• Trial of Alvia The driver's lawyer presents to the judge by surprise a version of the regulations after the one delivered by Adif

The judicial expert Juan Carlos Carballeira, a civil engineer who testifies in the trial for the Alvia train accident, explains "the length" of the driver's conversation due to the "incorrect" and "absurd" question that the controller posed to him.

That "length", according to this "plausible" hypothesis according to the expert himself, was the one that threw him off balance and for which he began to brake late, so that he took the Angrois curve with an excess of speed that caused the derailment.

Juan Carlos Carballeira has warned in his appearance that the controller was asking him if the train would fit on the tracks and not on the platform, which caused a "security problem", since the engineer could then think that, "if It doesn't fit, you have to pass the signal in red".

All this referred to the Pontedeume station (A Coruña), located almost an hour and a half from where the accident occurred -on the A Grandeira curve, upon arrival in Santiago-, as the prosecutor reminded him during his interrogation. .

In any case, Carballeira has specified that this is his reflection, since he considers that this could "influence the concern" of the driver.

Along with the driver, the former Adif security director is being prosecuted, whose representation in the trial, which is exercised by the state attorney, maintains that the duration of that call, of just under two minutes (about 100 seconds), was unthinkable.

In the opinion of this expert, "everything worked fine" that day, but he explains the duration of the call between the driver and the auditor through the corporate phone because, in addition, it is "a three-way conversation."

"If there is a word that defines it - this accident - it is difficult to understand: nobody understands this accident," he stated, to then refer to the fact that he studied the conversation that, according to the driver himself, caused his loss. of situational awareness.

According to this expert, "it is a three-way conversation", since what is recorded is only the sound of the cabin, and what is happening in the carriages is not heard.

His theory is that "an absurd question led to a safety problem," when questioned by the controller about whether the train "fit on the tracks."

The third in the conversation, according to Carballeira, was the traveler who was interested in arriving at Pontedeume, because "he knows that many times he does not fit on the platform of the detour."

"What relationship does this have with...?", the judge interrupted him.

"It can influence the concern you may have," this expert has responded.

"I try to explain the length of the conversation," he added.

In this sense, he later remarked that "the call has a complexity", although he has recognized that the driver is not the one who "decides", but the control center does.

What happened was that the driver "did not hang up the phone" on the controller, he has verified.

"One thinks things at the moment. Seen coldly, it is nonsense," he added.

However, he has stressed that "a conversation that had to do with security", according to his hypothesis, "totally distracted him".

"Because he was worried, I think, my interpretation, about whether he has to pass the signal in red if he does not fit in the station ... he has to pass the station in red the traffic light", he has abounded.

This is, as he stressed, "a very plausible hypothesis."

At this point, the judge has intervened again to clarify to the prosecutor, surprised by these explanations, that the expert's theory is that for this reason the driver "had to consult papers."

"I was very doubtful," added the expert.

"A Black Swan"

In the interrogation of the representative of the Public Ministry, which lasted just over an hour, Carballeira argued that the experts "thought they were doing great" and that they had "everything controlled with technology and regulations", together with the training of the drivers .

However, "they had a security gap that could not be covered," as evidenced.

This case, as she has indicated, "is called a black swan in catastrophes: the experts do not detect it, because it had never happened before; it had not happened before and there are no statistics of something that has not happened."

Thus, "you could intuit it but not know it."

Along these lines, he has argued that "when the regulations fail, it is when you criticize them."

As for the 'Asfa' control system, the only one operating once the 'ERTMS' was withdrawn from the section of the curve with a modification of the project, it has considered that "it is quite internal, but not that much", some "73 times lower , according to experts.

Asked if he believes that a second safety barrier was necessary to cover the risk of the curve being taken at excessive speed, he said that the driver "has protection", due to the time book, "the tools, he knows all the via... he is warned; he knows everything".

Thus, he has assessed that "it seems implausible" what happened and has criticized that there were "many errors" that he had.

"If I were one, I would understand", she has added.

The disconnection of the 'ERTMS' system on board the train ensures that it was "motivated".

Regarding regulatory issues, he has acknowledged an error in his expert opinion.

"If the Adif experts are wrong, how much more an expert like me", he has come to emphasize.

In this regard, it has now maintained that regulation 352 of 2009 was not applicable. Thus, it understands that a risk assessment report from an independent entity was not necessary, but "only the decalogue".

For this reason, he believes that "what they did there does not make much sense" (Adif), since "either the ISA (the independent report) is missing or the hazard log is too much."

This contrasts with the theory of the former head of safety at the European Railway Agency, Christopher Carr, who warned in court that risk analysis had to be done as far back as the 2004 safety directive, and that the 2009 regulation only sought to harmonize procedures.

At another point, Carballeira has reflected that "at that time it was considered that it was safer than signaling", due to the indications in the time book and maximum speed table and in relation to the beacons that were placed after the tragedy.

"The curve is not a danger," he stated then.

"There are no curve accidents. I only know of three, one on the general network. The rest are due to speed," she said.

At this point, the prosecutor has intervened to emphasize an idea: that "the driver exceeds the speed cannot be considered something incredible" since "this risk is in the security dossier", he has had an impact.

Given this, the expert has responded that "three failures cannot be had" and that he sees that "incredible."

Another controversial issue pointed out by this expert to the prosecutor's questions is that this line "that day was conventional, it was not high speed" since "it is a long distance train" and "it has Asfa digital, which is very good but it is control discontinuous".

The judge asks him not to ramble

The appearance this Thursday, unlike that of the first judicial expert, has lasted for several hours, which has meant that the judge called attention to both the lawyers of the different parties and the expert himself.

"Do not make ramblings or scientific debates. Your role is to advise me to see who is responsible for this accident," he snapped.

The industrial engineer said on Wednesday that it would have been "appropriate" for there to be a second level of protection and the statement from the telecommunications engineer is scheduled for next Tuesday, who in his report asserts that with 'ERTMS' the derailment would not have occurred.

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  • Santiago de Compostela

  • Train accident in Santiago