Karabakh.. Basic elements for understanding the historical conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan

At the airport in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, the policewoman asks me, as she turns the passport pages carefully and focused: Have you ever visited Turkey?

I answered: Yes, so you ask: Why?

I replied: Because I am a journalist.

She makes calls, whose contents I do not know, but it is clear that they are communications with her officials, she holds the passport and disappears for some time before she returns and allows me to enter.

It seems understandable, as the burdens of the past cast a shadow over the present and may threaten the future, especially that 250 kilometers from the capital Yerevan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a fierce war is raging in which Turkey is a major player alongside Azerbaijan.

Many did not hear the name of Karabakh until a month and a half ago, when the worst battles in the region in 30 years erupted, so perhaps it is important to start the story from the beginning.

Geography and history..a booby-trapped area

The Karabakh region is located on a rugged, mountainous area, with an area of ​​no more than 4,800 square kilometers, inhabited by less than 150,000 people of the Armenian nationality, at a rate of 95%.

To understand the conflict that erupted a month and a half ago, a quick historical reading that takes us back 100 years is necessary.

In 1921, under the Bolshevik rule under which the South Caucasus region was subject, Stalin, who was not at that time a leader of the Soviet Union, annexed the Karabakh region to Azerbaijan, within the framework of a political division that literally implemented the policy of "divide and rule", by annexing a region with an Armenian majority Azerbaijan and the annexation of an Azerbaijani enclave in Armenia.

The matter remained unchanged until the Soviet Union slackened, and its grip on the region receded, and national and ethnic tendencies returned to express themselves by force of arms, sometimes.

Thus, in 1988, the Legislative Council of Nagorno-Karabakh passed a decision to join Armenia, even though the region, according to international law, is an integral part of Azerbaijan.

With the declaration of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of most of the Caucasus republics, the region, with Armenian support, declared its secession from Azerbaijan, triggering a war that lasted until 1994, leaving 30,000 people dead. Armenia eventually took control of the region and occupied about 20% of the surrounding Azerbaijani lands.

The war ended with a Russian mediation of a ceasefire agreement, and the Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States, was established with the aim of searching for a radical solution to the conflict, but the group was able to do nothing but maintain a relatively stalemate and ensure the continuation of the ceasefire. Regarding sovereignty over the region, it has remained postponed and cannot be resolved despite attempts to launch dialogues in different periods, the last of which was in 2017.

This stalemate seemed comfortable for Armenia and for the Karabakh region, which declared itself an independent republic, which the Armenians call the "Republic of Artsakh", which has its flag and imposes a visa on non-Armenians to enter it, even though it does not enjoy any international recognition, including the Armenian one.

This was not the case for Azerbaijan, which found itself suffering the bitterness of a humiliating defeat in its first battle, which ended in 1994, and lost 20% of its soil, along with Karabakh, which had a hostile "independent state" in its midst, contrary to the resolutions of international legitimacy.

Therefore, the skirmishes did not stop. In 2016, the conflict returned again, but this time the war lasted only 4 days, leaving hundreds of dead, after which the two sides announced a new ceasefire agreement, and the file returned to its old stalemate before it erupted again on September 27 2020.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that military operations in Karabakh will continue until the entire region is restored (European)

Demography versus geography

If we turn a blind eye to the story of the "republic", which appears to be a mere claim that is not supported by reality or international recognition, the region represents in the international scene a special case in regional conflicts that we can call "demography against geography", because the land belongs to Azerbaijan, according to international recognition, but the majority The overwhelming majority of the population is currently Armenians.

Therefore, in its war, Azerbaijan is pushing the logic of geography based on international resolutions that consider the region and the eight towns that Armenia seized 30 years ago in the first war to be an integral part of the Azerbaijani territory, and this is what makes Azerbaijan not find legal embarrassment in declaring war As long as international resolutions are finally implemented, the mediators of the Minsk Group, which was entrusted with this task, failed to implement them.

Therefore, the Azerbaijani president and other officials repeat that Baku has waited 30 years to regain its land through negotiations, and nothing has been achieved, and it is not ready to wait for another 3 decades.

On the other hand, Armenia pays the demographic card, as the population of the region is currently in the overwhelming majority (95%) of the nationalist Armenians, so Armenia defends what it calls the right of the people of Karabakh or Artsakh to self-determination, and warns that Azerbaijan’s control of the region means the extermination of the Armenians there demanding international protection for them.

Azerbaijan responds that these demographic data are not natural and are artificial, and refer to the displacements that occurred during the previous war of Azeri nationalism, whose owners were forced to leave Nagorno-Karabakh after the war ended for what they wanted.

But regardless of the numbers related to displacement and displacement, which are confirmed facts, it is clear that the Armenians have always represented a majority in the Karabakh region, and perhaps for this very reason, it was annexed 100 years ago to Azerbaijan in the context of the Soviet Union’s policy aimed at improvising the region to ensure its control.

Turkish media previously mentioned the participation of Bayraktar aircraft in previous clashes between the Azerbaijani and Armenian armies (Anatolia).

Military data on the ground

Between the war of 1990 and the war of 2020, the geostrategic and military realities seem to have changed.

There are new players who entered the field with full force (Turkey), and there are others who retreated or chose the bench (Iran), while others preferred the role of the biased referee who touches the ball from time to time in favor of his favorite team (Russia).

Almost a month and a half after the outbreak of the war, no party was able to resolve it completely, but the data on the ground indicate the progress of the Azeri forces, benefiting from Turkish military support, especially in the use of drones, as they approached Shusha, the second largest city in the region.

In the event of controlling the city, it will later be easier to control the entire region due to the presence of confusion on a height overlooking the entire region, especially the capital Stepanakert, meaning that controlling the city necessarily means the fall of the capital and then the rest of the towns, respectively.

But this progress is not enough to resolve the war because Azerbaijan is facing a demographic and ethnic factor that is not in its favor. Even if it controls the land, it will never be able to control the people. Therefore, Armenia says that Azerbaijan bombs the populated areas with the aim of expelling the population to facilitate the control of the land.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (left) offered mediation to resolve the dispute between Baku and Yerevan (Anatolia)

Geostrategic calculations.. Armenian frustration

The South Caucasus represents a buffer zone between 3 important geostrategic powers (Turkey in the West, Russia in the North, and Iran in the South), and each of these powers has its own ethnic, economic and political calculations that determine its alliances and conflicts.

The most obvious of these positions is the Turkish position, where Ankara announced its support for Azerbaijan militarily, politically and diplomatically. This was expected given the Turkish-Azerbaijani cultural, ethnic and historical proximity, and also because of the Turkish-Armenian historical conflict that extends to the time of the Ottoman Empire accused of perpetrating massacres against the Armenians In 1915, Turkey entered this war with an open face, which constituted a major turning point in the battle and in Azerbaijan's position.

On the other hand, Armenia was left to its war without receiving from its friends sufficient support capable of stopping the advance of the Azerbaijani army.

Armenia is bound by a mutual friendship and defense agreement with Russia, a friendly relationship with Iran, and historical proximity with Western countries, especially with France, but no one has come to its aid in an open or sufficient way to change the course of the war.

And if we start with the strongest, largest and closest ally to Yerevan, we find that Moscow did not interfere militarily despite the mutual defense agreement signed between the two countries because it has other accounts mainly related to arranging relations with Turkey in Syria and Libya, as well as the S-400 missile deal signed with Turkey. Ankara.

Therefore, even when the military situation worsened and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan asked to activate this agreement and friendship agreement in an official letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the response from Russia was disappointing: “We will intervene if the Armenian lands are targeted,” meaning that Russia will not interfere to prevent Azerbaijan’s control On the Karabakh region, and it seemed like a message addressed to Azerbaijan and Turkey that you go ahead with what you are in, and we will not be exposed to it.

Therefore, Armenia keeps repeating that its territory is under attack by the Azerbaijani army, but this does not seem enough to convince the Russians - who know precisely the geography of the conflict - to intervene.

As for France, although it is considered a Western ally of Armenia due to the objective meeting with Turkey (the French National Assembly recognized the Armenian genocide, not to mention the presence of 600,000 to 700,000 Armenians living in France who constitute a strong pressure group), it refused the declared political alignment with Armenia. Not to mention the military, so as not to lose the "legitimacy" of its presence as a mediator within the Minsk Group, as justified by French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian before a group of deputies enthusiastic in support of Armenia in the National Assembly in Paris.

As for the United States, which was immersed in arranging its elections when the war began, and is now preoccupied with managing the aftermath of the elections and their results, it does not seem interested at this stage in resolving the crisis at its current level, because limited tension in the region between Turkey and Russia is not a bad thing for Washington as long as it does not It affects gas supplies and does not threaten the geostrategic stability of the South Caucasus, which is still, after all, Russia's backyard.

But the most complex situation is the Iranian one. Tehran, despite its historical proximity to Armenia, found itself in this exact war in a difficult situation that prevents any support or assistance.. 

On the one hand, Iran is not in its best economic and military conditions due to the succession of repeated crises with the many fronts it has been involved in during the last decade, in addition to the economic blockade that has a clear impact on the country's economy and people's lives.

On the other hand, the cost of direct intervention and victory for Armenia will be very great, and it is better politically to retreat and be satisfied with searching for a role of mediation and calm, and leave the battle to be waged by those who do not have the same calculations as Iran.

In order to understand the complexity of the Iranian position, a careful reading of the demographic and strategic data is necessary. Iran embraces within its population an ethnic Azeri of approximately 15 million people (some are talking about 20 million, and others indicate the presence of 12 million), so any Iranian intervention in favor of Armenia will not be accepted. Azeri Iran, and it may turn into a real internal crisis.

On the other hand, Iran does not see a direct interest in supporting Azerbaijan because Baku's decisive victory in this battle with Turkish support will enhance Turkish influence in the South Caucasus and feed Ankara's international extension from Libya to Syria to the Caucasus, and this expansion is not a pleasure for Iran given that Turkey's positions do not It always converges with Iranian positions.

In addition, the economic repercussions that the Turkish-Azerbaijani rapprochement may have, especially in the field of energy, cannot be ignored. Turkey has made large investments in Azerbaijan, which may affect the energy supplies that Turkey obtains from Iran and even from Russia.

There is fear in Iran of the rise of Azeri nationalism among Iranian Azeris (there is a faint call in Azerbaijan for some groups to establish a great Azeri homeland), and Azerbaijan’s decisive victory means an extension of the borders that unite Iran and Azerbaijan by more than 100 kilometers, which may contribute to fueling Azeri separatist tendencies. From this side or that, bearing in mind that the war in its current conditions does not seem to threaten Iranian interests.

Therefore, the solution for Iran was to play the role of mediator, benefiting from its good relations with the two parties, and this is what it is doing, as its foreign minister visited the two capitals, Baku and Yerevan.

Tehran says that it has a plan to resolve the crisis, its details have not yet been announced, but it is trying to play a limited role in alleviating the burden of the demands of its Azeri population, who are pressing for intervention without being fully involved in a war for which it is not ready.

Thus, Armenia found itself in a war without real support, as it had expected. Therefore, it continues to stress its readiness to return to the ceasefire agreements signed on October 10, 17 and 25, whenever Azerbaijan accepts and when what it calls mechanisms for international verification of respect for the truce are available.

Azerbaijan, for its part, sees what is happening as an exceptional opportunity because - unlike Armenia's allies who are content with statements calling for calm and monitoring the situation (to intervene, perhaps if the situation deteriorates further or their interests are directly affected) - it has an declared ally engaged in support with weapons, experience, and perhaps direct participation, which is Turkey.

Azerbaijan sees what is happening as a historic opportunity to regain its lands and avenge the humiliating defeat it suffered in 1994.

Netanyahu (left) secretly visited Azerbaijan in 1997 when he was prime minister in his first term (Al-Jazeera - Archive)

Is it a religious war?

Religious discourse in this war is often invoked on one side or the other.

During my stay in the Karabakh region during the battles, I saw Armenian volunteers drawing crosses on their weapons and on their uniforms.

But a careful reading of the geostrategic data related to this war makes it simplistic to say that it is a religious war between two countries, one Muslim and the other Christian. In fact, it seems that invoking the religious factor, even if it is present among some, is just an attempt to stoke the enthusiasm of the fighters and the population alike.

Muslim Azerbaijan enjoys great support from Israel, and Christian Armenia has good relations with Muslim Iran.

Israel was one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan after its independence in 1991, and then put it at the heart of its strategic relations in the region because of its proximity to Iran, which guarantees the former a base for spying and besieging Iran when needed, according to document leaks in WikiLeaks.

The manifestations of the depth of this relationship through commercial exchanges, as Israel obtains an important part of its oil and gas from Azerbaijan, while it provides Baku with weapons, agricultural technology and others.

As for Iran, which has been coexisting with this situation for decades, it finds it difficult to stand against Azerbaijan for the reasons previously detailed, and this is what makes the issue of religious conflict just a factor among other factors, if not just a hanger on which the conflicting parties’ accounts are hung.

In conclusion, whoever wins militarily will certainly impose his conditions, but the control of the land is not enough alone without international recognition (available to Azerbaijan) and without the acceptance of the population living on this land (and here is the problem).

Regardless of the military solution, it seems necessary to open the door to a serious negotiation in which the two parties (each according to the size of what was taken) concede to a real end to the conflict, otherwise the battle could continue for another 100 years without calming down the region.

In the end, and far from the political and military calculations, it seems clear that the ones who suffer the most from the fires of war and pay the price for it from this side or that are those who did not start it.