In view of the large number of refugees coming to Germany, there is sometimes talk of a new “2015”.

Can you compare the situations then and now?

Tobias Schrors

political editor.

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A meaningful comparison includes more than the bare figures.

We have to look at how exactly the refugee accesses took place then and now, how orderly or disorderly, predictable or unpredictable they are.

Then we have to consider how long people can or must stay with us, i.e. whether they receive temporary or permanent protection status and how quickly this happens.

Finally, we have to ask what legal, administrative and social tasks and consequences the various refugee approaches require, i.e. how politics, administration and society should react to them.

What do the bare numbers say compared to 2015?

When looking at the numbers, it is important to clarify what one is referring to: the Central Register of Foreigners (AZR) registers around one million Ukrainians.

However, it is not clear from the AZR whether there is return or onward migration.

When it comes to people who have received protected status, we're at just over half a million.

If we count who has applied for subsistence benefits in the job centers, then we are currently at around 604,000 recipients.

If we compare the number of asylum seekers with 2015/16, it is significantly less: 181,600 applications from January to October 2022. In the years 2015 and 2016 we had almost 1,200,000 - i.e. about 476,000 asylum applications in 2015 and around 722,000 applications 2016

Is it true that massive numbers of refugees are once again coming via the Balkan route?

There is certainly an increase in the numbers compared to the previous year, partly as a result of the corona backlog and due to onward migration from countries of first reception, where economic and political conditions have become more difficult.

But there are probably not nearly as many people as in 2015/16.

The data we have from the movements via the Balkan route are from Frontex, the EU agency for border and coast security.

And Frontex only counts irregular border crossings.

Many of the people who fail to cross the border try again and again – maybe a second, third or even a seventh time.

In other words, we do not know how many people actually crossed the border irregularly.

We don't have any reliable figures on this.

What was different for the refugees in 2015 than for the Ukrainian refugees today?

The people who came to us from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea and other countries of origin in 2015/16 had been on the run for a very long time. Due to the lack of legal access routes, they came via irregular, disorderly and dangerous routes.

It's different with the Ukrainian refugees.

You travel visa-free and via shorter routes.

You will be granted protected status from the outset;

in principle, this gives them direct access to subsistence benefits and the labor market.

What was the problem in 2015?

In 2015, you couldn't cope with the speed of access because there were several major challenges at once.

There was a backlog at the BAMF: there were not enough staff and processes were not efficient enough.

The municipalities then had to master the huge task of accommodation, which is how the gymnasium effects came about.

Have the municipalities learned from this?

Together with the many volunteers – we mustn't forget them – the municipalities now have much better know-how: they know more precisely where to tackle things and how scarce resources are to be used.

But they haven't had the corresponding reception capacities permanently since 2015/16.

The municipalities were also under great pressure from the pandemic, had to take on tasks in the health sector and scale back integration services.

That is why counseling centers have backlogs.

They also suffer from massive personnel problems.

Will the Ukrainian refugees stay?

We don't know how long the Ukrainians will stay here.

Other people seeking protection are also unable to return to their countries of origin due to war and destruction.

For them, the first priority is integration, access to housing, health services, language courses, day-care centers, schools and the job market.

The challenges here have been great for a long time.

How can the municipalities be helped?

There is no structure with which the integration work on site can be guaranteed in the long term.

We can't always say: "Now we have a new crisis, let's start all over again." Then the municipalities have to beg the federal and state governments for money again.

We need a structure with which this important integration work on site can be reliably guaranteed in the long term.

For a municipality, integration tasks are predominantly a voluntary service and not a compulsory municipal task.

Municipalities therefore have to repeatedly justify their spending on integration tasks.

I think we should consider whether integration shouldn't be made a municipal duty, like youth work.

Is it to be feared that large numbers of refugees will again have to be accommodated in gymnasiums?

With the Ukrainians, we initially had the advantage that many found private accommodation.

That's almost two thirds.

But you can't expect them to stay with other families forever.

Many are now coming out of private accommodation and need public accommodation.

And, of course, the local authorities are also concerned that many more refugees might arrive if the war continues and there are widespread power and heating failures in Ukraine in winter.