The Russian-Ukrainian war over the past few days has witnessed a remarkable development when Russia revealed that armed elements entered its territory across the Ukrainian border, which means that Ukraine may have begun to transfer the war into Russia.

Whether you do or plan to do so, the question that German writer and analyst Andreas Kluth asks in an analysis published by Bloomberg news is: Will this development be a good thing?

Russia said "Ukrainian terrorists" and "fascists" had attacked Russian territory. Of course, according to the German analyst, such statements and everything issued by the Russian government can be ignored, and it has been said that the armed groups that claimed responsibility for the attacks inside Russian territory consist of Russians who defected from President Vladimir Putin's army and are fighting against him for Ukraine now.

One of these groups calls itself the Russian Freedom Corps and the other is called the Russian Volunteer Corps, and includes elements of extreme nationalists.

According to Kluth, information is limited about these anti-Putin paramilitaries, especially regarding whether they take orders from Ukraine or operate independently.

Ukrainian exile

But these groups at least appear weakly connected to the pro-Ukrainian International Legion, a force of foreign fighters resembling the International Brigades that participated in Spain's civil war against ultra-nationalist forces led by General Francisco Franco, Spain's late dictator.

Ukraine was quick to deny any involvement in cross-border military attacks in Russia. It may be true, according to the German analyst, but the most important question remains: Does launching major attacks on Russian territory have a strategic return?

Some of the best military minds in history have won defensive wars in exactly this way. The idea was that threatening the invading state by attacking its bases on its territory would force it to withdraw completely or partially from the original frontline to protect its rear bases.


This scenario occurred during the period 210 to 202 BC when the Roman commander Shibion (Scipio) the African (died 183 BC) did. The Carthaginian commander Hannibal terrorized Rome with his invading forces for 8 years. Shipion, led by a Roman army, responded to the Iberian Peninsula to capture Hannibal's bases there. Years later he crossed the Mediterranean into North Africa to threaten Cartagena itself.

It was only at this moment that Hannibal was forced to leave Italy and returned his troops to his country to defend it, Shippion defeated him and Rome won the war.

In the same way, Ukraine could open new fronts within Russia. In this case, Putin will have to withdraw parts of his forces in Ukraine and return them to Russia. This will weaken Russian forces in Ukraine and help Ukrainians regain their territory. Putin will also appear weak at home and risk of being overthrown.

But Ukraine is not ancient Rome, Russia is not Cartagena, and certainly Putin is not Hannibal, one of the greatest military personnel in history despite his eventual defeat, so the strategic position is quite different.

Putin has a nuclear arsenal and has repeatedly threatened to use it if he finds himself trapped. If the world, including China, Russia's closest ally, has so far convinced Putin that any nuclear escalation would not be acceptable, Russian doctrine allows the use of nuclear weapons if the Russian state itself is at risk.

Since Putin considers himself Russian itself, he may decide to use these weapons if he is certain of his own defeat.

Commitment to defensive warfare

The second difference is that Ukraine, according to the German analyst, currently has the best combat readiness army in the world, which relies on continued Western support. It defends the skies with U.S. air defense missiles, launches its counterattack on Russian forces using German battle tanks and may control the air with U.S. F-16 fighter jets.

But all this is acceptable on the basis that Ukraine only defends its territory. The biggest fear in the West is the possibility of NATO involvement in the war against Russia, which in this case could turn into World War III.

Some Western countries may also stop supporting Ukraine if it adopts offensive tactics.

Finally, the so-called World of the South, the seemingly neutral African and Asian developing countries, may effectively and formally side with Russia.


Kluth believes that the best implementation of the African Chipion strategy could be Ukraine's attempt to retake Crimea, which Putin captured in 2014, not by invading it directly, but by cutting off supply routes by retaking the Zaporizhia region and then the Sea of Azov, and cutting the land bridge built by Russia to connect Lugansk and Crimea. If the Ukrainian offensive succeeds in achieving its objectives, Russian forces in Kherson and Crimea will be exposed in the long run.

In that case, Putin may see that he has achieved enough and reluctantly enter into peace negotiations, launching his own internal propaganda machine to promote the success of his "special military operation" in Ukraine.

On the other hand, if Putin is subjected to military operations inside Russian territory, it will be difficult for him to claim victory and enter into negotiations, and then he will find himself forced to redouble his talk about defending Russia against its enemies using all his military tools.

Finally, Kluth argues, Ukraine should not attack Russia's territory, and should not encourage militants like Russia's anti-Putin paramilitaries to do so. Ukraine would do well to make it clear to the world that it is engaged in a purely defensive war.

Kiev's strategy must remain to continue winning the world, and then regain as much of its occupied territory as possible, the German analyst said.