Beijing, May 5 -- How can technology boost world civilization?

Written by Su Qi Book Critic

Technology in World Civilization is a book published in 1991 by British technology historian Arnold Pacey, and revised by British sinologist and historian of science and technology by Francesca Bray in 2021, which was published by CITIC Press in January 2023. From the perspective of global history, this book focuses on three aspects: technological dialogue, environmental constraints, and the industrial revolution, and provides an overview of the history of the spread of world technology development since 1 AD.

This book says that when Western textile technology was introduced after the Meiji Restoration in Japan, it was selectively introduced, such as spinning machines, but not looms. Because there are many weavers in Japan, the introduction of looms wastes human resources, plus the cost of introduction, it is not cost-effective. This example fits the intent of this book: any successful technology that is introduced must be adapted to the specific situation, which is also a kind of re-innovation.

The specific situation includes the existing technical level, as well as human resources, business organization level, distribution network density, market development degree, etc., which determine the choice of technology introduction and the change path after introduction. In the author's view, Japan did a good job in these areas before the Meiji Restoration, laying a favorable environment for technology introduction. Focusing on technological upgrading in light industries such as textiles, Japan's human resource advantages have been converted into capital, supporting heavy industries such as coal, shipbuilding, and steel, and absorbing part of their production capacity, while heavy industry continues to feed back light industry from the level of technology and equipment.

The example of China also proves this. At the beginning of the reform and opening up, the Baosteel project, a model of advanced technology in heavy industry, mainly imported from Japan, went to rural enterprises in the Yangtze River Delta on weekends for technical guidance - the introduction of top-level technology to catch up and fill the market demand of low-end technologies and products went hand in hand and complemented each other.

Does the success of technology introduction depend only on the willingness to introduce technology and whether it can be adapted? Not. Technology may be neutral, but technology introduction and innovation are never purely technological events.

For example, the modernization of India and China, which were contemporary of Japan's Meiji Restoration. Among the many explanations, there is a market for technology introduction and re-innovation. It is commonly said that at first, China opposed the introduction and change of technology because the Manchu elites feared endangering their rule, and the foreign affairs movement was greedy and indigestible. India's problem is that the colonists intend to deindustrialize India, such as initially restricting the export of advanced Indian cotton cloth to Britain, and then British technology overtook and dumped India, and then only gave India some technology that was beneficial to the interests of the colonizers.

These statements are partially true, but slightly simplistic. For example, in the technological competition between Britain and India, imperialism should not be expected to be generous and selfless, and Britain won because it was more ruthless and more nationalist, while India lost because it was defenseless and organized. The naval gun itself is a symbol of technology, and the moment the naval gun comes to the door, it means that the other side has gone through a long road of technological and organizational change.

The situation in China is more complicated. Some scholars pointed out that China's textile industry at that time once had a semi-industrialized rational choice, that is, spinning machines and weaving more traditional looms. Although the heavy industry of the government-supervised commercial office is full of drawbacks, it has also cultivated many talents, accumulated management experience, and later became one of the foundations of a new round of industrialization as bureaucratic capital. Compared with the technology introduction model, the political game and market control caused by semi-feudal and semi-colonial status, and the process of industrialization was broken by wars, should be put in a higher position.

In short, the success or failure of technology introduction, interaction and innovation has always been complex and involves a variety of factors. Behind the successful experience of Japan's Meiji Restoration, the line struggle between industry and agriculture followed suit was actually obscured. Similar debates actually continued for some time after the founding of New China, and the choice of route did not depend entirely on the economic and technical level, and geopolitical pressures and the recognition of the possibility of catching up in stages were also important factors. After the reform and opening up, the model of "walking on two legs" has also paved the way before, such as the introduction of complete sets of equipment and social enterprises in the "Four Three Plan" in the 1970s, the former pointing to the path of Baosteel, and the latter laying the foundation for the prosperity of townships and private enterprises.

Each economy has its own heritage and faces current resource constraints. In coping with the constraints and challenges of the past and the present, the future path is unconsciously paved. For example, after winning political unity and independence and economic autonomy, China and India are both developing countries and have embarked on different technological development paths, which include many historical and practical conditions such as inherited industrial structure, economic pattern, distribution of interest groups, and geopolitical environment. This in turn laid a different foundation for the marketization process launched by the two sides, affecting the subsequent technical route - stronger government hands, stronger state-owned capital, making large-scale infrastructure and technology introduction possible, these and the larger literate population, that is, the industrial army, and many social enterprises transformed into townships and private enterprises, so that China's world factory model was born. India's path of information-intensive development has a lot to do with its relatively weak infrastructure and manufacturing base.

Another theme of the book is "whether and how it is possible for non-Western to usher in an original moment." It is often believed that the West has long been a technological leader in achieving breakthroughs in the Industrial Revolution through the scientific revolution and the conceptualization of technological problems. Japan, the modern "top student", is considered to be better at market-oriented innovation. This book argues that the reason why Japan's postwar technological route is biased towards market demand is that the "pacifist constitution" prevented it from developing an American-style defense science, technology-industrial complex model, rather than a lack of interest and capability in technological research and development. Many of the native technologies in the United States are also triggered by market demand.

How breakthroughs in basic R&D and native technologies in recent years between Japan and emerging economies, including China, will rewrite the global technological innovation and interactive landscape will be the object of research and writing by scholars. (End)