The fate of Ukraine will not be decided this Friday at the arms manufacturers' conference in Ramstein.

In this war, the complexity of which many underestimate, the West will still be at further difficult crossroads, because there is no quick end in sight.

Perhaps everyone involved, not just those in the discursively overheated Berlin, needs a little more time to think through the tank question.

As with so many things in (foreign) policy, it is ultimately a question of weighing up interests.

The military situation speaks in favor of supplying Ukraine with more powerful weapons.

Thanks to the latest mobilization, Russia should have new forces for offensives by spring at the latest;

A renewed attack on Kyiv from Belarus cannot be completely ruled out.

Probably also due to the weather, the Ukrainians have not made any significant gains in territory since the recapture of Cherson, and they have even had to accept losses in the Donbass.

The Russian airstrikes on the infrastructure not only weaken the country materially, they cannot be sustained psychologically forever either.

There is an objective need for powerful weapons on the Ukrainian side if the country is to continue to defend its independence as the leading Western powers also want it to be.

Attacks on Crimea?

Politically, the matter is more difficult for two reasons.

For one thing, the Ukrainians have long wanted to attack Crimea.

Positions on the annexed peninsula are the backbone for Russian attacks to the south and for maintaining the land bridge.

Western armored personnel carriers and main battle tanks would be helpful for a Ukrainian push in that direction.

A media report from Washington suggests that there is growing understanding of this project among American leaders.

That would, however, force the West to take a stand on an issue most governments have so far avoided.

Whether Ukraine's support is only for recapturing the territories it lost after February 24, or also includes regaining Crimea (and the now-annexed "People's Republics" in Donbass) was mostly not said at all, or even said so denied.

The matter would have a different quality not only because of Crimea's military importance, but also because its annexation nine years ago met with great approval in Russia.

Attacks on Crimea are more likely to strengthen Putin's domestic policy, which is neither in the interests of Ukraine nor the West.

Western unity

The other political problem concerns Western unity.

Arms shipments have been largely consistent so far, with the United States leading the way.

The advantage of this was that if Putin attacked a member country over its arms supplies, he could expect a response from all of NATO.

Now, for the first time, a situation could arise in which America, the supreme alliance power, does not go along with the Europeans: Biden currently does not want to deliver any Abrams, nor any longer-range missiles.

But he doesn't mind if the Europeans deliver battle tanks.

This is what concerns the Federal Chancellor in particular, who has so far paid close attention to coordinating with the President.

That was not unjustified, because Germany in particular is dependent on the (nuclear) American protective umbrella.

It's a bit easier for Great Britain, which doesn't have a large nuclear deterrent against Russia, but can at least muster its own.

this may have encouraged London's willingness to deliver the Challenger.

Countries like Poland and Finland, on the other hand, are more directly threatened, which is why they have an interest in the Ukrainians stopping Putin.

Scholz probably imagined the leadership role, which he likes to claim, differently.

He will have in mind that there are many reservations among the population about the delivery of the Leopards, and it should be no different in the SPD.

But now it's actually a question of whether Germany will go ahead.

It would not even be a sensible way out to allow the Poles or others to deliver, while exercising restraint yourself.

A Russian attack on Poland would be one on NATO.

You can't make that decision with the usual moral categories that govern discourse here;

German arms deliveries are not an indulgence for Nord Stream 2. It is about the strategic question of whether you really want to contain Russia in order to prevent it from expanding further west, even in the long term.

This requires more effort than before and involves more risk.

But the greater risk for Europe remains a Putin victory.