The Israeli movement towards Africa.. Will it motivate Egypt to restore its position in the brown continent?

Cairo

- Is Africa on the verge of major transformations?

A question imposed by a new Israeli incursion into the continent, which appeared in the visit of its Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, who was heading a delegation to Khartoum.

To resume normalization with Sudan, and Chad's announcement to open an embassy in Tel Aviv, in addition to Ethiopia launching a security partnership with Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia to confront the Somali youth movement in the Horn of Africa.

This coincided with the security and economic disturbances the world and the region are witnessing, which have repercussions on Egypt, which raised questions about Cairo's position on it.

On the one hand, Sudan represents a geostrategic and security depth for Egypt, and any presence of Israel in Africa will be deducted from its balance de facto and historically, regardless of the different ruling regimes. The new security partnership in the Horn of Africa also raises questions about its nature and whether Ethiopia will pave the way through it to form an anti-Egypt front in the water file.

The fears of Israeli penetration of Africa into Egypt, raised by observers, are reinforced by what Israeli literature indicates since the establishment of the Zionist movement, in the late 19th century, that Africa represents a strategic depth and security belt for Israel to surround the Arabs, and that the Israeli vital field must expand in the 21st century to include Every country can take part in offensive operations or block a waterway, especially if it has hostile regimes.

On the other hand, it seems that Egypt has learned a lesson from its previous experiences in neglecting Africa in favor of other parties, as it has worked in recent years to revive good relations with African countries - especially the Nile Basin countries - politically, security and developmentally.

In contrast to its efforts to crystallize blocs that serve its causes and interests.

Chadian President Mohamed Idriss Deby (right) and Netanyahu during the opening ceremony of the Chadian embassy in Tel Aviv (Anatolia)

• What are the most prominent time stations in Israeli relations with Africa?

The Israeli interest in Africa began seriously in the sixties of the last century, with most of the countries of the continent gaining their independence from European colonialism.

Israel faced an almost complete boycott of Africa between the wars of 1967 and 1973.

The peace agreement concluded by Israel with Egypt in 1979 provided an opportunity to break its African isolation.

After the Madrid Peace Conference and the Wadi Araba and Oslo agreements in the 1990s, an African jog towards Israel was recorded.

By 2002, Israel was able to restore its relations with 45 African countries at various diplomatic levels.

– However, for more than two decades, she did not succeed in regaining her seat as an observer in the African Union, as the Union summit in February 2022 decided to freeze the “observer status” decision that was taken - unilaterally - at the time by Commission President Musa Faki (Chadian nationality) after most protested. Member States.

Africa for Israel represents, in addition to the security depth, a fertile market for agriculture, technology and armament deals, in addition to the voting bloc (55 countries) in international organizations.

Starting in 2016, Africa witnessed an unprecedented Israeli movement, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched the slogan "Israel returns to Africa and Africa returns to Israel."

– In that year, Netanyahu made shuttle tours to many sub-Saharan African countries, and his country hosted an agricultural conference, which included officials from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS / includes 15 countries).

At that time, Israel announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with Guinea after nearly half a century of estrangement.

In 2017, Netanyahu attended the annual conference of ECOWAS, in Liberia, in a historic precedent with the participation of a non-African leader for the first time in the organization's regional conferences.

In the same year, a summit to be held between Africa and Israel in Togo was cancelled.

In 2018, Tanzania opened an embassy in Tel Aviv.

In a visit, the first of its kind, by a senior Israeli official to Chad, Netanyahu announced in 2019 the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries after a rupture that had lasted since 1972, and later he opened an embassy for his country in Rwanda.

In addition to Sudan, Israel announced in 2020 the normalization of its relations with Morocco, the UAE and Bahrain, amid expectations that the train of normalization will carry other Arab countries.

- Thursday, February 2nd, Chad opened an embassy in Tel Aviv, and an Israeli delegation headed by Foreign Minister Eli Cohen visited Khartoum.

Despite repeated denials of involvement in the dam crisis, the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv had previously recommended exploiting the water crisis and the Renaissance Dam to expand normalization with Cairo.

• Are the continents of Africa and Sudan witnessing major transformations in favor of Israel?

Academic and political analyst on Middle East and African affairs, Khairy Omar, points out that transformations have occurred slowly since the 1990s, helped by the continent's pretext that Egypt has relations with Israel.

In an interview with Al-Jazeera Net, Omar adds that with the decline of the experience of democratic transition in Africa, the ruling elites launched extensive relations with Tel Aviv, especially the countries of the Sahel and Central Africa.

With regard to Sudan, he indicated that the structure of opposition no longer exists or is weak at best, with the absence of a critical and balanced mass that can resolve matters, which seemed to be Khartoum’s tendency to cancel the boycott of Israel law (which has been in effect since 1958), and this represented An indication of the radical shift in the relations of the two countries.

He cited the competition of the President of the Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and his deputy, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hamedti), to seize the main bloc in Sudanese politics and their race over who will rule the country. However, he sees Al-Burhan's position as more strange in his orientation towards Israel, given that he is closer to the Arabist movement.

It is noteworthy that Hamidti announced after the visit of an Israeli delegation to his country that he was not aware of the visit, stressing that he did not meet with the delegation.

•  What is the impact of the resumption of Israeli-Sudanese normalization on Egypt?

Omar explains that the Egyptian defense policy is sufficiently cautious, in addition to an awareness of the dangers of increasing Israeli influence, but he said that the influence will remain dependent on the stability of the Sudanese government and if it is able to implement its obligations.

He pointed out that the issue of expanding relations with Israel may prompt Cairo to review many bilateral files between it and Khartoum, including the Four Freedoms Agreement (residence, movement, work and ownership) and joint agricultural cooperation, and the possibility of moving unilaterally in water issues and the Renaissance Dam.

With regard to the dam file, he explained that his country has made assumptions that natural and geological factors will determine the course of its completion and not external parties, and that the storage rates of the dam lake are now consistent with Egyptian assumptions built in 2014 and 2015 that it will not be less than 7 years, contrary to the desire of Ethiopia.

In turn, the academic and political analyst Muhammad Al-Zawawi says that the promotion of Sudanese-Israeli normalization is an embodiment of the great decline in the Egyptian role in the Arab and Nile circles, the most important circles of Egyptian national security.

In statements to Al-Jazeera Net, Al-Zawawi warned of the repercussions of normalization, which he considered an American trade-off to remove Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism. He also warned against allowing the expansion of Israel's influence in the Horn of Africa and the headwaters of the Nile, as this might open the door to its investments and its soft and hard power alike.

Referring to the construction efforts and strategic projects that Egypt has implemented in the Nile Basin countries, Al-Zawawi believed that it is still far from directing the decision-making process in issues affecting Egypt, and this may affect water security and strengthen Ethiopia's negotiating position.

• Is there any impact of Chad's decision to open an embassy in Tel Aviv on Egypt?

Academic Khairy Omar rules out the existence of a direct impact on Egypt, but he stressed the need to research how Egypt can re-enhance its interests in Africa.

He added that his country developed a strategy for the year 2018 for its relations with the countries of the continent, although it was moving slowly, but it was good in light of reviewing and addressing the negative effects that prevailed during the era of former President Hosni Mubarak.

With regard to the extent of Israel's ability to compete with Egypt in Africa, Omar ruled this out on the grounds that Israel has weak capabilities and is not expected to have a decisive octopus effect.

• Is Ethiopia's security partnership with countries in the Horn of Africa paving the way for an anti-Egypt front?

Omar believes that it is a partial issue, not a totality, and is based on the vision of these countries (Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya) that the youth movement represents a threat moving in their borders, and then there are security needs that prompted the arrangement of rapprochement without reaching the degree of alliance.

Also, according to Omar, these countries have no reason to oppose the Egyptian position, unlike Ethiopia, which has a historical competition with Egypt.

Holding on to the same thread, Al-Zawawi indicates that the quartet's "alliance" is a step in the right direction in confronting the dangers of Al-Shabaab and its transnational threat, and therefore it will not affect Egypt's security, but will enhance the security of the Horn of Africa, freedom of navigation, and the security of ships transiting the Suez Canal.