In his speech on the morning of the attack on Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin justified his actions with the experience of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

According to him, the situation for Russia at the beginning of this year was just as dangerous as it was 81 years ago, when the National Socialists were preparing their war of annihilation against the Soviet Union.

The timely "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine was necessary to prevent a repeat of the horrors endured by the people of the Soviet Union at the time, he claimed.

Since then, Russian propaganda has been shrill in describing the war in Ukraine as a struggle for Russia's survival.

In a strange contrast to this, the war is played down as a "special military operation" and kept away from the everyday life of the population.

If Russia's very existence were really at stake, the government would have to throw everything at its disposal into action.

Any setback at the front should put the whole country on high alert and necessitate even greater efforts.

But it is not like that.

After the collapse of the Russian front in the Kharkiv region, Putin and the army leadership acted as if nothing special had happened.

Moscow celebrated its city birthday with dancing and fireworks.

Had Russia defeated Ukraine in the spring as quickly as Putin apparently expected, this duality in dealing with the war would have remained irrelevant.

But the longer the war lasts and the more it becomes clear that Russia's current efforts are not enough to win it, the more this becomes a contradiction that is difficult to resolve.

If there are further defeats, it will be a crucial test for Putin's regime.

The moment will come when Russia's president will have to decide what is more dangerous for his rule: military failures or mobilization and full conversion to a war economy.

Mobilization would be the more dangerous choice

Both would touch the foundations of his rule.

One of them was the promise to the population that they would be guaranteed modest prosperity and stability again after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The subordination of all social and economic goals to war would be the final breach of this promise, which is already in question in view of the economic stagnation that has been going on for years.

Another bedrock of Putin's rule is imperial nationalism, centered on the idea that Russia must be a great power respected and feared around the world.

For years, Putin has announced that he has made Russia strong again.

After a lost war it would be over.

Mobilization is probably a much more dangerous choice for Putin.

Even a regime as repressive as Russia's can only terminate the unwritten social contract with a large majority of the population at great risk.

In addition, the benefit of a broad mobilization would be questionable: it takes time and ties up resources that are scarce in Russia's armed forces anyway.

A defeat like that in the Kharkiv region does not shake Putin's position.

But the fierce reactions among militant supporters of the war show that his authority among those still loyal supporters, many of whom are in the military and security forces, is threatened by further military setbacks.

In long-range Telegram channels, they accused the military leadership of incompetence bordering on treason and questioned where mobilization and the use of tactical nuclear weapons went.

It is not very likely that Putin will agree to this.

With a nuclear strike, he would alienate his remaining international partners, above all China.

But as Ukraine liberates more areas, there will come a point when the Kremlin can no longer hide military failures.

Then it becomes really dangerous for Putin, because then he seems weak.

Both the hawks, who want tougher action, and those in the elite who see the whole war as pointless but are afraid to remain silent could then turn against it.

And if some start to act, the others are also under pressure to act.

In the long run, Putin's prospects are bleak.

The question is how long that period will last - and how many more people will be killed before then.