While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky demands planes from the Europeans, the Russian army pushes with all its might on the front line. Vladimir Putin's army exploits the land…

Wings for Ukraine?

A "Mirage 2000" of the French Air Force.

"Some" of these could potentially match the needs of Ukrainians, says Elie Tennenbaum.

Photo: Ministry of Defence, source: General Staff

Text by: Franck Alexandre

7 mins

While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky demands planes from the Europeans, the Russian army pushes with all its might on the front line.

Vladimir Putin's army is exploiting the still frozen ground before it becomes muddy again, and especially before the arrival of Western tanks – and perhaps also fighter-bombers.

Will mastery of the sky allow Ukraine to reconquer its territory?

Élie Tenenbaum, research director at the French Institute of International Relations, answers questions from Franck Alexandre.

RFI: after the tanks, Volodymyr Zelensky is asking the Europeans for planes, is this a necessary condition for Ukraine's victory?

Élie Tenenbaum:

in any case, it's a logical additional step after the progressive accumulation of more and more offensive equipment, the will of the Ukrainians to be able to carry the fight in the depth of the enemy device….

Bring in one way or another to pose the problem of the third dimension and therefore of combat aircraft, in particular fighter bombers to allow either this spring or in later periods to conduct an offensive on the entire occupied territory.

We do not forbid ourselves anything

", says the Elysée, however, does France have the means to provide planes to Kiev?

It obviously seems very complicated in the current formats of an air force which is considerably constrained, reduced in its number of platforms and at the same time if we start to look in detail, the President of the Republic announced the passage at all Rafale within the framework of the military programming law to come, and therefore necessarily the scrapping or on the second-hand market of certain

Mirage 2000

which could potentially meet the needs of Ukrainians.

However, it is clear that it is not this option that the Élysée prefers today, both from the perspective of dissuasive dialogue with Russia, a desire not to provoke the ire of Moscow beyond what is naturally done with each delivery of arms, and the Westerners have proceeded in a rather cautious way finally for a year, by making slices after slices, so as to create a form of habituation of Moscow to these deliveries of materials and therefore always a desire not to cross a

gap

too radical in this increase and perhaps the delivery of combat aircraft today is not yet mature enough in the minds of Westerners and probably Europeans.

Although I have no doubt that we will eventually get there.

The Ukrainian air force is today very largely undermined, with Russian-made equipment which cannot be sustainably supported and therefore at one time or another, it will be necessary to go through a transformation of this army of the air, with western cells.

For Paris, could supplying planes ultimately be a symbolic gesture in order to push other allies to do the same?

A bit like the AMX 10 light tanks?

That could be the case and it would undoubtedly be a very strong signal, for example, in view of the delivery of the F-16

Falcons

, which we know, are really in the line of sight for Volodymyr Zelensky, but once again, it did not seem to me to hear the words of the president, that Paris was today in this hypothesis.

It will no doubt be necessary to accustom public opinion and the political class to the idea that the next stage will involve the delivery of combat aircraft, even if, once again and on this point, the Élysée does not have everything quite wrong in saying that the battlefield today is characterized by some form of low layer air interdiction, there are no actual Ukrainian wings over the battlefield, but nor are there any Russian wings above the battlefield.

We are therefore on bubbles of

interdiction with an air defense which is relatively effective and from this point of view even if the air superiority would undoubtedly be a considerable advantage for the Ukrainians, it is not at all sure that they can implement it because the defense Russian anti-aircraft is present, it is also effective.

Secondly, what the Ukrainians have shown so far is that obviously they could continue to nibbling ground without aerial dominance.

Will they be able to do much more than that, ie small local counter-offensives?

This is not obvious.

it is not at all sure that they can implement it because the Russian anti-aircraft defense is present, it is also effective.

Secondly, what the Ukrainians have shown so far is that obviously they could continue to nibbling ground without aerial dominance.

Will they be able to do much more than that, ie small local counter-offensives?

This is not obvious.

it is not at all sure that they can implement it because the Russian anti-aircraft defense is present, it is also effective.

Secondly, what the Ukrainians have shown so far is that obviously they could continue to nibbling ground without aerial dominance.

Will they be able to do much more than that, ie small local counter-offensives?

This is not obvious.

A few days before the first anniversary of the invasion, the staffs are wondering about the first signs of a new offensive.

Do the Russians benefit from a dynamic, a window of opportunity to take action first?

It is very clear that the Russian general staff with the demotion of General Surovikin and the promotion of General Guerassimov gives this message of a return to an offensive spirit in the plans which are undoubtedly prepared in Moscow.

We have extensive mobilization work which has made it possible to restore a form of numerical parity on the battlefield, in terms of numbers, even a numerical superiority gradually achieved on the Russian side;

we know that on the material plane there is a superiority which has declined but which remains present.

All of this, of course, is set up in such a way as to be able to relaunch an offensive.

Offensive, which has begun, we saw on Vouhledar with regular armored infantry maneuvering very differently from what we saw during the

winter with the fights of Bakhmout for example, which were made by Wagner and which were in a way more an attempt at fixation than a real offensive.

There we actually see something that is triggered.

However, the results are not amazing, far from it.

The Russian forces don't seem to be able to drive any major breakthroughs, but it's clear that the plan, if I may say so, and it's known to be the often the first casualty of war, the plan for the Russians is good to relaunch the offensive.

Bad news is piling up on the Ukrainian side, with for example, and this is symbolic but important, a restriction on access to the Starlink satellite network...

Yes, access to Starlink had played a vital role in maintaining Ukrainian communications at the start of the conflict, especially after the Russian strikes which crippled local systems and cell towers.

Today, Ukrainian reliance on Starlink is less.

They had time to set up redundant systems.

But for all that, it raises questions, first of all about the sustainability of the Western support effort, including in the field of the private sector, the momentum of the first months today is starting to run out of steam as and as the bill, the bills pile up and obviously on the other hand, it raises the question of Ukrainian dependence, not so much on Starlink, as a system,

but globally to the command and control system and above all to surveillance and reconnaissance intelligence which are provided today very largely by the Americans, and which gives an informational advantage to the Ukrainians in terms of transparency of the battlefield.

This allows them to anticipate the movements of the enemy army, which until now explains the good performance of the Ukrainian army.

If by chance this information tap were to dry up, that would obviously be very bad news for the Ukrainians.

Today, we are not there.