A document published for the first time confirms the British government's rejection of the Iranian interpretation of the colors of the Salisbury map dedicated to the Shah of Iran in 1888

In the last episode, “Item First,” it became clear to us how the international judiciary does not pay attention to the ancient claims of historical right, as long as the chain of this right has been interrupted by the control of other powers over the territory in which it is claimed that there are historical rights.

This means that it is impossible for the two parties to the conflict (Iran and the UAE) to rely on this bond, given that it was cut off by the control of many colonial countries, not only over the three islands, but over the entire Gulf region.

However, an echo of an Emirati right based on the idea of ​​historical consolidation appears clear in the overall functions of the state that it exercised on the islands (legislative, judicial, administrative, and political), which we will discuss as follows:

Second: Historical support for the right

A careful reading of the decisions and rulings issued in a number of border and regional disputes will lead us to an important conclusion that the idea of ​​historical support for the right is clearly evident in the foundations of Emirati sovereignty over the three islands.

This is because the historical facts indicate the existence of an Arab historical consolidation, which grew gradually over long periods of time, which resulted in the establishment of Emirati sovereignty over the three islands.

In the correspondence that exchanged between the Qawasim sheikhs on both sides of the Arabian Gulf, as well as the various British documents, what confirms the strength of the bonds that linked these islands to the Arab western coast of the Gulf, and the greatness of their economic importance to both Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, not to mention the close social and political ties that were A list of the inhabitants of the islands, their families and their authorities in the two emirates. 

Evidence of actual use and possession of the UAE, including the establishment and management of government facilities on these islands, their use as pastures, centers for fishermen and harbors for their ships, as well as licensing companies and individuals to exploit their natural resources, as well as raising flags and appointing government representatives;

All of these sovereign actions were carried out in a gradual manner, in a continuous and continuous manner for long and varied periods, without any objection from other governments.

What entitles it to a document of right that has been strengthened and consolidated over a long period of time, nearly 250 years.

Third: Geographical neighborhood

In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of ​​1982, the determination of the coastal state's sovereignty over its territorial sea gives it the right of sovereignty over the islands located in it, considering the neighborhood as evidence of sovereignty.

This means that this neighborhood is considered - a fortiori - evidence of the coastal state's sovereignty over the islands located in its internal waters, regardless of whether or not it exercises its territorial jurisdiction over these islands, or whether there is a continuous human presence on its land, or It was uninhabited.

However, previous rulings should not be taken into account.

For the state’s sovereignty over the islands located within its territorial sea or internal waters, it is required that another country not be able to submit a higher or first claim, with the existence of an approved legal right deed confirming the islands’ subordination to its sovereignty.

In the British-French dispute over the Minquiers & Ecrehos Islands, the International Court of Justice ruled, in its decision issued in 1953, that Britain had sovereignty over these islands, despite their proximity to the French coast to a distance of less than 12 nautical miles, as it was proven that Britain exercised the manifestations of its actual sovereignty. regular over a long period of time.

In the Yemeni-Eritrean dispute over the Zuqar Hanish Islands, the arbitral tribunal ruled in its ruling issued in 1998 that Eritrea did not need to ask it to issue a decision establishing its sovereignty over the Haycocks Islands located within its territorial sea, because it considers them to be Eritrean islands, but not because of their proximity. From the African coast, or because some of them are located within the territorial waters of Eritrea, but rather because Yemen failed to present a more likely deed of right proving the subordination of these islands to its sovereignty.

As for the legal value of the idea of ​​neighborhood or geographical proximity outside the scope of the territorial sea and the internal waters of states, it can be deduced from the rulings of the international judiciary that dealt with this idea in a number of regional disputes.

In the case of Palmas Island in 1928, the United States of America claimed its right to sovereignty over the island due to its geographical proximity to the Philippine island of Mindanao - which was then subject to American sovereignty - at a distance of only 48 nautical miles, while it is far from Nanusa Island, which belonged to the Netherlands. up to 51 nautical miles.

Which means - in America's opinion - that it is located within the geographical scope of the Philippine archipelago, and thus the assumption that it is subject to American sovereignty through its colonies in the Philippines.

However, Judge Max Huber, who handled the arbitration alone in this dispute, rejected the American push to establish sovereignty over this island, saying: “Although the United States has indicated several circumstances indicating that the island has strong relations with its coasts (in the colony of the Philippines) ) Because of its geographical position, it is not possible to find a rule in international law that decides that the islands located outside the territorial waters are related to the state simply because its territory represents an interconnected land of Terra Firma ».

The previous judgments can also be reinforced by the realities of the existing regional situations in a number of regions of the world.

For example, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) located in the Atlantic Ocean are subject to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, which is approximately 12,865 km away from it, while it is only 643 km from the coast of Argentina.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that international law, although it affirms the sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea for a distance of 12 nautical miles, as it represents a part of its territory that is covered by water and thus its sovereignty over the islands located in it, but what can be deduced from these provisions also is that it does not Reliance on neighborhood, whether the islands in question are located in the territorial sea or even in the internal waters of the coastal state, and that is if another country was able to drop the presumption of this neighborhood with legal evidence and substantiating its regular exercise of state functions on the disputed islands.

As it was clear from the aforementioned rulings, that proximity or proximity - whether it is within the scope of the territorial sea or outside it - does not amount to establishing an independent right to acquire or prove sovereignty over the disputed islands. If the evidence in their possession is equal, in addition to being a presumption to prove the opposite.

Based on the above, although the two islands of Tunb are located in a marine area close to the territorial waters of Iran, they are located outside its internal waters, as well as its territorial sea defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of ​​1982 with 12 nautical miles, which is confirmed by the facts. Geographical data, as well as Iranian references, indicate that the closest Iranian land area to the two islands is Qeshm Island, located 17 miles from Greater Tunb Island, while Lesser Tunb Island is located seven miles west of Greater Tunb.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Iran’s claims based on the principle of neighborhood or geographical proximity are difficult to invoke, as long as it remains unable to produce evidence and arguments comparable in legal value to the arguments and deeds presented by the UAE that enabled it to refute the presumption of neighborhood and prove its sovereignty over the two islands.

It is also impossible - as a general principle - to accept the idea of ​​neighborhood or geographical proximity as a tool for deciding issues related to regional sovereignty, due to the risks that arise from its application, in the event that some countries take it as a vehicle to achieve their expansionist ambitions, or claim that there are security justifications that legitimize the occupation.

This is not evidenced by Iran's strategic and security justifications to justify its occupation of the three UAE islands.

The map presented by the British Ministry of War to the Shah of Iran in 1888, in which the three islands appeared in the color of the Persian coast.

A British document published for the first time dating back to 1928 denies the official status of Lord Curzon's map and India survey map, which showed the three islands in the color of the Persian coast.

Third: the occupation under the pretext of strategic interests

Iran seeks to achieve military and strategic control over the Strait of Hormuz and the entire Arabian Gulf, and to form a security umbrella with the participation of the Gulf countries to confront America and its allies, whom it sees as an enemy trying to curb its ambitions to impose hegemony and political and economic superiority on the countries of the region.

This explains its adherence to the three islands, which have an important strategic and economic location, and its rejection of repeated calls by the UAE to find a political or legal solution to the dispute over them.

However, what should be stated here is that Iran was not an innovation of countries in adopting the idea of ​​strategic and security interests to justify regional expansion at the expense of the sovereign rights of other countries. 

For example, the strategic location enjoyed by the Syrian Golan, specifically the Hermon Mountains or the Sheikh Mountains, which have many peaks overlooking occupied Palestine, with a height of about 2814 meters, was a direct reason for Israel to occupy it, under the pretext that Its important location gives Syria the advantage of overlooking most of the lands of Palestine, and the consequent security and military risks that threaten the existence of the Israeli state.

The same applies to the Egyptian region of Taba, whose distinguished strategic location on the Gulf of Aqaba played a decisive role in Israel's desperation to keep it under its control, had it not been for Egypt's insistence on recovering it, and the Egyptian jurists of international law were able to refute Israel's allegations, and restore Egypt's full rights over that region before the commission. Arbitration formed by the two parties to settle the dispute. 

Fourth: The legal value of geographical maps

Technical accuracy, clarity and consistency of data are important factors by which the legal value of a map is determined.

This is because the availability of these advantages or not represents a starting point for the judge or the arbitrator to decide the extent to which they can be considered as proof of evidence in the dispute before him, or to neglect and disregard them from the first sight, or at best weaken their evidentiary value to the rank of precautionary evidence that cannot be relied upon. It is only in the absence of the original evidence.

There is no doubt that technical accuracy depends on the availability of several conditions, the most important of which are: the validity of the data contained in the map, the authenticity of the sources drawn from it, and the scale of the drawing with which it was prepared.

This means that the geographical maps, which showed the three islands in the color of the Persian coast, lacked objectivity, authenticity, and the power of proof, in many respects.

The same Iranian sources have proven that most of these maps were issued during the 18th and 19th centuries. However, it is known that most, if not all, of the maps issued in those periods of time are characterized by ambiguity and technical inaccuracy, especially since they were colored at a later stage. drawn.

This is what was referred to by the Zaqar-Haneish Islands Arbitration Tribunal between Yemen and Eritrea in 1998, when it ruled that “.

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It is impossible to explain the coloring of maps issued during periods of time when colors were fixed on maps in stages following their issuance.

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Also, what was included in the decision issued by the Court of Arbitration for the border dispute between Guatemala and Honduras in 1933, where it ruled that «.

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Maps, including official maps, although they must be taken into consideration when examining the facts in dispute, their value diminishes or may not exist, when the information shown on the map is inaccurate, in addition to the lack of clarity of its source.

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For our part, we see that the Iranian maps are riddled with the aforementioned defects.

It was not possible for any official or specialized body to ascertain its accuracy, the clarity of its data, the drawing scales with which it was prepared, and whether it included a reference to its source, or the signature of its editor.

These are important and necessary conditions for looking at the map as one of the proofs.

It is also impossible for Iran to resolve the issue of sovereignty over the three islands based on the geographical maps it possesses - no matter how many - in isolation from any other evidence that it may have, especially in light of the UAE's readiness to provide documented legal evidence and evidence proving its sovereignty over these islands for a long period of time. .

In the Palmas Island arbitration between the Netherlands and the United States of America in 1928, the latter presented nearly 1,000 maps issued at different times, all of which, with the exception of three of them, show the island’s subordination to American sovereignty. He decided that.

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If it is proven to the judge that there are legal elements related to the subject matter of the dispute that contradict the information and data of the map-makers whose sources of information are not known, then he cannot give any value or weight to these maps in evidence, regardless of their number.

And since the Iranian maps were issued during the 18th and 19th centuries, and their connection - in an organic or semi-organic way - was not proven to be with any treaty or agreement that took place between the two parties to the dispute over the three islands, whether it was between Iran and Britain - given that the latter was the protector of the Trucial States - or between Iran and between the emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, it is very difficult to classify these maps within the range of official maps attached to the deed establishing the borders, which means that they are devoid - assuming that all their technical conditions are met - of any legal value that would enable them to resolve the dispute on their own.

Iranian maps are maps selected from countries and institutions that have not been proven to be issued frequently and repeatedly for a long period of time, which is an important condition of granting the map authoritative evidence in international law.

Also, those maps - with the exception of the British Ministry of War map of 1888 - were not issued by a party that disputes with Iran sovereignty over a border or regional area, but were issued by foreign countries and institutions.

Even those maps issued by persons belonging in one way or another to the British side, after all, did not represent the parties to the conflict, and their actions were not an expression of the official view of the British government, including Lord Curzon's map of 1892, and the survey map of India of 1897, which were deposed Iran has an official capacity, despite Britain's denial that this capacity was proven in its official documents.

This is confirmed by what was included in one of the documents issued by the Ministry of India (British) on August 24, 1928, in which it was stated, “The Iranian claims to the Abu Musa Islands, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, based on Lord Curzon’s unofficial map of Persia in 1892, which colored the islands in the color of the Persian coast , In addition to the survey map of India in 1897, they cannot be relied upon, given the persistence of the British government in expressing its rejection of Persian claims in the islands before and after the aforementioned dates ».

And if Britain had denied its commitment to what was stated in these two maps, due to the lack of their official status, and their statements contradicted its firm position regarding the Arabism of the three islands;

The first is that their argument against the UAE is denied because they were not issued by its official bodies, and it was not possible to know the way their statements were based on, in addition to proving the weakness of the inferential value of the map that was not issued by the two parties to the conflict compared to the map issued by them, especially if it was intended to analyze their subsequent behavior And knowing their position regarding the border line that appeared on this map.

Also, the issuance of maps by some countries, institutions, and specialized geographical associations containing coloring the three islands in the color of the Persian coast, does not necessarily mean arranging sovereign rights for Iran in these islands, or establishing an argument against the UAE to push it to accept those rights.

Even if these maps were issued by a major international organization the size of the United Nations and not by small unofficial institutions, in countries not related to the conflict.

This was confirmed by the Zaqar-Haneish Islands Arbitration Court between Yemen and Eritrea in 1998, when it rejected Yemen's argument that there were maps issued by the United Nations that showed the disputed islands in the color of the Yemeni coast.

Where she ruled that ".

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It is well known in the rules and actions of the United Nations that its publication of a map of a region does not lead to confirming or establishing its recognition of the existence of sovereign rights over that region.

The foregoing rulings support what the International Court of Justice ruled in the Qatari-Bahraini dispute over the Hawar Islands in 2001, when it ruled in favor of Bahrain, and the maps that showed these islands in the color of the Qatari lands were not given any evidentiary value.

This confirms that the international judiciary does not deal with this type of map except within narrow limits and in the absence of other evidence drawn from the legal facts of the dispute.

As for the map presented by Sir Drummond Wolf, the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Tehran, to the Shah of Iran, Nasser al-Din al-Qajari, in 1888, on the instructions of Lord Salisbury, the sophic of the British Foreign Secretary at the time, its official nature must be recognized at the moment of its issuance. ;

However, the proper legal foundation for it confirms that it appears from the evidential point of view as weak as the previous ones from the Iranian maps.

This map is also characterized by ambiguity and lack of clarity.

It is not known specifically, the scale with which it was drawn, nor the strength of the cartographic or legal support on which it relied.

It is also considered one of the secret maps, because it was presented as a special dedication to the Shah of Iran, which means that it lacks the qualities of fame and frequency, which are necessary for the maps to be adopted as backup or authentic evidence, before international courts.

As for the political aspect, the British government affirmed, before and after issuing this map, its recognition of the rights of Arab sovereignty over the disputed islands, and its rejection of the Iranian interpretation of the colors contained in it, stressing that it did not intend by issuing it to recognize the sovereign rights of this or that party, just as It was not issued for the purpose of fixing the borders of the (Trucial) Emirates with the Faroe Islands, which was proven by one of the minutes of the British Foreign Office dated September 4, 1934, which included a comment on this map stating, “3- Its legal value as an argument is denied by Her Majesty’s Government to object to the allegations Persian and firmly and officially before and after the date on which this map was presented to the Shah.

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The British Foreign Office had issued a statement about this map in 1928, stating, “The Persian authenticity does not prove anything, and it certainly does not prove that His Majesty’s Government recognized the Persian ownership of the islands at that time. On the contrary, the Commission Only finally, by reminding the Persian government of the rights of Arab sheikhs.

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As for the international judiciary, the Chamber of the International Court of Justice decided in its ruling issued in 1986 regarding the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, that «.

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Maps, in matters of delimitation, constitute information only, and never, in and of themselves, are title deeds to the land, as they are merely external evidence that can be used along with other evidence to prove the real facts.

Likewise, what was included in the decision of the International Court of Justice in its ruling issued in 1998, on the issue of land and sea borders between Cameroon and Nigeria, in which it was stated that “the maps constitute only superficial evidence, the possibility of relying on them varies greatly, and they can be used with other evidence of the deductive type to prove or re-present Real facts.

We conclude from the foregoing that there are no hopes for Iran in the evidence of geographical maps, which, although they have some evidentiary importance for their use in any future legal argument, but - as a general principle - do not carry a high evidentiary value that lowers them to the rank of supporting the right capable of playing a prominent role in resolving the dispute. , due to its negligible legal value compared to the most likely evidence presented by the UAE. 

Fifth: Legal history and functions of the state

Among the foundations on which the UAE built its sovereignty over the three islands is its possession of a set of documents confirming the existence of a legal history for these islands that proves its dependence on Arab sovereignty, in addition to the evidence it possesses indicating that it exercises the functions of the state over them.

It presented - among its other evidence - a number of documents indicating the existence of a legal history of the islands confirming Arab sovereignty over them, represented by British records and notes, as well as the correspondences that were exchanged between the Qawasim sheikhs on the Persian and Arab coasts of the Gulf.

However, the question raised by this guide is: To what extent can this type of document be invoked to establish a legal right in the disputed territories from the point of view of international law?

The international judiciary has settled on giving the treaties great importance, as they represent an original evidence to establish legal rights in the borders or territories over which states dispute sovereignty.

However, the absence of such treaties does not necessarily mean resorting to some of the rules and principles adopted in international law to settle border or regional disputes. Rather, it is necessary to refer to documents from which what can be derived to support and establish the existence of legal rights for any of the parties to the conflict. 

This was confirmed by the Arbitration Court in the case of the Zuqar Islands - Hanish 1998 between Yemen and Eritrea, when it ruled that «.

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What strengthened the court's confidence in the decision in favor of Yemen in the group of Zuqar-Haneish islands, is the evidence it provided proving that the islands are under the jurisdiction of the Arabian Coast.

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Based on the foregoing, it seems to us that the judge or arbitrator who will hear the dispute over the three islands will find in the outcome of the documents submitted by the UAE, including their clear declarations, frank confessions, and precise identification of the disputed islands, what could constitute a tool for paving the way In front of its efforts to prove its legal right to these islands. 

Evidence of the exercise of state functions

Legal documents and historical facts confirm the UAE's exercise of state functions and manifestations of sovereignty over the three islands in a permanent, stable and public manner, represented by legislative, judicial and administrative jurisdiction.

These actions carry very important legal connotations, especially as they were carried out in light of the relative remoteness of the islands from their main territory, in addition to the harshness of their nature, the scarcity of their resources, the limited number of their population, and their small area.

Therefore, the government presence of the UAE on the three islands was not an emergency, or was imposed by temporary economic or political conditions, but rather was an exercise of its legal rights in these islands from the first moment of extending its sovereignty over them centuries ago.

This was not achieved by Iran, with the exception of the historical allegations that were refuted in the past, and we refer to it in order to prevent repetition.

Legal settlement of the Emirati-Iranian conflict

Google Earth 

The most important feature that distinguishes the book “The Legal Settlement of the UAE-Iranian Conflict” over the Three Islands, which is originally a master’s thesis that the League of Arab States adopted for publishing it in a book, in a precedent that is the first of its kind, is its scientific level, in addition to touching on an important dimension of Arab relations. Iranian border disputes.

In fact, the issue of the Iranian occupation of the three Emirati islands, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, is considered an obstacle to the development of Gulf-Iranian relations in particular, and Arab-Iranian relations in general.

As Iran's policy towards the Gulf region aims at regional expansion outside the borders of the state.

This is the reality of the situation since the days of the Shah's rule until now, although the methods and tools varied. 

Therefore, raising questions related to the strategic importance of the three islands, their legal status before and after the establishment of the Union State, the grounds that the Emirati and Iranian sides relied on to establish their right to the three islands, and the opinion of the international judiciary on those grounds, has become an indispensable issue in the search for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. between the two sides.

The book is located in 469 pages of large pieces, and includes five chapters, the first of which deals with the historical and political situation of the islands before the establishment of the Emirates, and discusses the role that the Qawasim played in their struggle with the British and Persians, in addition to the economic and strategic importance of the islands.

While the second chapter discusses the legal status of the islands after the establishment of the state, and deals with the position of international law on the memorandum of understanding on the division of Abu Musa Island, the implications of the occupation of the three islands and the importance of settling the dispute by legal means.

As for the third chapter, it deals with the grounds for the sovereignty of the UAE and Iran over the three islands, and explains in detail the grounds for Emirati sovereignty and the Arab historical right in the Gulf and its islands, and the pillars of this right.

It also discusses the legal right to the islands and the exercise of state functions on them.

It comes to the foundations of Iranian sovereignty, and the claims of the Persian historical right in the Gulf and its islands.

In the fourth chapter, the writer deals with the evidence of the two parties to the conflict in the balance of international justice.

As for the fifth and final chapter, it deals in detail with the dispute over the islands in the light of the legal principles governing the settlement of border and regional disputes, with citing examples of disputes that were legally resolved, such as the dispute over Taba between Egypt and Israel, and Hanish Island between Yemen and Eritrea.

In view of the importance of this book, we decided to offer it a presentation in five episodes, in addition to a special episode for the documents that are presented for the first time, not with the aim of establishing an established right, but rather a generalization of the benefit.  

 "7-5"

Abdul Latif Al-Sayyadi

He works as a lecturer at the Dubai Police Academy.

He holds a master's degree in public international law, and a postgraduate diploma in public international law.

He holds a Bachelor's degree in Sharia and Law.