Tehran and Iranian cities witnessed protests on Friday evening, November 16, 2019, after imposing a 50% increase in gasoline prices, including protests, blocking streets with cars and attacking banks and government facilities. The Iranian government has started legalizing the distribution of gasoline and raised prices by at least 50% as of Friday, in a move it said aims to raise funds to help needy citizens and tackle fuel smuggling, according to the plan approved by the Supreme Council for Economic Coordination in Iran. Iran has launched an economic plan that includes lifting subsidies on a number of goods and first introduced a fuel card system in 2007, in an effort to reform the government's fuel subsidy system and end widespread smuggling.
The protests that erupted following a government decision to raise gasoline prices, as well as the protests in Mashhad and a number of Iranian cities, in December 2017, were not a new event in the history of the Islamic Republic, where dozens of protests of a political and economic nature can be counted since the victory To date, these protests as a whole have become a political and social phenomenon that is a reality. They are expanding space and imposing questions related to politics, administration and, most importantly, political stability and stability. A important political instability factors. This paper examines the state of protest in Iran and its various dimensions and its implications for a socio-political conflict that extends across the wings of government and society.
Multi-dimensional case
In their research on the dualism of protest and political stability in the Islamic Republic, Ghulam Reza Khawaja Saravi and Sayyed Jawad Hosseini believe that the Islamic Republic as a political system faced the issue of political protest. The protests that came years after the victory of the revolution showed the growing state of protest in Iranian society.Iran witnessed protests in 1981, 1992, 1999, 2009, 2017 and 2019.Although there is a clear title for each of these protests, it has become a multidimensional issue for the Islamic Republic. But it has become an undeniable political reality, as can not be denied its internal causes, and therefore we find calls to acknowledge the need to acknowledge that the growing situation needs a different approach other than denial.
Perhaps the observation recorded here that the research and academic community has examined the protest situation in a way different from the political and security approach by officials, and can be monitored dozens of research and university theses discussing the act of protest in Iran and its causes and effects, especially with regard to political stability, and many conclude that the protests One of the most important indicators of political instability in the Islamic Republic. Some researchers who made their presentations at the Al-Jazeera conference on Iran tend to say that strikes and protests over inflation, declining economic conditions and low salaries are part of the alphabets of Iranian society, a political situation dating back to the pre-revolutionary history.
Iranian society, in its structure, is a protest society, as Hossein Beshiriyeh describes it. In addition to the culture of Shiism and the revolutionary dimension, which was promoted as a dog for Shiite political thought, it is possible to return to the conditional revolution, the nationalization of oil and the movement of Mossadegh, the revolution of the forest, the Khurdad uprising of 1963, the Islamic revolution itself, and the subsequent protests. This is closely related to the “right to political protest”, although this is guaranteed in the Iranian Constitution in Article 27, which recognizes the “right of political protest” of citizens, but the application of this provision is characterized by a lot of confusion and imbalance.
| Islamic Revolution in Iran (websites) |
In the search for reasons
The situation of protest is multidimensional and its causes are also multiple, and we will focus on the most important reasons for the recent protests witnessed and witnessed by the Islamic Republic:
First: deprivation and poverty
Here, we cannot speak of protesting as a rational political act, as much as a populist emotional act. Therefore, demonstrations are rapidly tending to sabotage public property and an act of violence. Over the past decades, the cycle of deprivation and poverty in the Islamic Republic has widened, enabling the emergence of a current. Described as populist, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's current is directed mainly at disadvantaged and poor classes. To this day, he still possesses these populist characteristics and describes his great majority as deprivation, poverty and a sense of marginalization and exclusion.
Iranian official statistics do not deny the extent of poverty and deprivation. In his speech in the city of Kerman recently, President Hassan Rouhani said: "The economic situation in the country worse than the years of war that lasted for eight years and the situation in the country is abnormal, and we have no money to run the country 18 million out of 25 million families live in difficult conditions. " Nasser Mousavi Larkani, a member of the Shura Council's economic committee, says that given the poverty line, 55 percent of Iranian households are at risk of poverty. Despite the difference in statistics, it is almost unanimous that 40% of Iranians are below the poverty line. In parallel, the report of the Iranian Statistics Center reports unemployment of up to 12%, that the number of unemployed in Iran exceeds 3 million and 200 thousand people of working age, and the unemployment rate in the 15-29 age group is more than 25%.
In January 2018, Tehran witnessed a conference to discuss protests in Iran with the participation of intellectuals and party leaders, and there was unanimity among participants that Iranian society is undergoing rapid and visible social changes, that Iran's real problem now is the economy, and that the problem of the economy is due to Ultimately, the government's poor performance, the responsibility of government policies and its successive failure to meet the needs of people, especially young people. The situation of deprivation and poverty is further complicated by the fact that it is concentrated in the border provinces where there are minorities: Arabs, Kurds and Baluch. This is largely related to the gap between the slogan and reality. What is achieved in Iran today compared to the slogans presented is very small.
| A beggar spreads the land on a Tehran street (European News Agency) |
Second: the struggle of the wings and the opposite of speech
This situation is not new and is not only related to the exclusion of the reformist movement, nor what followed the protests of the Green Movement in 2009. The state of conflict of the wings has accompanied the Islamic Republic for four decades.After the revolution reached its goal, the previously formed coalition was collapsing, and the differences that remained Some time in order to overthrow the Shah, a day after the victory of the revolution, a conflict of interest between political groups began. Within the revolution that triumphed with the alliance of several forces, the religious forces, through a high-charismatic leadership, were able to seize the opportunity and take advantage of the weakness of other forces, and hold the reins of political power, but tightened the grip on political power, was only to exclude and exclude competitors from the scene In the end, the Islamic-based government established the Islamic Republic in the 1980s.
The struggle for power did not end with the fall of the Shah and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini victorious from exile, in 1979, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, but continued throughout the 1980s, during which time the alliances of forces that toppled the Shah fell. At first the confrontation with the liberals took place, and then it moved to the leftists (secularists and Islamists), a confrontation that ended with the victory of "fascist spiritualists" ("clerical fighters") in both cases. Later, the "victorious force" was also involved in a conflict and divisions that still exist today. The state of protest in 2009, for example, did not come away from the (Rafsanjani-Ahmadinejad conflict). Similarly, in 2018 in Mashhad, it came in large part as part of the struggle against Rouhani by a fundamentalist movement seeking to exclude the man whose name came with the nuclear deal to the list of possible successors of the Islamic Revolution Leader, Ali Khamenei.
A few days before the recent protests broke out, the Kayhan newspaper spoke of what it described as the "contradictions" in Rouhani's statements in Yazd, Kerman and Rafsanjan. The newspaper considered that Rouhani is trying to attack the judiciary (headed by Ibrahim Raisi, one of the leading candidates to succeed Khamenei), to escape the answer to the demands of the people who asked him in Yazd for the work of his government. The newspaper added that the protesters who chanted during Rouhani's speech in Yazd, were hoping their slogans "pushed the president to answer the economic promises made before his election," The newspaper said: These citizens "do not want to go Rouhani to the margins in his remarks, as well as to create Political tension in the country. " The "Rouhani reassured the West that Iran does not intend to get out of the nuclear agreement, rather than encourage people to fulfill their covenants that his government did not originally fulfill." Commenting on earlier statements by Rouhani, the newspaper found that it carries "a message to the West that the four nuclear steps taken by Iran during the past months were not to pressure them to implement their pledges, but only steps show."
Third: External Factor: It can be explained here in two contexts:
A : The Iranian Foreign Act : It is true that the presence of Iran abroad, along different arenas, takes revolutionary ideological titles clearly, but resorting to the ideological framework alone does not help to explain Iranian political behavior, but in many respects leads to contradictions that make the issue of understanding and interpretation Perhaps it would be more useful to use political science to understand and explain Iran's foreign political behavior, first and foremost the support that Iran provides to its allies abroad despite the crisis in its economy, a question that has been raised and re-posed with all the sanctions Iran was facing. It is essential to stop at the theory of the role, based on the fact that the Iranian foreign policy is now governed by a dual threat and opportunity.
Iran's search for a recognized regional and international role is an important gateway to the background of the Iranian decision-maker's insistence on continuing to support allies abroad, despite the country's critical economic situation, decades of sanctions on Iran were an important reason. Returning to theories of state behavior, which seek to understand the behavior of the state and explain the motives and motives of this external behavior, which is closely related to the environment surrounding that state and move within and through it, we find that the nature of the relations that governed Iran in its regional environment and specifically Its Arab neighbors lack confidence, accompanied by a sense of mutual threat.
There is a firm conviction in the minds of Iran's decision-makers that Iran's presence in a number of regional files and the accompanying economic burdens is a necessity to ensure its national security.
The ideological arguments that accompanied Iran's external behavior cannot be underestimated, but the stick of Iranian influence abroad has other aims that may outperform slogans. Classical Realism seems to be useful in this regard, especially as regards the goal. It argues that the search for power and security is the goal of all states, the main engine of state behavior, and Iran's political performance shows a clear tendency to focus on "power and security." In order to achieve this goal, Iran seeks to increase its strength in conjunction with the weakening of adversaries and enemies, in an apparent effort to tilt its weight in the regional balance of power (the case of Yemen is a clear example of this case), and therefore the overall performance of Iran comes within the framework of the collection and multiplication of elements of power, Each other country as competitors; Considering that if the force were not in the hands of the state itself is the risk of them. But Iran's external action is costly economically and politically, and infuriates groups within Iran who see Iran's poor as first with support from Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria, with the saying: "The lamp the house needs is forbidden to the mosque."
In Iran, there is a strong conviction in the minds of decision-makers that Iran's presence in a number of regional files and the accompanying economic burdens is a must to ensure its national security. In addition to security imperatives, Iran goes further and does not hide its quest to use this influence to change the geopolitics of the region; Therefore, despite the high cost and tightening of the sanctions cycle, Iran will continue to finance its external presence and spending on its allies in the region.
B - Act of the anti-Iran camp : The United States leads this camp, and contributed to its policy towards Iran in creating a protest situation in its dimensions, economic and political, especially with successive cycles of sanctions that have recently reached oil. Iran's crude oil exports fell from 2.5 million bpd in 2017 to 1 million bpd in November 2018, recovering temporarily and rising to 1.5 million bpd in February 2019. After refusing to renew US exemptions for eight countries to import Iranian crude oil In order to zero exports, Iranian exports are expected to range between 300-650 thousand barrels of oil per day. Sanctions are openly linked to the statement: "Seeking to change Iran's political behavior." The researcher, Tamer Badawi, in a previous paper published by the Al-Jazeera Center for Studies entitled: "US sanctions again: the effects and limits of the flexibility of the Iranian economy" the impact of cycles of sanctions imposed on Iran since the victory of the revolution and to date, as these sanctions are the result of decades of economic sanctions Imposed by Washington on Tehran.
A report by the International Crisis Group, entitled "The Spider Web: Making and Dismantling Sanctions on Iran," released in February 2013, speaks of three phases in which sanctions have passed:
The first stage : from 1979 to 1995, during this period targeted Iran against the backdrop of the American hostage crisis, anti-Washington behavior, and Tehran's support for violent groups.
The second phase, which extends from 1995 to 2006, was aimed at weakening the Islamic Republic's regime by targeting the oil and gas sector and trying to prevent the regime from acquiring sensitive technologies to help it develop a nuclear and missile program.
Phase III : runs from 2006 to 2010 and targets Tehran economically against the backdrop of developing its nuclear program. US sanctions at this stage come in the context of broader sanctions packages imposed by other Washington-friendly countries (in coordination with them) and UN sanctions.
The fourth phase of sanctions : Given the setback of the nuclear deal, a fourth phase of sanctions could be added, which began with the arrival of Trump to power and continue to today and take the title "maximum pressure on Iran" with the goal of zeroing the export of Iranian oil. This phase can be described as an "economic war against Iran". "Economic warfare" is the most accurate characterization of US action toward Iran today.
A - Comprehensive economic sanctions : This means depriving Iran of the benefit of its capabilities, especially those that depend on its national income, namely oil and gas, which is being applied today, in the context of zeroing Iranian oil exports, and enhances the impact of this rent in the Iranian economy. The International Monetary Fund estimates Iran's economic growth in 2019-2020 to a significant contraction due to sanctions, and expects the growth rate to decline from + 4% in Iran's 2018 annual report to -6% in April 2019, the worst rate since 2012 (18). Whether the IRGC controls 10 to 30 percent, according to research by Kamyar Mohandes, or 60 percent, according to Kivan Harris, of the Iranian economy, it is one of the most targeted groups in terms of sanctions, especially since its economic activity is concentrated in the oil and gas sectors. This challenge necessitates Iran to find new approaches to circumvent sanctions and bear the consequences, especially as this is accompanied by an unemployment rate of about 13% and concentrated in the young age group.
B - prohibition of economic dealings with Iran : This includes a series of US sanctions make companies reluctant to do business with Iran for fear of sanctions, and this applies to European companies, Chinese and Indian, which withdrew successively after Washington's withdrawal from the nuclear deal. The dilemma of the Iranian currency, which has lost 60% of its value over the past year, is compounded by the fact that hard currency exchange, especially the US dollar, is fundamentally affected by declining revenues from crude oil and non-oil exports.
C. Bank transfer impasse : On February 22, 2019, the FATF, Iran, gave Iran another four months to make the necessary amendments to combat money laundering and financial support for terrorism. According to the FATF, Iran remains blacklisted until June 2019, pending acceptance of Tehran's accession to the international treaty.``Iran has not enacted the remaining legislation by June 2019 in line with FATF standards, the group returned in Iran gave a new deadline until October 2019 to strengthen measures to combat terrorist financing and money laundering to comply with international standards in the field, followed by another deadline until early 2020. According to the FATF, Iran remains off the list. Black, waiting to accept Tehran's accession to the international treaty. European countries require Iran to meet the requirements of the group to be able to activate the financial channel for bank transfers with Iran. Therefore, the obstacle to bank transfers to Iran will remain in place until further notice, with a strong rejection of the requirements of the FATF within Iran, particularly with regard to the Money Laundering and Terrorism Support Agreement.
D. Political and Social Impact In his book "Reconsidering Economic Sanctions," which has become a key reference point for advocates of maintaining the sanctions regime, Gary Hofbauer and his team, the authors of the sanctions study, defend the impact and usefulness of sanctions on foreign policy. However, the results of their study of 200 cases of sanctions (since World War to date) say that only one-third of these cases can change the behavior of the party under these sanctions, but other researchers say that the proportion is much less than that, in the range of 5%, According to Christian von Zost, head of the Security and Peace Studies Unit at Leibniz.
Sanctions have dealt a severe blow to the middle class in Iran, while the policy of support has so far contributed to the cohesion of the poor class.
The impact of sanctions on Iranian society cannot be overlooked. In a study by Azam Rajabi for a master's degree at the University of Tehran entitled: The Impact of Sanctions on the Social Welfare of the People, the main topic of the research was to study the impact of economic sanctions on people's social welfare. Survey and Questionnaire Technology. The population of the study was families living in Tehran, and the head of the household was targeted. The results show that people's living conditions worsened after the sanctions, their purchasing power and income declined, and the amount of people reaching some commodities, as well as health and medical conditions and quality, declined from pre-sanctions.
A recent symposium held by the Association of Iranian Sociologists, in Tehran, believes that the sanctions targeted several episodes, the most important of which are: the leadership ring, the requirements of life, infrastructure, society and defense capabilities, have had the least impact on the leadership circle (the decision-making circle), and spent the impact on the community circle and the requirements of life. . Sanctions have dealt a severe blow to the middle class in Iran, while the policy of support has so far contributed to the cohesion of the poor class, while the opulent class has employed high prices for further gains in a country where social justice was a prominent slogan in its revolution.
Conclusions and results:
The protest situation is not new to Iranian society either before or after the Islamic Revolution. Iran has witnessed more than four large protests from 1979 to date, most notably the Green Movement protests in 2009, against the background of Ahmadinejad's re-election.
* Despite the emergence of the economy as a key factor of protest, but protests prolong politics and the meeting as well, and perhaps the protests rejecting the compulsory veil is a clear indication of this.
Despite the recognition of the importance and sensitivity of the protest situation, Iran is witnessing what might be called the emergence and development of the state of the "culture of protest" in Iranian society, but its success depends on the state's ability to recognize the legitimate demands of the people and develop peaceful tools to deal with the protest situation.
* Political stability is heavily influenced by the protest situation in Iran and depends on the effectiveness of government measures and the ability to find a state of parity so that the ruling space in the face of the act of protest is a factor of stability and political stability and not vice versa.
* The dilemma of the economic war for Iran is not related to its inability to resist in terms of its political behavior, but is mainly related to the consequences of this war on Iranian society, and the regime's ability to activate the system of institutional solidarity and direct spending, and fight corruption.
The Iranian environment is fertile in terms of the seeds of protest. The Islamic Republic itself is the product of a revolutionary protest that led to the overthrow of a regime that was one of the most powerful and ruthless.
* Although the right to protest is guaranteed in the Iranian Constitution, Iran does not have a clear strategy in dealing with this in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the security formula prevailed over all cases of protest.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] There are no major doubts about Iran's ability to "rein in" these protests, but this will be costly because of the security character of Iran as a state and the control of the security elite.