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North Korea's missile launch drill, which was conducted from the 25th of last month to the 9th of this month, under the leadership of General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Jong-un, was a comprehensive strike training against South Korea using tactical nuclear weapons.

North Korea publicly stated that it was a strike drill aimed at striking South Korean airfields, military command facilities, and ports, and mobilized all new short-range ballistic missiles, including the North Korean version of the Iskander, Atakims, and super-large multiple rocket launchers.

These are solid fuels that can be launched in a short time and are evaluated as having the ability to carry tactical nuclear warheads.



North Korea said yesterday that it also test-fired a long-range strategic cruise missile deployed to its tactical nuclear operations unit.

It is said that cruise missiles are also equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, which seems to mean that all missiles that North Korea has are equipped with nuclear weapons. 



They are showing off that they can strike South Korea with various types of nuclear missiles anytime, anywhere, but as North Korea's nuclear threat becomes so explicit, the discussion of 'tactical nuclear redeployment' is resurfacing in South Korea.

It is argued that nuclear weapons should be deployed in South Korea in order to cope with North Korea's increased nuclear threat.


U.S. Forces Korea's tactical nuclear withdrawal in 1991


The withdrawal of tactical nukes from USFK in 1991 was not because of North Korea, but because of the US' global nuclear weapons management.



After a failed coup d'état by communist hardliners in the Soviet Union in August 1991, the Soviet Union began to collapse rapidly.

Eventually, on September 27, 1991, President Bush announced that he would withdraw all U.S. land and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons deployed around the world, and in this context, he also decided to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea.

In response to the US President Bush's measures, Soviet President Gorbachev responded on October 5, 1991, that he would dismantle all short-range tactical nuclear warheads.



On November 8, 1991, President Roh Tae-woo's declaration of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was announced in this context.

And more than a month later, on December 18, President Roh officially declared the absence of nuclear weapons in Korea, saying, 'There is no single nuclear weapon anywhere in our country at this time.'

On December 31 of the same year, a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was also reached between the two Koreas.


Why 'tactical nuclear redeployment' is on the rise

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It is a stark reality in terms of security that we have no choice but to respond with 'nuclear' to 'nuclear'.

Considering the formidable destructive power of nuclear weapons, it is impossible to cope with other conventional weapons.

The nuclear-to-nuclear 'balance of terror' is thus an unavoidable way to deter an opponent, not to attack them.



In response to North Korea's nuclear development, South Korea has responded with extended deterrence from the United States.

Although South Korea's conventional weapons cannot cope with North Korea's nuclear weapons, it has achieved a 'balance of fear' of nuclear versus nuclear through the 'South Korea-US versus North Korea' structure under the protection of US nuclear weapons.



However, as North Korea's nuclear capabilities developed to the point where it could attack the US mainland, anxiety about the US extended deterrence began to grow.

If North Korea attacks South Korea and threatens to send nuclear weapons to the US mainland if the US intervenes, will the US help South Korea at the risk of being attacked on the mainland?

In other words, the question arose whether the US would sacrifice Washington or San Francisco to protect Seoul.



The logic behind the argument for the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea is generally as follows.



The 'nuclear-to-nuclear' balance between the two Koreas must be balanced by relocating tactical nuclear weapons.

In addition, it is necessary to use tactical nuclear weapons as a negotiating asset for North Korea's denuclearization by proposing to North Korea to negotiate nuclear disarmament along with talks between the ROK and the US, and to stop deploying tactical nuclear weapons if North Korea denuclearizes.

In addition, the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons will play the role of a 'nuclear turnaround line' that strongly supports the US nuclear umbrella promise.

If North Korea attacks the tactical nuclear units of the USFK with nuclear weapons, the US will have no choice but to launch nuclear retaliation, leaving no room for questioning whether Washington will sacrifice Washington to protect Seoul.


Possibility of tactical nuclear redeployment is low at present

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However, for now, it seems unlikely that tactical nuclear weapons will be redeployed in South Korea.



First, the United States, which holds the key to the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, is negative.

The U.S. is of the position that its current extended deterrence promises are sufficient to defend South Korea.



Even if it is not a violation of the NPT if USFK units are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, it is burdensome for the US to newly deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula from the standpoint of the United States, which is preventing nuclear proliferation worldwide.

If tactical nuclear weapons are redeployed to USFK, budgets and manpower must be allocated for the safe management of nuclear weapons, which is also a burden for the United States.



In fact, US nuclear weapons are in South Korea, but in Guam, but in Hawaii, but on the US mainland, but there is not much difference in their ability to strike North Korea.

This is because even an ICBM equipped with a nuclear warhead from the US mainland can strike Pyongyang within tens of minutes.

From a military point of view, the US would judge that it would be more effective to strike North Korea by using strategic nuclear bombers, ICBMs, or SLBMs from submarines rather than deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea, which is exposed to North Korea.



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Deploying tactical nuclear weapons and using them as negotiating assets for North Korea's denuclearization is only possible when North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear weapons.

North Korea's Kim Jong-un regime will not give up its nuclear weapons because it sees nuclear weapons as the last bulwark to defend the regime.

Even if North Korea embarks on nuclear disarmament negotiations, it is highly likely that the negotiation will not only target tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, but will demand a denuclearization zone such as preventing US strategic nuclear assets from entering Northeast Asia at all.



The argument that USFK's tactical nuclear units should be used as a 'nuclear turnaround line' is worth considering.

This is because there is an aspect of linking the US nuclear retaliation so that there is no need to question whether Washington will be sacrificed to protect Seoul.

However, if there are signs that North Korea will launch a nuclear attack on South Korea, it means that tensions on the Korean Peninsula are at their highest.

If North Korea attacks South Korea with a tactical nuclear weapon, it is highly likely that an SLBM equipped with a nuclear warhead will fly to Pyongyang from a US submarine near the Korean Peninsula before launching a counterattack on the US mainland.



Taken as a whole, it is questionable whether tactical nuclear redeployment is an effective way to counter North Korean nuclear weapons.


Concerns about huge social costs in promoting the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons

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Nevertheless, if tactical nuclear redeployment can be pursued without significant political and social costs, tactical nuclear redeployment can be considered as an option in the face of increasing North Korean nuclear threat.

However, the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is likely to entail enormous political and social costs to our society.



If the tactical nuclear redeployment becomes a reality, civil society, led by progressives, will face strong opposition to the nuclear redeployment, which denies the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is another source of ideological confrontation between progressives and conservatives, and is highly likely to cause severe internal divisions in our society.

It is skeptical that our society will pay a huge social cost for the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, whose military effect is also unclear.