65 years ago, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union adopted a resolution to reduce the army by 300 thousand people.

Shortly before this, on behalf of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the USSR Ministry of Defense considered the issue of reducing the number of military personnel and found it possible to cut the regular and payroll of the country's armed forces.

Under the dismissal, as considered in the department, personnel from government bodies, rear and service units and institutions, military educational institutions and combat units should fall.

Soviet military personnel reacted negatively to this decision.

As follows from the materials of the KGB published by the media, in letters to their wives and relatives they complained about the general disbandment of units and non-compliance with social obligations.

For example, one of the officers of the Trans-Baikal Military District in February 1958 called Khrushchev's reduction "general demobilization."

“Our division will be disbanded.

From our regiment (so far according to rumors) only five people will remain, that is, almost all will be transferred to the reserve ... We must say, dressed and shod, but you should see how our officers are demobilized, who have two or three children: no clothes, no money, nothing, and they are fired without a pension ... Everyone is in a terrible mood.

Now it’s just general demobilization,” his letter said.

"Heavy Burden"

In a RT commentary, candidate of military sciences Sergei Suvorov said that the decree of the USSR government on the reduction of 300 thousand soldiers and officers was another step by the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev to significantly reduce the size of the army.

“The implementation of Khrushchev's ideas about the army had very ambiguous consequences.

On the one hand, he did not spare money for the development of nuclear missile programs, which was justified in those years.

On the other hand, the Ground Forces suffered quite a lot from his reforms, which just could not be allowed in the conditions of the Cold War, ”Suvorov explained.

The Soviet leader believed that the USSR did not need to maintain a large number of large formations, both for economic and military-technical reasons.

According to Khrushchev, huge budget expenditures on the army and the defense industry divert resources from the development of the national economy.

“The arms race is already weighing heavily on the shoulders of the peoples.

A huge amount of human energy, knowledge, ingenuity, skill falls like in a bottomless barrel, absorbed by growing armaments, ”said Khrushchev.

At the same time, as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU believed, the Soviet Union could well ensure its defense capability with the help of missile weapons, including those of a strategic class.

So, in a note to members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party dated December 8, 1959, Khrushchev proposed to cut the number of the Armed Forces by another 1-1.5 million people and "go for a further reduction in armaments in our country even without conditions of reciprocity from other states."

According to his calculations, such measures should not have undermined the defense capability of the USSR.

“My opinion is based on the fact that, firstly, we have now reached a good position in the development of the economy of the Soviet Union;

secondly, we have an excellent position with rocket science;

we, in fact, now have an assortment of missiles to solve any military problem, both long-range and close combat, ”said Khrushchev.

  • Preparations for the first successful launch of the domestic intercontinental ballistic missile R-7

  • © Ministry of Defense of Russia

The First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee recalled that the USSR's arsenal included ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, air-to-air missiles, nuclear submarines, and a "good assortment" of warheads of various capacities.

“I am sure that this (further reduction of the Armed Forces. -

RT

) would be a very strong, amazing step ... I think that now it would be unreasonable to have atomic and hydrogen bombs, missiles and at the same time keep a large army,” wrote Khrushchev.

As a result, on January 15, 1960, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the law "On a new significant reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR", according to which another 1.2 million people were to be fired from the army.

“To carry out a new major reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR, namely by 1,200,000 people.

In this regard, disband the corresponding number of units, formations, military schools of the Soviet Army and Navy, reducing armaments accordingly, and also reduce the Soviet Union's military spending on the state budget of the USSR, ”the first two articles of this document said.

As a result of the implementation of legislative norms, the number of Soviet Armed Forces was to be reduced to 2.4 million people.

At the same time, according to open data, as of March 1, 1953, 5.3 million people served in the army.

However, Khrushchev's plans were not fully implemented.

The first reason for this, according to experts, was the outbreak of the Second Berlin Crisis in the summer of 1961, which arose due to contradictions over the ownership of the German capital.

At the talks in Vienna in June 1961, US President John F. Kennedy told Khrushchev that the United States was ready, if necessary, to fight against Moscow's attempts to incorporate West Berlin into the GDR.

  • Section of the Berlin Wall, October 1961

  • Gettyimages.ru

  • © Ron Burton

In addition, the head of the White House insisted on the need to maintain the presence of the American Armed Forces in Germany for an indefinite period.

After meetings with the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries and the East German leader Walter Ulbricht, the decision was made to build the Berlin Wall.

The second serious test for the military-political leadership of the USSR and the USA was the Caribbean crisis of 1962, which could also end in a global armed conflict. 

"Dangerous Delusion"

Until his removal from office in 1964, Khrushchev remained a staunch supporter of the policy of forming a compact armed forces and mass "rocketization" as the basis of the USSR's defense capability.

“It seems to me that Khrushchev was clearly trying to extract certain diplomatic and reputational benefits from the policy of reducing the army.

Along with this, he sought to accumulate resources to achieve parity with the United States in the nuclear missile sphere, ”Dmitry Kornev, founder of the Military Russia portal, commented in an interview with RT on the logic of the Soviet leader.

According to him, it was under Khrushchev that the USSR acquired the nuclear triad, that is, land, air and sea means of delivering nuclear warheads to American facilities in Europe and on US territory.

However, to achieve real nuclear parity with the Americans was still far away.

“Under Khrushchev, there really was a breakthrough in the development of Soviet nuclear forces.

This was a significant achievement during the Cold War.

Nevertheless, even at the end of his reign, the Soviet nuclear triad lagged far behind the American one.

Parity was achieved only in the mid-1970s, and already without prejudice to other types and branches of the troops, ”Kornev noted.

According to Sergei Suvorov, the correction of the excesses of Khrushchev's military policy began with the coming to power of Leonid Brezhnev.

So, already in the mid-1960s, the number of the Armed Forces approached 5 million people.

However, the reforms of the former Soviet leader left a certain negative imprint on the development of the army and heavy weapons.

“Most of all, the USSR lagged behind in cannon artillery, both in towed and self-propelled systems.

Let me remind you that it is artillery that gives about 90% of losses in armed conflicts.

Under Khrushchev, Vasily Grabin fell into disgrace, many truly promising developments were buried, ”Suvorov explained.

  • Shooting from a towed howitzer "Hyacinth"

  • © Konstantin Mikhalchevsky

The expert added that after the removal of Khrushchev, a renaissance began in the development of artillery.

A kind of symbol of a new era in the history of these weapons was the decree of the Soviet government of July 4, 1967 on the creation of four self-propelled guns at once: "Carnation", "Violet", "Acacia" and "Tulip".

Later, work began on the Astra, Lily of the Valley, Peony and Hyacinth complexes.

Most of these systems in a modernized form are in service with the Russian army.

According to Suvorov, Khrushchev's strategic mistake was to rely too much on the deterrent effect of the presence of powerful nuclear missile forces.

According to the expert, the main lesson to be learned from the military policy of the Soviet leader is that the development of the armed forces in any era should be comprehensive and balanced.

“Unfortunately, even now one can sometimes hear the opinion that Russia allegedly does not need a large army if it has nuclear weapons.

This is a very dangerous delusion.

The realities of the Cold War and our time are such that the Russian Federation needs armed forces capable of effectively performing a variety of tasks without the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, ”summed up Suvorov.