The upheavals of 2022 did not come as a surprise as is often claimed, especially in Germany.

Basically, the past year was the culmination of a handful of global political developments that had been apparent for a long time: a shift in economic and military power from the old West to new powerhouses, especially in Asia, an increase in authoritarian rule, especially in the former Eastern Bloc and in Africa, a Identity crisis of liberal democracies in Europe and the United States and first tendencies towards deglobalization.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was not the logical consequence of these trends.

Nothing about Putin's unscrupulous war was compelling.

But it is a symptom of the new conditions: the West is losing influence, others are filling the vacuum in their favor.

As is well known, this happens not only in Eastern Europe, but also in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

Russia and China have moved into many geopolitical positions that America, tired of the global anti-terrorist struggle, has given up.

End of the war not foreseeable

In principle, this will not change in the new year.

That there is a way back to life as it was before the Ukraine war is just as unhistorical as the hope that one day things could go back to what they were “before Trump” or “before the pandemic”.

There is no end in sight to the war, and the constant Russian bombardment has not yet weakened Ukraine's will to fight.

Western observers do not expect the Russian troops to collapse in the near future, nor do they expect them to be victorious.

Comparable conflicts have often dragged on for years.

However, the material issue could become even more important in the coming months than it has been so far.

It is often overlooked that Western sanctions against Russia are only now beginning to take full effect.

The EU's oil embargo, which came into effect in December, and the G7's new oil price cap hit the Russian state's most important source of income to date.

Putin even shut off the flow of gas to Europe himself.

It will be important whether he can compensate for the losses with sales to China and India.

In both countries, one should think carefully about the political costs incurred in relation to the West.

Unrest in Iran, elections in Turkey

Ukraine, on the other hand, can continue to count on Western support.

Zelenskyy's recent visit to Washington, however, earned him no more than a single Patriot battery.

Biden continues to hold back other modern weapons systems that are on Ukrainians' long list of wishes, much like what is happening in Europe.

Walking the tightrope between military support for Ukraine and not going to war will remain more difficult in 2023 than many participants in the discussion in Germany want to admit.

The re-found unity of the West, which was one of the outstanding features of the past year, should by and large hold up for the time being.

In the USA there will be no elections until 2024, in the EU regular elections will only be held in medium-sized and smaller countries, including Poland, Spain and Greece.

The governments in Washington, Berlin, Paris, Rome and London should therefore stay the course.

If you add Japan to that, then Putin cannot have high hopes of friction between the most influential powers in the West.

The situation is different in the illiberal camp, which has seemed to be on the rise in recent years.

Some of its major protagonists faltered violently in 2022: Russia due to the costly war, China due to its long adherence to the zero-Covid strategy, Iran due to unrest.

And in Turkey, an election is coming up in June that Erdogan is far from winning.

The thesis that authoritarian regimes are more efficient, which is also surprisingly widespread in the West, is difficult to maintain at the moment.

The fact that Beijing abruptly and with strong political motivation changed from draconian containment to uncontrolled contagion in its corona policy shows that life in democracies is not only freer, but often better.

And otherwise?

In 2023, Germans will continue to argue about gender, about climate protection or migration.

You will have (legitimate) concerns about inflation, energy supply or crime.

If one could exchange views on all of this with less abuse, alarmism, dogmatism, exaggeration and untruths, then it would be possible to document that enlightened societies are also discursively superior to their authoritarian challengers.