CAIRO -

“Weapons are manufactured locally.” For nearly 7 decades, this dream haunted the imagination of the Egyptians, especially in light of the attempts at industrial expansion that took place during the Nasserite era.

And with the fluctuations in Egyptian-American relations and Washington's use of weapons as a pressure card against Cairo, and amid internal demands to own weapons locally as one of the most important demands for the independence of the national decision;

The Egyptians have renewed hopes about owning weapons locally, but they often collide with the reality of economic crises that may make a solution out of reach at present.

In this context, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi's speech regarding the development of military industrialization and the localization of advanced technology in this sector renewed questions about the extent to which his country possesses the necessary capabilities and capabilities that make it distinguished in military industries, and is it sufficient for it this time to overcome the obstacles and challenges it faced during the past decades?

During his meeting with Lieutenant General Ahmed Khaled Tawfiq, Commander of the Strategic Command and Supervisor of Military Industrialization, and Colonel Ahmed Adel Mujahid of the Strategic Command, Al-Sisi directed efforts to continue efforts to support the military and defense industrial development sector at the national level, and to transfer and localize advanced technology in this framework, in a way that helps achieve exploitation. It is optimal for the capabilities and accumulated expertise that Egypt possesses, according to a statement by the Egyptian presidency last week.

In addition to huge and sophisticated armament deals from various sources, Cairo has taken steps in recent years to revive the national military industry through joint production initiatives, although - according to observers - it has not yet lived up to the hoped-for aspirations.

It may seem that these deals were a major reason, among other reasons, in contributing to the Egyptian army remaining in an advanced position among the most powerful armies in the world, as it is the 12th in the world out of a list of 142, and the strongest in the Arab world and in the Middle East, according to the latest update of the military capabilities classifications. Unofficial 2022 "Global Fire Power" website.

In addition to the major role of the Ministry of Defense in the official military economy, two official entities are concerned with military industries, whose activity also extends to civilian goods and services.

  • The first:

    The National Authority for Military Production (established in 1984), affiliated with the Ministry of Military Production, which was established in 1954, and its companies achieved revenues in the fiscal year 2021/2022 estimated at 26 billion pounds, compared to about 20 billion in the previous year.

  • The second:

    It is the Arab Organization for Industrialization and was established in 1975 with cooperation between Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to build a joint military defense manufacturing base, before it was fully owned by Egypt in the nineties, and it was not possible to know the total annual revenues of its economically active companies.

70 years of lofty hopes

  • The Egyptian defense industry is the oldest and largest in the Arab world, yet most of its outputs are for-profit consumer goods and services, according to observers.

  • Since the fifties of the last century, internal, regional and international factors have affected the performance of the Egyptian defense industry, which has witnessed zigzag growth curves.

  • In the fifties and sixties, Soviet support for the regime of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser contributed to the rapid growth of the Egyptian military industry.

  • The military industrial sector was negatively affected between 1967 and 1973, the period that witnessed the Arab-Israeli wars.

  • The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Institutes (1979), sponsored by the United States, contributed to the expansion of local armament technology, with Western support.

  • The beginning of the eighties represented the first full Egyptian reliance on US military funding to rebuild the Egyptian army.

  • The period of the rule of former President Hosni Mubarak was characterized by the deterioration of military industrialization, as the activity of military factories that were not closed turned to the manufacture of civilian products for local consumption.

  • Beginning in 2014, the unreliable American position on the part of Cairo (particularly Congress) due to the overthrow of former President Mohamed Morsi in the summer of 2013, among other reasons, accelerated the shift of the Egyptian helm to alternative military arsenals, without ending the strategic military partnership with Washington.

  • Military factories did not move towards serious industrialization, and continued to expand in the production of consumer goods and services, as well as increasing the pace of their control over business sectors and companies, according to observers.

  • Between 2015 and 2019, Egypt's arms purchases swelled, becoming the third largest importer of weapons in the world, and the second largest in the Middle East and Africa after Saudi Arabia.

  • At the end of 2021, Cairo hosted the Defense and Military Industries Exhibition (EDEX), the Egyptian pavilion representing 15% of its total exhibits.

  • The wing provided more than one weapon that kept pace with modern technology, such as a homemade drone, a mine-detection robot, and a variety of ammunition and launchers, but this lineup did not live up to the quality of advanced armament such as planes, tanks, and missiles.

Hurricane plan

  • In February 2020, the late Minister of Military Production, Muhammad al-Assar, announced a 3-year plan to promote the local manufacture of weapons, to increase the capabilities of the army and achieve self-sufficiency, in addition to the main goal of Egypt becoming an exporter of weapons to its African neighbors.

  • The plan aimed to invest 7.3 billion pounds to meet the needs of the armed forces during the period from 2020 to 2030, and direct the surplus for export in the period from 2025 to 2030.

  • The plan included deepening local manufacturing, increasing the role of technical research, establishing cooperation with international companies, completing the development and rehabilitation of production lines, developing lines for the production of explosives, and ammunition of all types and components.

  • As well as the launch of an integrated medium-range air defense system, the production of an Egyptian tank, and the design and manufacture of an armored combat vehicle protection system and 3D radars.

  • Due to the secrecy surrounding military industrialization - other than armament deals - it was not possible to know what this ambitious plan had reached on the ground.

The most prominent military industries

According to official and press statements and reports, the most prominent Egyptian military industries (complete components / joint manufacturing) are:

  • The 300 Military Factory at the Abu Zaabal Industries Company specializes in ammunition for small and medium weapons and missiles, and although the factory entered into force in 2005, its production began in 2020.

  • The "NUT" aircraft, the first Egyptian drone, is used for tactical reconnaissance and information gathering, and is equipped with an optical / television camera, but press reports previously questioned whether it was entirely domestic.

  • Egypt succeeded in manufacturing a drone named "June 30", which is a reconnaissance aircraft and carries out limited combat missions, with a speed of up to 218 kilometers per hour, and it can stay in the air for 60-70 hours.

  • The main battle tank "Abrams" (M1A1) in cooperation with the American defense company General Dynamics.

  • Rescue tank (m88 A2) Hercules, in cooperation with the American company United Defense.

  • Two combat and troop transport vehicles, a giant transport trailer for transporting tanks and heavy weapons, and a field cannon.

  • Rocket armament systems, mortars and cannons.

  • Small weapons include rifles, machine guns, and launchers.

  • Ammunition, explosives and mines.

  • Disinfection vehicles, protective gear and protective masks.

  • At the level of naval armament, the field of joint military manufacturing resulted in the manufacture of 3 frigates, coastal traffic ships, and dozens of marine vessels.

  • Last week, the Arab Organization for Industrialization signed a cooperation agreement with the Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) to localize the technology for manufacturing advanced training and ground support aircraft, in order to meet the needs of the Egyptian Armed Forces and export to third countries.

Challenges and opportunities

According to a previous report by the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (based in Washington) and the latest update of Global Fire Power (2022), the most prominent challenges and opportunities available to Egypt in the field of military industrialization are;

Represented in:

  • Egypt is a country with a large military workforce, with an estimated total of 1,230,000 military personnel out of a total population of over 100 million.

  • Little civilian oversight of military projects.

  • The defense budget is estimated at over $4 billion.

  • Egypt is not among the 45 largest defense budgets in the world, as it occupies 47th place out of 142 countries, despite major armament deals in recent years.

  • Poor management, problems with workforce training, and poor marketing led to massive amounts of inefficiency that continually impeded attempts to launch self-sustaining industries.

  • For example, at EDEX 2021 in the Egyptian pavilion, 3 separate and competing lines of armored vehicles were on display, some of the products being outdated despite just being introduced.

  • The biggest challenge is that attempts to build reliable military production capabilities are based on unrealistic assessments of the political leadership rather than sober assessments of feasibility and need.

  • Relying on a variety of sources for armaments in recent years, it does not build close strategic relationships to nationalize sensitive foreign technologies or bypass the regulations of multilateral arms treaties.

  • In diversifying sources of armament, national industries are being undermined.

  • Lacking the financial strength to force technology transfers like Egypt's Gulf neighbors.

  • The long-term strategy should be to nationalize the subcomponent and retrofit legacy weapon systems, meet lower-cost requirements, and attract buyers from export markets with similar requirements across Africa, Asia, and Latin America.