Palestinian fighters take a captured Israeli soldier during Operation Al-Aqsa Flood (social networking sites)
Occupied Jerusalem -
The attack launched by the Palestinian resistance on October 7, 2023 in the Battle of “Al-Aqsa Flood” opened the door to wide discussion about the Israeli deterrence strategy and the extent of its effectiveness in confronting challenges and threats, and many questions were raised about the extent of Israel’s heavy reliance on this strategy. The strategy, the extent of its erosion, and the failure to restore it, even after half a year of the aggression against Gaza.
Over the decades, the deterrence strategy has formed an important pillar of the Israeli security concept, and Tel Aviv has relied heavily on the deterrence force, which has remained a fundamental pillar in the Israeli security services’ dealings with the Palestinian resistance factions, and the Hamas movement in particular.
The readings of Israeli political analysts agree that the sudden attack launched by Hamas on the “Gaza envelope” settlements and Israeli towns in the south reflects the failure of the deterrence policy adopted by the Israeli security establishment against Hamas, and these are the same assessments of military analysts and national security specialists, which agree among themselves that the continuation of the war On Gaza, it confirms Israel's failure to restore deterrence power.
Hit the concept
In a reading of the concept of Israeli deterrence and what happened to it since last October 7, through the months of the war on Gaza, the military analyst on the Israeli Channel 13, Alon Ben David, says, “The concept of Israeli deterrence in confronting armed terrorist organizations has been proven wrong,” as he put it.
The military analyst says, "Over the years, the Israeli army has explained to citizens that our combat tours create deterrence, making the enemy not want to fight with us. And for proof, they said: Look at the 16 years of wonderful calm that the northern border has enjoyed since the Second Lebanon War."
Ben David adds, “The concept of deterrence promoted by the various Israeli security services only led to the intensification of the Islamic threats around us, as the armed organizations surrounding Israel realized that all that was required was to build sufficient military force, which in the moment of truth could attack Israel and achieve The decision is in her favor.”
The military analyst explained, “Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas established offensive forces, and on the day the order was issued, the war was transferred to Israeli territory,” saying, “We deluded ourselves, and we believed in deterrence. We have to be honest with ourselves, if Hezbollah launched an attack with Hamas.” On October 7, we were still fighting to liberate the naval bases of the Northern Divisions and the air base at Ramat David near Haifa.”
Where does the failure lie?
Dr. Amir Lubovitz, lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at Tel Aviv University, reviewed a study he prepared in cooperation with the Institute for National Security Studies, in which he highlighted the failure of Israeli deterrence, and wondered why Israel placed its confidence in this strategy towards Hamas, despite the lack of clarity. How effective they are at all in confronting imminent threats.
Lubovic explained, "Experiences during previous combat rounds on the Gaza front showed the ineffectiveness of Israeli deterrence, and its very limited impact on the approach and behavior of Hamas, which was secretly preparing to attack Israel, and which, despite the failure and ineffectiveness of its strategy, continued to adopt it."
Although it is still too early to determine with certainty the reasons for the failure of deterrence, Lubovich says, “Some doubt the ability to deter an organization like Hamas, but it can be estimated that a number of factors had a decisive influence on Hamas’ decision, which seemed undeterred, and adopted an element "Sudden attack on Israel, in order to prevent the liquidation of the Palestinian cause."
The Israeli lecturer explained that Israel has refined its identity as a “deterrence force” over the years, as it saw its role on the international scene in terms of the deterrence it must exercise, and the effective steps it takes in order to achieve national security, a role that was shattered on October 7th.
It is believed that by launching the sudden attack on Israel, Hamas “shattered the identity of the Israeli deterrent force, which already seemed eroded, and the continuation of the war for a long period without a resolution also represents a threat to Israel’s security identity, which it has always prided itself on and that it is an effective deterrent element.”
Strategy collapse
Dr. Dan Seger, a researcher at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, seemed more critical of the Israeli deterrence strategy, and asserted in an article on the Zaman Yisrael website that “Israeli deterrence against the Palestinians completely collapsed on October 7.” the past".
"Following the surprise attack, Israel went to war primarily in order to undermine Hamas' military power, restore deterrence and return the kidnapped people, but after months of war, none of the goals were achieved, which reflects failure at all levels," Seger said.
Seger believes that "the continuation of the Israeli war on Gaza will not restore deterrence power, and the desired image of victory will not be framed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, due to the opening circumstances of this war, where Hamas had the upper hand in attacking Israel."
He says, "As a researcher of Israeli deterrence, I believe that restoring Israel's deterrent power in the face of the Palestinians, Hezbollah, and other Iranian-sponsored organizations must be consistent, first and foremost, with the strong message that Israel will not abandon its citizens in times of war, and will not keep They should be captured."
Source: Al Jazeera