for a government they lost all confidence in was not very engaging. Most of the cities were taken without a fight." 

Demobilization and corruption which explains why the Taliban were able to seize the country without almost having to fight, like the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul.

The latter was taken on August 15 without the slightest fight, President Ashraf Ghani having chosen to desert the country. 

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