An academic specializing in international relations said that Russian President Vladimir Putin made a grave mistake when he decided to wage war on Ukraine, but his decisions and expectations are not all wrong.
Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, pointed out that Putin overestimated the valor and strength of his army, and at the same time underestimated the tyranny of Ukrainian nationalism and the ability of its armed forces - despite their small numbers and numbers - to defend their lands.
Walt said in an article in the American magazine "Foreign Policy" that Putin also misjudged the unity of Western countries, the readiness of NATO and other countries to quickly extend a helping hand to Kiev, and the ability of energy-importing countries to impose sanctions. On Russia and stop relying on Russian energy exports.
Among the mistakes made by the Russian president also - according to the magazine's article - was his overestimation of China's desire to support him during the war, which buys Russian oil and gas in large quantities, yet it does not provide Moscow with explicit diplomatic support or valuable military assistance.
But the American academic believes that these mistakes do not mean that everything Putin did was wrong, and he acknowledges that the Russian president was right in many of the things he did.
Where did Putin hit?
Walt says that US President Joe Biden's administration hoped that the threat of imposing "unprecedented sanctions" on Russia would deter Putin from the war, and believed that those sanctions would succeed in stifling his war machine, arousing popular discontent with him and forcing him to back down, but the Russian president was convinced when He made war that his country could safely bypass those sanctions, and so far he has been proven right.
He points out that although the long-term repercussions of sanctions may be harsher on Russia, Putin was right in his assessment that sanctions alone will not resolve the outcome of the conflict in the foreseeable future.
The Russian president also correctly predicted that the Russian people would bear the heavy costs of the war, and that military setbacks in Ukraine would not lead to his overthrow, according to the article.
Although the writer believes that the mobilization of more Russian forces was "shameful" according to Western standards, he also believes that Moscow has managed to retain large forces on the battlefields despite the heavy losses incurred, without affecting Putin's tightening grip on power.
He adds that this situation may change, of course, but it has been proven so far that Putin was right in his mobilization of forces.
As for the third matter - according to Walt - it is Putin's realization that other countries will seek to achieve their own interests, and that he will not be subject to widespread condemnation for his actions, and most of all - in the view of the professor of international relations - that the Russian president is aware that the fate of Ukraine matters more to Russia than the West. .
Perhaps this fundamental divergence of interest and motivation is why the United States, Germany, and most other NATO members have had to adjust their responses so carefully, which is why President Joe Biden ruled out sending American forces to Ukraine from the beginning of the war.
The writer believes that the realization of this discrepancy also explains that the threat of using nuclear weapons is of limited benefit, and that fears of "nuclear blackmail" are misplaced, and despite that, he does not completely rule out the possibility that Russia will resort to nuclear weapons if it is about to suffer a crushing defeat.
"Does this mean that we surrender to nuclear blackmail?" the writer wonders.
He says no, claiming that Putin cannot use such threats to win additional concessions elsewhere.