Russia/Ukraine: 'The chances of a speedy political settlement are close to zero'

Russian President Vladimir Putin receives Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Kremlin, in Moscow, March 20, 2023. AFP - SERGEI KARPUKHIN

Text by: Anissa El Jabri Follow

9 min

The three-day state visit to Russia that began on Monday (March 20th) by Xi Jinping began with an informal tête-à-tête with Vladimir Putin. The two leaders notably discussed Beijing's peace plan for Ukraine before Tuesday the official part and in particular the signing of cooperation agreements that the Kremlin announces numerous. Interview with Andrei Kortunov, Director General of the Russian Council for Foreign Affairs, a think tank created by presidential decree.

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RFI: How would you describe Xi Jinping's visit: important, essential, crucial?

Andrei Kortunov: This is undoubtedly an important visit from a political point of view. Symbolically, it is important because it is President Xi Jinping's first overseas trip after his reappointment as China's current president. But of course, both leaders need to address some outstanding practical issues. For example, discussing common transport and energy infrastructure, consolidating the achievements made in this area over the past year. They are also likely to discuss various bottlenecks and gaps that remain in bilateral relations. At the same time, I am sure that geopolitical issues will not be omitted. So they will talk about the general political situation in the world. It is certain that their stories coincide to a very large extent.

At the same time, I do not think it will be a decisive event. I do not think there are any surprises at the end of this meeting. I think we know the positions of both nations on major international issues. I do not think they are likely to change.

Read also The visit of Xi Jinping to Vladimir Putin in Moscow, boost and mediation

What is your position on this peace plan?

First of all, we do not have a detailed Chinese peace plan. We have a number of principles that China considers important for further efforts. We also believe that each party to this conflict will pay primary attention to points that could serve its own interests. The Ukrainian side is likely to emphasize the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and Russia on the need to lift unilateral sanctions and stop Western arms transfers to Ukraine. This ambiguity is therefore likely to continue. I don't think China will make any significant changes to its positions, and I think Beijing understands very well that the chances of an early political settlement are close to zero at the moment. It would even be very difficult to achieve a ceasefire.

However, the Chinese position will be exposed, and I will not be surprised to learn that after this trip to Moscow, the Chinese president has a phone call with President Zelensky so that the Chinese position is communicated not only to Moscow, but also to Kiev.

What can be accepted, or conversely totally rejected by Russia?

I think it is impossible to imagine that the Kremlin would easily accept the Ukrainian terms of the peace agreement, because to abide by those conditions would mean accepting defeat. And Russia's leaders are certainly not ready to accept defeat.

Moreover, I do not believe that the Russian leadership would simply restore the status quo ante, in the sense that it would not accept an agreement that would imply that Russia withdraws from the positions it held on 24 February last year. They always talk about "new geopolitical realities," which I think implies that they want to defend the territorial gains Russia has made over the past year in Ukraine. And this should be seen as one of the preconditions for any peace negotiation, that's clear enough. This is not something that Ukraine can accept, and it means that the chances of a compromise political settlement are not very high, unfortunately, at this stage.

So why is China, but not just China, talking about peace at this point?

We are not talking about peace. The Russian side is talking about a ceasefire. And I think that by stressing the need for a ceasefire, the Russian side is positioning itself as a constructive actor. In this sense, the responsibility for military actions therefore lies with Ukraine, which is not ready to accept a ceasefire. But at the end of the day, I think everyone expects potential offensives or counteroffensives. And both sides are apparently convinced that over time, their negotiating positions could strengthen.

We do not know what the plans of the Russian leadership are and what will be enough to be considered a victory. If we look at the official Russian narratives, we see that there are at least two different logics. The first is to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of Donbass and Crimea, which means that Russia would have to take control of the two Donbass regions within their former administrative borders and maintain the land bridge to Crimea, which would be sufficient.

But others say it's not enough, because whatever Ukraine's geographical borders at the end of the conflict, it will likely be anti-Russian, heavily militarized and deeply integrated into NATO structures. Thus, in order to achieve victory, Russia must change the Ukrainian state project, which is of course completely different. It is not a question of seizing territory. It is much more than that. And these two narratives coexist somehow, at least in the public space, and I think maybe the Russian leadership is purposely preserving some degree of ambiguity in order to keep some flexibility for their actions in the future.

Economic exchanges between Russia and China have exploded in 2022. Some speak of the emergence of a multipolar world, others of the "vassalization" of Russia. What do you think?

We need to be specific about what we mean by "vassalization" because everyone is competing for Chinese markets. In this sense, it can be said that everyone wants to become a vassal of China, but I think that in different areas, the level of dependence of Russia on China is not the same. In some areas, it is not even that important. For example, if you look at the financial sector, I don't think Russia is really dependent on China in any significant way. Russia may depend on China in terms of energy exports, but we also observe that, for example, if you look at last year, you will see that Russia has significantly increased its oil exports to India. So there is an attempt to balance the relationship with China and explore other opportunities in Asia and elsewhere.

But certainly this relationship is asymmetrical in many ways, and that's something to keep in mind of course.

Can this cooperation be extended to other areas, such as the military and strategic fields?

I don't think Russia is seeking direct military assistance from China. I really don't think that's the point. But if you think about broader military cooperation, it's likely to increase in terms of coordination and joint exercises and some parallel actions that the two countries could undertake. So I think that in the military field, this cooperation will develop, especially if relations between China and the United States continue to deteriorate. Beijing will then be more interested in a rapprochement with Moscow in the military field. If, on the other hand, there was a rapprochement between the United States and China, perhaps the interest on the Chinese side will be less important. But in any case, I think that this cooperation has already gained a great deal of momentum. There are very powerful interest groups. Our interests are shared on both sides. This cooperation will therefore continue.

On Monday, Vladimir Putin also made a speech to representatives of about forty African countries according to the Duma website. How was this speech an important step before the next Russia-Africa summit scheduled for the end of July in St. Petersburg?

You know, we were talking about political symbols here. We organized the first Russia-Africa Summit in the fall of 2019, and this event attracted a lot of people. Almost all African leaders gathered in Sochi to meet with President Putin. So I think the turnout this year will be an important indicator of Russia's position in Africa. And this will certainly depend in part on what Russia has to offer its African partners, because this summit cannot be a mere repetition of the first. It needs to be more focused and precise. It must bring concrete results to the African countries that will participate in the summit because, of course, most of them are under pressure from the West not to visit Russia this year.

For Russia, this is important. This must be a demonstration that Russia is not really isolated in the international system. So I think a lot of energy and effort will be invested to make sure that we have a representative event with many African leaders present. I think this will be an important indicator of Russia's position in Africa. In this perspective, it will be important to launch projects that would be mutually beneficial and mutually beneficial. Summits are good, but they are not enough to ensure a stable and mutually beneficial relationship.

What can Russia offer these countries?

Russia has some comparative advantages in Africa. For example, look at how many Africans graduated from Russian and Soviet universities. In some countries, these figures are quite significant. In total, we can talk about half a million people who did their higher education in Russian or Soviet universities.

Russia also has some achievements in areas such as energy, not only oil and gas drilling, but also in the nuclear field. It can also offer a lot in terms of public goods such as public health, urban planning. I don't think Russia can compete successfully with China or the West. I do not think that is likely to happen. But Russia has its own niche in Africa and it can expand it if it works hard there.

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  • Russia
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