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Translation introduction:

Chinese development is not limited to the economic and technological aspects only, but also extends, as befits any country that wants to compete for global leadership, to the military aspects.

In this regard, China was not satisfied with manufacturing military equipment according to the standards set by the Western world, but rather it set for itself and others new varieties and standards in military industrialization.

In this detailed report from The Diplomats, the writer on Chinese military armaments, Rick Ju (a pseudonym), takes us through the corridors of the most prominent changes introduced by China, not only to military equipment, but also to military doctrine, classifications, and ranks.

Translation text:

The twenty-first century witnessed the passage of the Chinese army or the "People's Liberation Army" with a number of fundamental changes that many observers and analysts around the world watched closely, and there is no doubt that the scope and speed of change that was introduced to the Chinese military industry, from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2019, remarkable when compared to other military forces of superpowers.

It is sometimes easy to lose sight of seeing the broader picture, and since we are entering the year 2020, perhaps the time is right to go back in time and review the most important and most prominent improvements that were made to the Chinese military industry and the Chinese army during the period after 2010, and in short, this review is not a detailed review. .

In the first section, I will review the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF), and the Chinese Army with its land forces (PLAA/GF) as well as the organizational and institutional fields. Then, in the second section, I will review the Chinese Navy (PLAN) and the Second Artillery or Missile Forces (PLARF).

air forces

  • Chengdu (J-20) and the beginning of stealth fighters (stealth)

Until now, the development of the Chinese Air Force that appeared most in the headlines was that of the stealth fighter (J-20), and the prototype of this fighter appeared in late 2010 and made its first round in early 2011. Since then, the fighter has completed the main stages of development to stabilize In the end, in its current form, it will be in military service with the combat units in 2018.

Stealth fighter (J-20) (Reuters)

However, in the mid-to-late 2000s, the (J-20) was still known as (J-XX), and doubts arose even among the Chinese military observer community about the form this fighter would take, as observers ruled out that it would be a (J) fighter. -XX) is just a semi-disguised aerial vehicle that lacks internal weapon pockets, or the older (F-117) model, with its cantilevered, ghostly shape, is used instead of the modern, homogeneous shape.

Until 2009, some circles within the observer community considered the idea of ​​a fifth generation of Chinese fighters purely rosy dreams.

The appearance of (J-20) in a way that met - and perhaps exceeded in a number of respects - the expectations of the observer community was one of the rare examples of "hunting" an elusive white whale (1).

In many respects, the disclosure of the J-20 led to a massive change in the way the Chinese army observer community would assess subsequent military developments that would emerge over the course of the 2010s. more carefully.

Of course, the introduction of a fifth-generation fighter, and the Chinese army's dispatch of its first stealth fighter, marks a huge stride in physical military capabilities and military-industrial progress as well.

  • Integration of fourth generation fighters

As of late 2019, it might be easy to look at the hundreds of J-10 fighters and Flankers in service with the Chinese military and assume that this has always been the case.

However, since the beginning of the 2010s, the fourth generation aircraft of the (J-10), (J-10A), (J-11B), and Su-27 and Su-30 fighters that China supplied from the Russian army began to form a part. Much smaller than the total combat air fleet of the Chinese army.

At that time, there were only about 400 air fighters in service, and it can be said that half to two-thirds of these fighters were ready for battle and possessed "beyond visual range" (BVR) capabilities.

Fourth generation aircraft (J-11B) (Reuters)

The decade 2010 also witnessed abundant production of (J-10A) and (J-11B) varieties, followed by a limited transition to (J-10B / C) and (J-16) of the improved “fourth generation plus” that provided more avionics. More modern and improved weapons that have the "Beyond Visual Range" feature.

During that decade, the Chinese army also began to demobilize from service some of its oldest and most flying fourth-generation fighters that it supplied from Russia, especially the old "Flankers" (J-11A) and (Su-27), but the volume of production also witnessed an increase. The air fleet is up to 900 to 1,000 air fighters of the fourth generation and fourth generation plus models, while it is considered a modest progress, as it can be considered that more than half of the air fighter fleet is of the fourth generation and higher.

And the size of this change transforms the modern air fleet of the Chinese army, if we limit it to fourth-generation fighters and higher, to become the second or third largest air fleet in the world by a number of criteria, and it becomes the largest in Asia without a doubt.

The size of the air fleet of fourth-generation and fourth-generation fighters also means that "beyond visual range" capability, which was once a scarce commodity, is now a familiar capability in Chinese fighter aviation.

Of course, the PLA is among the boldest militaries in terms of "beyond visual range" weapons technology, with systems such as the PL-15 and PL-X.

  • WS-10 Epic

Many foreign observers and analysts of the Chinese military are right to point out that "high-performance turbofans" are a technological pitfall that leaves China's military industry significantly behind the leading military powers.

The WS-10 engine is cited as one such example, since it is an engine that suffers from many drawbacks, embodied in the form of a product that can be compared at best to older alternatives from Western and Russian-made engines.

But it is also not possible to deny the fact that WS-10 engines have been equipped with all newly produced Chinese ground Flanker aircraft that have been manufactured and put into service since 2010. We still do not know the exact number of these engines since we do not know the number. The exact number of Flankers built during this period as well, but it is likely that their number was approaching 1,000 engines by the end of 2019.

Much more recently, images appeared to appear of newly manufactured J-10C and J-20 aircraft equipped with their own variants of the WS-10 engines, as these aircraft previously used Al-31 engines.

And if the future production of the J-10C and J-20 fighters can be compatible with the WS-10 engines, then the Chinese aerospace industry will achieve another important achievement in terms of self-sufficiency.

Aircraft (J-20) (Reuters)

  • Early Warning and Control Systems (AEW&C)

The Chinese Air Force and Navy entered the decade of 2010 with a huge fleet of early warning and control systems aircraft consisting of four (KJ-2000) aircraft, and a group of (KJ-200) aircraft for both the Navy and Air Force.

Equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar mounted on the aircraft's premium fuselage, this fleet provides an important nucleus for future early warning and control capabilities.

However, the decade of 2010 witnessed the arrival of the Chinese air fleet equipped with early warning and control systems to distinguished international standards, as the military production of the (KJ-200) model amounted to about 24 aircraft, which were divided equally between the Navy and the Air Force.

The middle of the 2010s witnessed the emergence of the (KJ-500) aircraft, which uses the same (Y-9) airframe, as is the case of the (KJ-200) systems, but with a more powerful radar with a 360-degree aetheric field, and has the latest technological developments.

By the end of 2019, 14 of the aircraft had been confirmed to have entered service, split between the PLA Air Force and Navy, with more currently in production.

KJ-200 (Reuters)

Just as in the experience of the People's Liberation Army with the "beyond visual range" capability, the development of "early warning and control" systems has led to the transition from being a semi-rare commodity to a familiar capability and a routine, even natural, part of the PLA Air Force's ammunition. .

  • Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)

Chinese military drones witnessed remarkable progress on two fronts during the decade of 2010. First, this period witnessed the development of local technology from these aircraft, including "MIL" systems for medium-altitude long-distance flight, and "Hill" systems for high-altitude flight for long distances, and includes The first model is a number of helicopter-engined drones for surveillance and assassination purposes, while the second model is exclusively for surveillance and reconnaissance.

Both types were introduced to service in the Chinese army, especially in the second half of the decade, in the form of (GJ-1) and (GJ-2), followed by (WZ-7) models.

Drones (Reuters)

Testing and development of more stealth drones and unmanned aerial stealth fighters, particularly the GJ-11, also known as the Sword of the Dead, was still underway during the second half of the decade.

Other leading countries in the field of aerospace pursued similar projects in the meantime, such as the United States, Britain, Europe and Russia, but the presence of (GJ-11) at the Independence Day celebration in 2019 indicated that it might be the first unmanned aerial fighter of this type to enter Service space in some way.

We find the other area of ​​development on the drone front in the success of Chinese exports of this product in the international arms market, where a number of Chinese drones such as (Wing Loong-1) and (Wing Loong-2) were found, which are the original model for the two copies ( The GJ-1 and GJ-2 are in the Chinese military, with enthusiastic customers in the Middle East, Africa and parts of Eastern Europe.

This increasing presence of Chinese drones in the international arms market has been well documented previously, and therefore we will not go into it much here, but it is worth saying that this development was highly unlikely at the beginning of the decade.

  • Strategic shift in transport aircraft

One of its major shortcomings has always been the strategic and tactical transport aircraft in the Chinese army.

During the decade 2000, Russia supplied China with 14 Il-76MD aircraft, and there were plans to purchase 34 aircraft of this type around 2005, but manufacturing problems caused the contract to be terminated.

Thus, the Chinese Air Force entered the decade of 2010 with a relatively small fleet consisting of 14 strategic transport aircraft with old designs, albeit usable.

During that decade, the Chinese army began to rectify this shortcoming by acquiring a number of refurbished Il-76 aircraft from Russia, and it is estimated that during the decade 2010 it had purchased a total of 10 aircraft of this type.

An Il-76MD (Reuters)

But the appearance of the Y-20 in late 2012 was the real indication of the ambitions of the Chinese Air Force in strategic transport capabilities.

The aircraft began entering military service in mid-2016, and by the end of 2019, at least 10 aircraft had been put into service, with the possibility of manufacturing more of them year after year.

Currently, the Y-20 uses temporary D-30K engines of the same older types as the Il-76, but provides a newer airframe than the Il-76, especially in providing greater payload capacity for cargo. Mega.

Over time, these temporary engines will be replaced by the locally manufactured (WS-20) engine, even if it separates us from it by a few years.

In terms of overall capabilities and tangible performance, the Y-20 falls into the category of older Il-76 variants.

However, the ability to sustain production from local resources over the next several years means that the total strategic transport fleet will likely enjoy significant growth for the foreseeable future.

Ground forces and organization

  • Rapid modernization of the army

The ground forces enjoyed less development compared to other branches of the army, as the strategic challenges of the modern army placed greater importance on air, sea and missile warfare, and accordingly the limited resources had to be prepared towards the most urgent requirements first.

This does not mean that the ground forces have not witnessed developments in terms of technology and systems, since there are a number of new battle armored vehicles, guided missile systems, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery systems, joint weapons sub-systems and ground electronic battle, along with integration and integration efforts that make the forces The wilderness of the People's Liberation Army in late 2019 is very different from that of 2010.

However, we cannot deny that the scale of change that affected these forces in the decade of 2010 was less than what the Air Force and the Navy enjoyed.

Thus, the thoughtful modernization of the ground forces is considered to be more important in that it was the fastest modernization that a branch of the People's Liberation Army had undergone.

  • High intensity exercises

Gradually increasing intensity, sophistication, and realism in training methods was among one of the least well-covered aspects of other army developments during this decade. Chinese military literature indicated an increased focus on more realistic and intense training as part of efforts to modernize the Chinese army as a whole.

The ambiguous nature of regular training and exercises makes it difficult to judge the degree of qualitative progress in this field.

But some of the more well-known exercises, such as the Stride exercises for the ground forces, or the large-scale (Red Sword) exercises for the Air Force, have led to the production of an ongoing literature on more demanding and complex exercises from official and unofficial informatics.

  • 2015 fix

In 2015 a large-scale institutional reorganization was announced within the entire Chinese military.

This reform assigned the PLA Ground Forces a service equivalent to the Navy and Air Force, while the Second Artillery Divisions were promoted to become a self-contained service under the name of the "Chinese Army Missile Force".

Also, this reform has changed the seven "military regions" of the Chinese army to become five consisting of theater forces operating under a different command structure, which will lead to the production of a force with greater readiness and ability to perform common tasks as well.

The PLA's chain of command has been completely restructured, with a "Central Military Committee" that now has a clear administrative chain of command as well as a clear operational chain of command within its services.

The old, bloated general departments within the army were dismantled and reorganized.

A cut in the infantry force of 300,000 recruits was announced, who are said to have drawn mostly from the ground forces along with political forces and non-combat support devices.

It goes without saying that a reform of this magnitude is not fulfilled by a few paragraphs, but it was, most likely, capable of conveying the most important changes and developments among all the developments that we have mentioned in this article.

Naval repairs

  • Look at destroyers and frigates

Surface fighters are the horses behind which a chariot, i.e. a military navy, is pulled. The capabilities and number of these ships determine the navy's ability to impose its presence in nearby and remote places in the blue waters.

As is the case with most modern navies, the main surface fighters in the Chinese navy consist of destroyers and frigates, and during the decade of 2010 the fleet of destroyers and frigates of the Chinese army enjoyed an increase in the capacity of new ships assigned to missions along with an increase in the number of these ships.

By the end of 2019, the People's Liberation Army Navy had dispatched Aegis destroyers into service, including 12 (052D) destroyers and 6 (052C) destroyers, without including any registered (055) destroyers in service. But since it is a warship that is the first in its class, it is expected that it will not be equipped for combat yet, along with 30 anti-air combat frigates of the type (054 As).

This is in addition to 11 non-shield destroyers in service and about 12 pre-054A corvettes.

However, when the Chinese army's navy entered the 2010 decade in January 2010, it contented itself with deploying two "combat shield" destroyers, two destroyers of the (052C) class produced in the mid-2010s, and only four of the class (054A) in the frigate force. affiliated with the army.

The PLA will not receive its third "combat shield" destroyer until 2013 in the form of a third destroyer of class (052C), although the first two months of 2010 will witness the commissioning of two (054A) destroyers.

Despite this, the number of two modern "combat shield" destroyers in service has increased to 18 ships of this type within a decade, or even less than a decade, given that the first three years of the decade 2010 did not witness the commissioning of any destroyers of the "combat shield" type. Combat armor" at all, is remarkable, not only in terms of seaworthiness but also in terms of ingenuity in ship design.

Going from four modern frigates to 30 modern frigates over a period of a decade is no less significant, and has helped establish the class (054A) to be among the most capable blue-roof fighters of the modern era.

It is expected that the production of destroyers (052D) will continue until a year or so, and its production is likely to stop at 25 hulls, as the last piece of it will enter the service range with the end of the 2020 contract. The production of the Chinese Navy of class (054A) has stopped at 30 pieces with the operation of the last hull. In the middle of 2018. It is expected that the production of (055) will continue for another year or two until the number of 10 to 12 structures is reached, so that the quorum is also completed.

It is expected that sometime in the 2020s, a successor or replacement of each modern fighter class will enter series production.

However, the fleet of destroyers and frigates that the army will deploy with the end of the current construction phase at the beginning of the decade 2020 will likely turn the army navy into the second largest fleet in the world in terms of surface fighters, and it was difficult to imagine a possibility of this kind in 2010.

  • A larger destroyer called "055"

On the subject of naval fighters, a special corner must be devoted to the "huge destroyer" (055).

Although it is usually described as a destroyer of the 10,000-ton class, the actual (2) total displacement of the ship is 13,000 tons.

Its total armament, displacement, and estimated capabilities have prompted some foreign observers to describe it as a "cruiser" instead.

However, it seems that the Chinese army's navy describes it as a "huge destroyer" in its literature, but regardless of the name, the (055) class is a much larger ship than most of the sea surface fighters around the world built in recent memory.

Few military navies have built surface combatants with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons. Rather, navies less than these have also built large numbers of ships of this type.

When rumors first circulated about it, many observers were expecting maybe six or so destroyers to be built over the course of production.

In the end, with the recent construction of a destroyer of 13,000 tons, only the American destroyer "Zumwalt" of 15,000 tons exceeds it in size, and it displaces almost the same amount, surpassing the American destroyer "Flight III Burke", and displacing this The latter is comparable in displacement to a Chinese destroyer (052D).

The US destroyer "Zumwalt" (Reuters)

However, it soon became clear in 2017 that production was proceeding at a graceful pace, with four ready-made hulls seen before the first was commissioned, and then additional rumors from reliable sources indicated that the number of the 055 "initial beam" might stop "only" at 8 to 12 vessels, while at some point in the decade 2020 it will be followed by a larger production cycle of a later model of the same class.

Almost overnight, the evaluation of Class (055) changes from light and rare "capital ships" to another in which the Chinese Navy can deploy a destroyer of 13,000 tons, which in itself may constitute a new class of large sea surface fighters.

As of late 2019, the first piece of this model has been commissioned on an initial scale, with five stages as diverse as final follow-up or sea trials, along with three or four other stages that are believed to be the final stages of construction.

Prior to Destroyer 055, the PLA's most capable surface combatants tended to be smaller and less heavily armed than the rest of the warships of neighboring countries.

In the range of "highly efficient" sea-based fighters, Japan is deploying a total of 6 10,000-ton destroyers of the pre-existing "Kongo" and "Atago" models, along with two "Maya" destroyers, which are supposed to be equipped at the beginning of the decade 2020, while Korea is The South operates three pre-existing 11,000-ton Seyong destroyers, with three additional ones expected during the middle to the end of the 2020 decade. However, the psychological impact resulting from the possibility of the Chinese Navy deploying double numbers of 13,000-ton destroyers by the beginning of the decade 2020, after the absence of any destroyed before 2019, not very large, especially when we take into account the possibility of following it in larger numbers with broader capabilities of combat ships towards the middle of the 2020 decade.

  • Huge height in the Corvette

On the other end of the field of naval surface fighters, it is worth noting the unprecedented pace of operating and dispatching class (056 / A) corvette ships as an important development for the Chinese army navy as well.

The first hulls were commissioned in May 2012, and since the beginning of January 2020, 71 hulls have been commissioned in the water and 52 of them have entered service.

These 1,400-ton corvettes provide modern surface combatants for low-intensity general patrol missions in Chinese territorial waters, with larger and more modern weapons and sensors, not to mention that they are much more comfortable than the Class 037 submarine-hunting boats that preceded them.

This allows more space for frigates and destroyers to conduct other missions either in the vicinity of Chinese territorial waters or in the distant blue waters.

In addition, the variant (056A), which surpassed the main product in production after the 26th hull, has the advantage of an improved anti-submarine warfare package, including the "sequential mode sonar" and "variable depth sonar" combinations that appear to be the same model as the Provides much larger ships of the (+054A), (052D) and (055) classes of destroyers and ships.

The total number of Class 056A corvette hulls fitted with a comprehensive anti-submarine package has greatly improved the overall acuity of the anti-submarine capabilities of the Chinese Army's surface combatant fleet.

  • amphibious assault

The Chinese Navy has always provided an excellent force of medium-sized tank landing ships, but the Navy entered the 2010 decade with an orphan landing dock of class (071) of 25,000 tons.

However, in the following decade, seven additional landing ponds of the same type were commissioned, and five of them were dispatched before the end of 2019, bringing the total to six ponds currently in service.

In terms of the tonnage of a large amphibious assault ship in service, this puts the Chinese Navy's Class 071 fleet in second place in the world, although it is still far less than the total amphibious fleet of the US Navy.

The year 2019 witnessed the operation of the long-awaited Class (075) helicopter landing dock for the Chinese Navy, and the confirmation of the construction of a second dock as well.

And while we will have to wait a few years until the first piece of class (075) enters the scope of service, the appearance of this class of helicopter landing dock will likely greatly enhance the overall capabilities of the Chinese army's amphibious ships during the first years of the decade 2020.

  • Carriers arrive

The development of the capabilities of aircraft carriers in the Chinese Navy does not need to be presented. Starting from the absence of any piece at the dawn of the 2010 decade, and ending with two 65,000-ton aircraft carriers by the end of it is not an easy task.

However, of course, a number of important reservations must be noted, including how the designs of the two current carriers (CV-16 Liaoning) and (CV-17 Shandong) are temporary designs for the Chinese Navy, and it is usually rightly indicated that the Navy still has to gain experience. Large operational enterprises in the field of carriers.

But given that the Chinese Navy did not have any experience operating aircraft carriers before the Liaoning entered service in September 2012, the speed with which the Chinese Navy proceeded to train and launch the J-15 fighter accompanied by ships is also impressive.

The pace of the Shandong's construction, launch and sea trials before entering service is impressive given that it is the first aircraft carrier built by the Chinese shipbuilding industry.

Both carriers are expected to play key foundational roles as the seed for developing a huge core of operational expertise for officers, crews and pilots.

The carrier (003) is expected to enter service in the mid-2020s, and it is expected to replace "Liaoning" and "Shandong" in capabilities, but these two carriers equipped with sled launchers will likely still be ready for combat use, especially if the next-generation fighters are designed. Fifth, designed for carriers to be compatible with the styles of aircraft launch platforms and ski jump platforms.

  • Blue water scale and fill

لقد تزامنت زيادة مقاتلات الأسطح البحرية الحديثة المزودة في المياه الزرقاء للبحرية الصينية أيضا مع ارتفاع في سفن سد النقص. وكان لدى البحرية الصينيّة أسطول من 5 سفن لسد النقص في مستهل عام 2010، وكانت اثنتان منها صنف (905) القديم جدا، وكانت هناك واحدة فريدة من نوعها من صنف (908)، واثنتان أكثر عصرية من صنف (903) الذي يتخطى 20.000 طن.

بينما شهد عقد 2010 ستة تحسينات إضافية، ومنها سفن سد نقص ذات حجم أكبر من صنف (903A) أُرسِلت بين عامَيْ 2013-2016، وتم تشغيل واحدة أخرى في عام 2018 لكنّها تحت الصيانة في الوقت الحالي.

مكّنت هذه الزيادة في سفن سد النقص الحديثة ومقاتلات المياه الزرقاء المزودة الحديثة البحريةَ الصينيةَ من الحفاظ على حضور بحري دائم يتألف من ثلاث سفن على الأقل في خليج عدن، بالإضافة إلى مجموعة صغيرة من مقاتلات الأسطح البحرية في أرجاء المحيطين الهندي والهادئ دون الحاجة إلى إنهاك أسطولها البحري الكلّي. كما أن القدرة على إجراء تمركزات بحرية منتظمة يُعدُّ تطورا هائلا مقارنة بالوتيرة التي أجرت فيها البحرية الصينية هذه التمركزات في العقد 2000.

بالإضافة إلى ذلك، كانت قد انتُدبت سفينتا سد نقص من صنف (901) ذي الـ 45.000 طن بين عامي 2017-2018، مما يجعلهما من أكبر سفن سد النقص في العالم. ويعُتقد أن هذا الصنف من السفن مصمم برفقة مجموعات من حاملات الصواريخ لسد النقص (CSG)، وأنها تعتبر بالعديد من الطرق مؤشرا على طموحات الصين البحرية بالنظر إلى حيازتها الضخمة على المدمرات وحاملات الطائرات.

  • الغواصات النووية المراوغة

الغواصات النووية هي من ضمن الأسرار الأكثر احتجابا لجيش التحرير الشعبي كله. لا أحد في مجتمع مراقبي الجيش لديه الثقة التامة للبتّ بالعدد الدقيق للقطع المختلفة من فئة الغواصات النووية، دع عنك العدد الدقيق لحجم الأسطول. ومع ذلك، شهد العقد 2010 إنتاج اثنين من التطورات المهمة للغواصات النووية الهجومية (SNN) وغوّاصات الصواريخ البالستية (SSBN).

أولا، في منتصف حتى أواخر العقد 2010، تلقّى مجتمع المراقبين أخيرا تأكيد وجود هياكل إضافية من صنف (09III) من الغواصات النووية الهجومية. وكان من المعروف جيدا أنه قد أُنتِجت وأُرسِلت اثنتين من هذا الصنف على الأقلّ في منتصف العقد 2000، وبعد تلك الفترة بدا أن تتابع الإنتاج قد دخل فترة من الجمود. لكن بين عامَيْ 2015-2019، ظهرت صور لبدائل وهياكل من هذا الصنف تحت اسم مبدئي هو (09IIIA). وبدءا من عام 2019، كان هناك اعتقاد أنه لربما قد تم إنتاج ما مجموعه 6 إلى 8 غواصات هجومية من صنف (09III).

ثانيا، إن بناء ما يُتكهَّن على نطاق واسع بأنه منشأة لإنتاج الغواصات النووية في مدينة هولوداو والشائعات بشأن أصناف جديدة من فئات (09IIIB /09V/SSN /09VI/SSBN) قد أثار مزيدا من التكهنات بشأن ما سيقدّمه العقد 2020 من غواصات نووية صينيّة.

وقد تناولتُ هذه المنشآت ومُخرجاتها المحتملة في مقالات سابقة، وبالتالي فلن أعود لمناقشتها هنا.

الصواريخ

  • النطاق الإقليمي

حظي تحديث إمكانيات وقدرات قوات الصاعقة الإقليمية الصينية بتغطية تكاد تكون مكثّفة من قِبل معلّقي الدفاع الأجانب. وكانت نوعية صواريخ كروز جو أرض من صنفَيْ (KD-20) و(DF-10)، التي نُصبت على متن قاذفات (H-6K)، وتتمكّن من حمل ما يصل إلى ستة صواريخ من طراز (KD-20) وقاذفات أرضية، تحمل ثلاثة صواريخ (DF-10)، قد وفرت للجيش الصيني قدرة هائلة لقوات الصواريخ التقليدية يصل نطاقها حتى 1500 كيلومتر عند احتساب المجال من حدود الصاروخ نفسه. لا يزال الجرد الدقيق لصواريخ (KD-20) و(DF-10) لدى الجيش الصيني غير معلوم بعد، كذلك هي أرقام القاذفات الأرضية لصواريخ (DF-10)، لكنّ احتساب الأرقام التسلسلية لقاذفات (H-6K) يؤكد أن هناك على الأقل ثمانين قاذفة من طراز هذه الأخيرة قيد الخدمة بما أنَّ الصنف دخل الخدمة أوّل مرة عام 2011.

ظهور صواريخ باليستية جديدة مثل صواريخ (DF-16 ) و(DF-26)، إلى جانب بدائل محسنة من صواريخ (DF-11) و(DF-15) و(DF-21) الموجودة سلفا، قد عمل أيضا على تحسين قدرة الجيش الصيني على ضرب الأهداف في المنطقة. وقد حظيت صواريخ (DF-26) و(DF-21D) بتغطية مكثّفة بفضل مكانتها بوصفها صواريخ بالستية مضادة للسفن للجيش الصيني، ومع أن الأسئلة المتعلقة بقدراتها ووفرة سلسلة القتل الداعمة لها لا تزال معلقة، لكن يبدو أن الأسلحة قد أثرت إلى حدٍّ كبير على الطريقة التي يقوم فيها الأعداء المحتملون بالتخطيط لعملياتهم البحرية مستقبلا.

  • المسألة النووية

لا تزال الأرقام الدقيقة لرؤوس الحرب النووية الصينية والأرقام الدقيقة للصواريخ الباليستيّة العابرة للقارات (ICBM) غير معلومة للعموم حتى اللحظة، وذلك لسبب جيد. لكن العقد 2010 شهد قيام قوة الصواريخ الصينية (والمدفعية الثانية من قبلها) بتطوير تكنولوجيتها للصواريخ العابرة للقارات بأنظمة أرضية أكثر قدرة وقابلية للنجاة.

كان من المعروف جيدا وجود الصواريخ الباليستية العابرة للقارات من صنف (DF-31A) قبل العقد 2010، لكن ظهور طراز (DF-31AG) في استعراض الذكرى الـ 90 لجيش التحرير الشعبي الذي عُقد في قاعدة "زوري هييه" التدريبية في عام 2017 شكّل مفاجأة من الحجم الصغير.

حيث يقدّم صنف (DF-31AG) قاذفة "وحدة نقل ونصب وقذف" أكثر تكاملا وقدرة في الطرق الوعرة مقارنة بسابقتها من صنف (31A)، لكننا لا نعرف بعد إن كان الصاروخ نفسه قد مر بأي نوع من التحسينات.

لقد كُشِف عن الصواريخ الباليستية العابرة للقارات من صنف (DF-41) في الاستعراض الصيني الذي عُقد في الذكرى الـ 70 لليوم الوطني بتاريخ 1 أكتوبر/تشرين الأوّل 2019، مما أكد أن السلاح قد دخل نطاق الخدمة بعد أكثر من عقد على الشائعات والصور المغبشة. ومع أن أعداد وقدرات الطراز لا تزال غير معلومة بعد، فمن الممكن القول بشكل عام إنه ينبغي أن يحظى بمجال وحمولة أكبر من صنفَيْ (DF-31A) و(DF-AG).

يبدو أن أصناف (DF-41) و(DF-31A) و(DF-AG) ستكون الصواريخ الأرضية الرئيسية من الصواريخ الباليستية التقليدية العابرة للقارات في القرن الحادي والعشرين، لكن سيكون علينا أن ننتظر لرؤية ما سيكون عليه حجم التزوّد الكلي من هذه الصواريخ، ومن غير المعروف أيضا إن كان الحجم الإجمالي للأسطول الصيني من الصواريخ الباليستية العابرة للقارات سيتغير أيضا.

وشهد عقد 2010 أيضا ما يبدو أنه جهوزية أسطول غواصات الصواريخ الباليستية من صنف (09IV) بقوّة تتألف من أربعة إلى خمسة قوارب. كما كُشِفَ عن الصاروخ (JL-2) الذي أطلقته الغواصة البالستية (SLBM) في موكب 2019، مما يدل على حالتها في الخدمة أيضا. ولكن بطبيعة الحال، فنحن لا نعلم كمية الصواريخ المتوفرة في الخطة، كما أننا لسنا على دراية بنوع حالة أو عقيدة الردع التي تستخدمها الدوريات حاليا.

It goes without saying that the issue of the People's Liberation Army's nuclear capabilities will remain extremely important throughout the decade of 2020, not only in terms of the volume of supply of proven systems that we know so far, but also in terms of any new systems that can be developed, such as the (JL-3 SLBM) system that has spread. There are many rumors about him.

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Margins

  • "elusive beluga": a metaphor for achieving an extreme obsession with something, and catching an elusive beluga means that this event meets or even exceeds the obsession of the observer community.

  • Displacement or displacement of a ship's cargo is its weight based on the amount of water displaced by its hull in varying loads.

This report is translated by The Diplomat and does not necessarily reflect Meydan's website.